This article is dedicated to an analysis of the current situation in the Arab world within the framework of Neomodernism theory and to the detection of the religious component of the socio-political process. According to Neomodernism theory, contemporary human society is at the point of transferring from the postmodern stage to a new one. This stage is characterized by the combination of three elements: the need for a new positive message, the archaic content of this message, and the use of postmodern tools to construct it. The religious factor plays a special and very important role in the socio-political process, which can be discovered by means of secular and post-secular ideas. After making some general observations the author tries to apply them to Middle Eastern reality and Arab-Muslim culture. As a result he outlines the principal traits of "Islamic secularism" and reveals the common post-secular trends of Middle Eastern and Western society. At the end of the article the author analyzes links between Neomodernism and post-secularism at the regional and global levels.

Keywords: secularism, post-secularism, postmodern, modern, archaic, neomodern, islam, Middle East, Arab Awakening.

The article was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant "Problems and Prospects of International political transformation of the Middle East in the context of regional and global threats", project 17-18-01614.

Kuznetsov V. Postsecular age of neomodern. Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom [State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad]. 2017. N 3. pp. 85-111.

Kuznetsov, Vasily (2017) "The Post-Secular Age of the Neomodern in the Middle East", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkou' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(3): 85-111.

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In 2001, shortly after the tragedy of 9/11, Jurgen Habermas put forward a thesis about the transition of Western society to a post-secular state.1 The concept of post-secularism has since gained some popularity. Sensing a certain "tectonic shift" that has taken place in the religious life of society, researchers feel the need for a new word2, even if its specific content remains not yet fully defined.

Trying to describe at least approximately the general contours of post-secularism, the authors repeatedly mention the role of the Islamic factor in its emergence. If the reflections of Yu. If the events of September also caused Habermas, but they did not directly concern Islam, then A. Kyrlezhev already directly calls "global Islam" (a rather controversial term) a catalyst for post-secularism3, and D. Uzlaner, quoting the same A. Kyrlezhev, notes:

"Religion" does not return, "religion", on the contrary, disappears, if by it we mean what has been accepted since the beginning of Modern times. The most striking example of this transformation is demonstrated by modern Islam, which categorically does not recognize the borders established in Modern times. 4
By mentioning Islam, all three researchers deduce the problem of post-secularism from a narrow Western context. If relative to Yu. While it is possible to assume that this is just a kind of version of "challenge and response", in which Islam is prepared only for the role of an external impulse that triggers some processes inside the Western world, this cannot be said about the other two authors mentioned. Both of them

1. Habermas Yu. Vera i znanie [Faith and Knowledge]. The Future of Human Nature, Moscow: Vse Mir Publ., 2002, pp. 60-66.

2. Along with post-secularism, there is talk of the deprivation of religion (X. Casanova), desecularization, religious revival. The term "post-secularism" seems to me preferable for the same reasons as D. Uzlaner. See Uzlaner D. Cartography of the post-secular / / Otechestvennye zapiski. 2013. N1(52). [http://www.strana-oz.ru/2013/1/kartografiya-postsekulyarnogo#_ftn2, доступ от 10.06.2017].

3. Kyrlezhev A. Secularism and post-secularism in Russia and the world. 2013. N1(52). [http://www.strana-oz.ra/2013/1/sekulyarizm-ipostsekulyarizm-v-rossii-i-v-mire, доступ от 04.07.2017].

4. Uzlaner D. Postsecondary mapping.

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they talk about the processes within Islam, however, without going into details.

Despite the methodological weakness of this approach, 5 the mention of Islam raises much more important questions.

First, is the phenomenon of post-secularism universal, or does it apply only to a local Western reality (including Russia and Latin America)?

Second: if this phenomenon is universal, then how does it manifest itself in the regions that have fallen out of the authors ' field of view, in particular in the Arab-Muslim world (since they are talking about Islam), and how does the specific Middle Eastern strain of post-secularism relate to the Western strain?

And finally, the third. If we agree with the generally accepted thesis that secularism was an attribute of the modern era, then, most likely, post-secularism should be an attribute of some other era. And if post-secularism is a universal phenomenon, then this new era is also universal and ubiquitous. How does the process of "post-secularization" relate to the fundamental socio-political process of transition of societies to a new state in the concrete realities, in this case, in the Middle East?

This article is devoted to the answer to these three questions.

However, we should start by defining some of the initial parameters of post-secularism and the aforementioned "new era", since its very proclamation seems possible even without any connection with the study of religious life.

Post-secularism

Without delving into the discussions of religious scholars about the essence of post-secularism, in the framework of this article it makes sense to limit ourselves to listing a few of its most significant features.

1. The growth of religious diversity in previously more or less homogeneous confessional Christian societies with a kind of "standardization of supply", which implies a certain " theological mi-

5. The characteristics of post-secularism are derived from the experience of Western societies, and then attributed to Islam. It is not clear what specific societies are meant by "Islam".

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nimalism", which allows you to convert elements of one religion into another 6;

2. Religious bricolage, which means the dissemination of individual strategies for the profession of faith, combining elements of various religious practices 7;

3. The growing importance of religious identity in public life 8. Identity is understood as a sign of a priori belonging to a particular historical and cultural tradition, rather than as a worldview marker. As a result, such expressions as"half-Muslim "9," secular Muslim","Orthodox atheist" 10 acquire a completely understandable meaning in society;

4. The interpenetration of religious and political spheres of public life 11, the growth of the political influence of religious institutions that assume the function of carriers and interpreters of "traditional" values.

5. A new ideological situation in which the primacy of scientific knowledge over non-scientific is called into question in public discourse.

6. A vivid example of the growth of confessional diversity is provided by the countries of Latin America, where various branches of Protestantism are becoming increasingly widespread. A slightly different example is the expansion of the range of religious symbols perceived through popular culture, as mentioned by D. Hervier-Leger. As an example of "theological minimalism," the researcher cites charismatic Catholicism and evangelical Protestantism, "where' minimal credos 'are becoming increasingly common, which can be summed up as follows:' God loves you, Jesus will save you, and you can be healed.' A theological justification for such a "credo" is not required, and its practical effectiveness must be confirmed by experience by each individual believer." Hervier-Leger D. In search of definiteness: paradoxes of religiosity in societies of developed modernity / / State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad. 2015. N 1 (33). pp. 254-268. P. 261.

7. Ibid., p. 259.

8. "Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe", Pew Research Center. 10.05.2017, p. 7; Casanova, J. (2004) "Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration", Eurozine. 29.07.2004 [http://www.eurozine.com/religioneuropean-secular-identities-and-european-integration/, accessed on 05.07.2017].

9. See a vivid example of postsecularity: Timati's interview. Rain. 7.01.2017 [https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/sobchak_zhivem/timati_ksenii_sobchak_o_druzhbe_s_kadyrovym_ramz an_ahmatovich_vsegda_rjadom_chtoby_dat_mne_sovet_v_kakoj_to_slozhnoj_situatsii-380319/, доступ от 05.07.2017].

10. Kyrlezhev A. Secularism and post-secularism in Russia and the world.

11. This is an element of the X described above. Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World. University of Chicago Press.

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A new era

Defining the parameters of a new epoch is more complicated.

In this article, I will refer to it as the neo-modern era, which is replacing the postmodern period (the last third of the XX - beginning of the XXI century) of the Art Nouveau era.

In principle, the very change of milestones is recorded today by completely different authors, 13 who analyze the general system of international relations, its regional subsystems, the socio-political life of individual societies, and new cultural phenomena. The general content of the process is seen as follows.

The uncomfortableness of an extrahistorical existence described once by J. R. R. Tolkien. Baudrillardism, which forces us to look for some strongholds in a vague and ever-moving world, forces us to strive for a new, clear, serious message, expressed in large narratives. This gives grounds to speak about the revival of modernism, which, in fact, was built on such narratives. However, without really knowing what this message might be about, having long been disillusioned with the ideals of modernity and tired of the postmodern grin, a person turns to archaic (or pre-modern), filling his statement with its practices, symbols, and values. Without the postmodern game and irony 15

12. For more information about Neomodern, see: Kuznetsov V. A. Posle posmoderna: mideastochnoe izmerenie odnogo trenda [After Postmodernism: The Middle Eastern Dimension of one Trend]. 2017. N 3. pp. 25-37; Alekseenkova E. Revival of "domodedovo" / / Russian Council on International Affairs. 31.03.2016. [http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/vozrozhdenie-domoderna/, accessed from 03.07.2017]; Korshunov A. From postmodernism to Neo-modernism, or memories of the future // Russian International Affairs Council. 30.01.2017. [http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ot-postmodernizma-k-neomodernizmu-il i-vospominaniya-o-budushch/, accessed 03.07.2017]; Gibelev I. Neomodern, transactionism, space // Russian International Affairs Council, 2.05.2017. [http://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/igor-gibelev/33615/?sphrase_id=341383, доступ от 03.07.2017].

13. Rubtsov A.V. Posle postmoderna: reabilitatsiya filosofii [After Postmodernism: Rehabilitation of philosophy]. Alexander Pavlovich Ogurtsov / ed. by S. S. Neretin. Moscow: Golos Publ., 2016, pp. 360-431; Bykov D. Gentlemen, all over again. Manifesto of Dmitry Bykov / / Novaya Gazeta. N58. 2.06.2017 [https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/06/02/72664-gospoda-vse-snachala, доступ от 25.06.2017].

14. Baudrillard J. In the shadow of the millennium, or the suspension of the year 2000. 1998 / / Digital Library of Philosophy, [http://filosof.historic.ru/books/item/foo/soo/z0000326 / accessed 10.02.2017] (Baudrillard, J. (1998) A l'ombre du Millenaire, ou le Suspens de l'AN 2000. Paris: Sens & Tonka).

15. Irony is understood in this case as a literary trope that allows you to make a statement that denies its own content. For the role of literary tropes in shaping the historical and political picture of the world, see: White

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the synthesis of modernist seriousness and archaic content is impossible, if only because archaism in the neo-modern world is not based on an archaic religious worldview, but is only one of the options for conscious choice. As a result, a neo-modernist utterance implies not a truly modernist belief in objective progress, but a social contract of striving for a future whose progressive character will be recognized as conventionally true.

In the Middle East, the transformation processes of the 2010s, which began with the events of the Arab Awakening, are seen as a concrete expression of the change of epochs. Both overthrown and retained political regimes can be characterized as mostly postmodern 16. They were characterized by: an instrumental attitude to ideology, eclecticism in building political architecture and justifying political strategies, triumphant consumerism that replaced any common values, ironic political discourse, etc. The political forces that succeeded them after 2011 almost always carried an Islamist agenda, although they did not always position themselves as Islamists (for example, in Libya).17.

It was the Islamists ' keen grasp of neo-modern trends that made them successful. Ennahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, Libya (in different political incarnations) , etc. - time after time we talked about the use of

H. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th-century Europe. Yekaterinburg: Ural State University Press, 2002; Kuznetsov V. A. Poetika politiki [Poetics of Politics]. Tunisian version, Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013.

16. Politically, they can be considered hybrid in most cases. However, according to the proposed logic, hybridity itself is only a concrete institutional manifestation of postmodernism.

17. As you know, Islamist parties in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Fajr Libiya) were forced to cede power in whole or in part two or three years after the revolutions. However, either they went into the shadows and retained their socio-political influence in order to return (Tunisia), or they were forced to hand over a significant part of their agenda to the "counter-revolutionaries" who overthrew them (Egypt). Finally, in those countries where the overthrow of the regime did not take place (Morocco, Jordan, Algeria) Islamists either managed to expand their presence in the government (Morocco), or the government itself, acting ahead of time, began to Islamize. See: Conflicts and wars of the XXI century. The Middle East and North Africa / ed. Naumkin V. V., Malysheva D. B. M., Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015.

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postmodern tools for the implementation of a large narrative based on an appeal to the archaic.

The struggle for democracy and human rights became an argument in favor of Sharia law, and the inclusiveness of the political system became a reason for refusing to prosecute jihadists. As a result, liberal-democratic rhetoric turned into a cover for the implementation of the project of Islamic statehood, which never really existed, but was attributed by the imagination of its apologists to the "golden age" of the Prophet Muhammad.

All this has led to accusations of "double discourse" by Islamists, according to which Islamists only talk about their commitment to democracy, secretly seeking to establish a dictatorship of religion.

If these accusations were true, then of course there would be no question of neomodernism - it would be limited to simple instrumentalization. However, it is impossible to prove their validity. It is the objective synthesis of archaic meanings, the modernist project and postmodern tools that indicate the neo-modern nature of the current processes.

DAESH 18, which has proposed a project of alternative statehood, can be considered as the embodiment of an extreme form of political neo-modernity in the region.

However, the described process affected not only the political life of individual States, but also the regional system of international relations as a whole. The struggle for leadership between regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc.) is determined by their desire to implement big narratives. The latter can be described both through the prism of geopolitical confrontation between national states, and through the prism of nostalgic great power, confessionalism, or (less often) ethnicity. This struggle itself is combined with the construction of narratives on an archaic value basis (protection of co-religionists, revival of the empire, etc.), the use of all the richness of postmodern tools in a fierce confrontation (informational and hybrid

18. Banned in the Russian Federation by decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. AKPI 14-1424 P of 29.12.2014.

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wars, instrumentalization of identities, etc.) serve as evidence of neo-modernity.

Universality of post-secularism or secularism and Islam

Since the emergence of post-secularism is a lively and relatively recent process that is difficult to describe comprehensively, it is impossible to make an unambiguous judgment about its universality based on some empirical data.

However, the secondary nature of post-secularism in relation to secularism makes it possible to assume that if secularism is a universal phenomenon, then post-secularism can also be such. Accordingly, it makes sense to look at the extent to which the concept of secularism applies to the Middle East.

There are three possible perspectives here.

The first one corresponds to the universalist (modernist) understanding of secularism as the next stage in the progressive development of mankind. According to it, the concept of a secular State was implemented in the region from the outside during the period of colonialism, 19 of which it remains a legacy to this day.

According to the second one, which assumes that secularism is a function of modernity, and modernity is an exclusively Western phenomenon, there has never been and could not be any secularism in the Arab-Muslim world. Accordingly, there is nothing to analyze here.

According to the third one, which is a compromise with the previous two, we should talk about the "multiplicity of modernity" 20, and, accordingly, about the diversity of secularisms. In this logic, the Arab world can be seen as an inherently secular world, where power has always been essentially separate from religion, and the Western idea of secularism has only allowed us to conceptualize the primordial foundations of power that were already inherent in the Arabs.

19. This, of course, does not mean that the colonial authorities are indifferent to the confessional factor. See: Sarabyev A.V. " The mandate power reserves only the right of leadership...": confessional management in solving colonial problems (Syria and Lebanon in the 1920s) // East. 2017. N5. (in print).

20. Zvyagelskaya I. D. Archaization in the Arab world: after and instead of revolutions / / Russia and the Muslim world. 2016. N2(284). pp. 138-153.

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If you follow the first of the proposed perspectives, then you need to take into account several specific circumstances.

First of all, the absence of the concept of secularism in the traditional Arabic lexicon (al-'almaniyya is a term that has been established quite recently and is still incomprehensible to the majority of the population of most countries) and only the conditional equivalence of the concepts of ad - din and "religion" made it impossible for the antithesis "secularism-religiosity"to appear.

The lack of a sacral institution of the Church in Sunni Islam, in turn, made it problematic to separate religion from the state.

Neither the French nor the American approaches to secularism were applicable in this case.

The French approach of forcing the Church out of public space was not technically feasible (there was no Church).

The American approach, which presupposes the coexistence of different religious groups in a common public space, was redundant. In the Middle East, the system of coexistence of different faiths has long existed in the form of the institute of Dhimmi in the Middle Ages and Millets in the Ottoman Empire.21 Built on a compromise, it has been effective enough for almost a thousand and a half years to ensure the ethno-confessional diversity of the region, which neither Europe nor America has ever known. And if it did not allow for the creation of a single public space (at least, its existence is controversial), it still guaranteed the relative stability and stability of the system of public relations. This deprived Middle Eastern societies of the motivation to adopt American-style secularism.

Finally, a significant role was played by the different understanding of religiosity in Europe and the Arab-Muslim world. The Western understanding of religion, including scientific and philosophical ones, stems primarily from the experience of Christianity, which is based on orthodoxy - the right faith, which makes possible the idea of privatizing religion. Islam, while remaining the religion of orthopraxia, focuses on the problem of non-inner faith of a person, considering

21. Dhimmi (protected) - a common name for "people of the Book" - Christians and Jews living in the territory of the Caliphate and subject to special jurisdiction. Millets-institutional design of confessional communities of Jews and Christians of various faiths in the Ottoman Empire.

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it is not subject to human judgment, but on questions of its external expression - at least, this is the dominant practice. Accordingly, secularism is synonymous with atheism.

It is precisely from the fundamental discrepancy between the Christian and Islamic understanding of religiosity that the main argument against secularism of the most anti - Western Islamic religious thinkers-from Abu al-Ala al-Maududi to members of the Islamic Fiqh Academy - arises: secularism is atheism22 and materialism. The latter assume the priority of material resources

22. This, of course, is a very harsh and, ultimately, dangerous statement, the possibility of which is determined, as it seems to me, solely by the lack of reflection of Islamic thought on the essence of atheism.

After all, non-belonging to a particular religion, as a rule, is not considered by this religion itself as equivalent to atheism at all - otherwise such concepts as hereticism, otherness, etc.or - in Islamic terminology "shirk" - would not make sense. The classical Arabic dictionary Lisan al - 'Arab defines atheism (zindiqa) as follows:" An atheist (zindiq) is one who speaks of the eternity of existence (al-ka'il bi-biqa 'ad-dahr)... He speaks of the duration of the existence of time (yakulu bi-dawam biqa' ad-dahr)... He does not believe in an otherworldly existence (la yu'minu bi-l-ahira) and the unity of creation "(Ibn Manzur. Lisan al - ' Arab. Vol. 4. al-Kahira. Dar al-hadith. [b. g.], p. 413). That is, atheism is defined much more narrowly than in the European tradition - there is no question of denying the divine as such or metaphysics as such (moreover, the concept of ad-dahr, used by the compiler of the dictionary in the sense of time, being, existence, in earlier texts is usually used in the sense of fate or fate, which gives grounds for and for other interpretations of the definition). According to this definition, the existence of an atheistic religion is also quite possible - not only, for example, Buddhism, which is sometimes defined as an "atheistic religion" in the European tradition, but also many different forms of theism.

It is quite obvious that such an understanding contradicts the above, primarily because it is based precisely on the logic of dogmas (in Islamic terminology - usul ad-din - the roots of faith), and not on religious practice. However, in the light of the latter (to which I referred above), if a person does not observe any religious duties, then only at first glance it is necessary to conclude that he does not believe in any god. However, there is no reason to say that his faith (theism) does not affirm the necessity of non-observance of religious duties. Thus, atheism includes not only the statement that God is nothing (the insufficiency of the statement about the non-existence or non-existence of God was shown by A. Kozhev in "Atheism", see Kozhev A. Atheism, Moscow: Praxis, 2007), but also the statement, for example, that he is nothing. It does not interfere with its own Creation (deism).

As a result, despite all the differences between the dogmatic and praxic understandings of atheism in both cases, in the Islamic interpretation, this concept should include not only atheism as such, but also numerous other forms of religious faith. Equating them with materialism, it seems, is not at all conditioned by anything.

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values, the endless pursuit of pleasure, and the ultimate victory of animal instincts over reason and spirit.

The path of secularism that Western society has taken turns out to be a dangerous dead end, leading not only to moral degradation, but also to the division of the world, which is fundamentally contrary to the central Islamic principle of tawhid (monotheism), which presupposes, as the ideologist of political Islam Sayyid Qutb noted, the understanding of the unity of the universe and correspondence of the natural laws of nature to the laws of man, 23 as well as the recognition of the inability of the human mind to harmonize the relationship between nature and man because of its original inability to comprehend the complexity of both natures to which it belongs. 24

Thus, the universalist understanding of secularism meets serious obstacles when trying to implement it in Arab-Muslim culture. Being a creative process of consciousness liberation in the West, it comes to the Middle East as a ready-made dogma or a set of meaningless rules that do not fit in with local reality and do not meet the conscious needs of societies. Perceived as an instrument of colonialism, it causes quite a natural sharply negative reaction on the part of the soil-minded part of the intellectual elite.

However, as mentioned above, a different interpretation of secularism is also possible, corresponding to the theory of the"plurality of modernity".

One of the proponents of this interpretation can be called the Egyptian philosopher M. Imara25. In his work "Islam and Religious Power" 26, he refuses to accept both the Islamic concept of al-hakimiyyah (sovereignty of Allah) and European laicism (French-style secularism). If in Laicism he does not accept its anti-religious character, then in relation to al-hakimiyyah he points out the danger of expropriating the power of the ab-

23. Qutb, S. (1968) Jalons sur la route de Vislame, p. 88. P.: L'imprimerie de Carthage.

24. Ferjani, M-Ch. (2012) Islamism, Laicite et Droits Humains, p. 296. Tunis, Amal Editions.

25. Other authors may include, on the one hand, moderate Islamists. Turabi, R. Ghannouchi (both have late works), on the other hand - such modernists as J. Ben Ashur or M. Arkun. It is clear that the political views of the representatives of these two camps differ enormously.

26. Imara M. Al-islam wa-s-sulta ad-diniya. Beirut: Al-mu'assasa al - ' Arabiya, 1980.

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a sovereign ruler who monopolizes the right to interpret sacred texts, which, by the way, would contradict the very logic of religion, which presupposes the possibility of endless updating of interpretations depending on the urgent needs of a person.27
Ultimately, Islam for M. Imara is initially secular in nature, since the divine power in it has never been given to people, and the establishment of secularism today would mean not the rejection of the Islamic tradition, but its restoration. Islam insists on the civil and human nature of political power, which should be based on consultations between people, choice, representativeness, and the responsibility of those in power to society. But all this must be done within the framework of certain norms and rules of a global nature set by religion.

The philosopher's views point to a certain angle from which to view the entire history of the region in the Islamic period.

Indeed, neither the Arab Caliphate nor the Ottoman Empire has ever been an Islamic State in the full sense of the word.

Until the tenth century, Islam did not have a codified Sunnah of the Prophet, legal norms and procedures were not worked out, the basis for making legal decisions was ijtihad - a free interpretation of the Holy Qur'an-and (from somewhere in the middle of the eighth century) hadith (traditions about the life and words of the Prophet), methods of verification of which, however, were not yet developed. quite defined. In fact, Islam then only set the very general value framework that M. Imara writes about. This is evidenced by the Umayyad religious hurling (recall the construction of the Dome of the Rock by 'Abd al-Malik, designed to symbolize the unity of Christianity and Islam28), and numerous other religious events.

27. In this regard, it is interesting to pay attention to some reflections of the modern Tatar jadidist Raphael Khakimov: Hakim R. Jadidism (reformed Islam). Kazan: Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2010.

28. The Umayyad Caliph ' Abd al-Malik went down in history as a major reformer who tried to create or strengthen the state institutions of a vast empire, taking as an example the Byzantine experience. Among other things, he built the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem, whose decoration mentioned the names of two prophets - Isa and Muhammad. This emphasized the sacred status of Jerusalem (as opposed to Mecca and Medina) and indicated the unity of Islam.

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discord among the early Abbasids, and disputes over caliphal authority in the early state.

In the tenth century, the religious and symbolic power of the caliph and the political power of Amir al-Umar (the chief military commander), and then (from the eleventh century) of the Sultan, were clearly separated.

The last attempts to unite religious and secular power seem to have been made by the Abbasids on the eve of the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in the thirteenth century, but after the fall of the illustrious capital and the relocation of the dynasty to Cairo, its real political status was completely negligible.

Finally, in the Ottoman Empire, the caliphal title of Sultan was never perceived as the main one. Even in the official titulature, he was mentioned only among all the others. 29

In general, such an analysis of the history of Arab-Muslim statehood is possible, in which it would acquire a completely secular character, although it is understood somewhat differently than in the modern European tradition.

This makes it possible to talk about specific Islamic secularism.

The history of the Arab countries of the twentieth century, in my opinion, only confirms this thesis and indicates rather the continuation of the tradition than a break with it after decolonization.

Just as the traditional Arab-Muslim statehood was not completely religious,so the secularism of postcolonial regimes should not be overestimated, even if they are constantly called secular.

Such heralds of secularism as the Syrian Christian Michel Aflak or the Algerian Farhat Abbas, 30 have consistently emphasized the importance of Islam:

Our concept is a global concept of national life. National life, in our opinion, includes everything. Religious faith is an organic part of it. Ideologies,

and Christianity, which was especially important in the context of the dominance of the Christian population.

29. See for example: Bartold V. V. Khalif i sultan // Bartold V. V. Works on the history of Islam and the Arab Caliphate. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 2002. pp. 17-78. The title of caliph began to be emphasized after the signing of the Kuchuk-Kainarji Peace Treaty in 1774.

30. Landa R. G. Farhat Abbas / / Voprosy istorii. 2004. N 9. pp. 58-82.

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Those who separate the religious faith from the national faith and from the national revolution present a fragmentary and superficial vision and are unable to set in motion the creative forces of our nation.31
Even today, Abdallah al - Ahmar, Deputy Secretary General of the Syrian Ba'ath party, which is naturally secular, notes: ... Arab Christians and Muslims consider Islam to be their common culture, ...the connection between Arabism and Islam ...not like the relationship of any religion to any nationality, but that "Arabism is the body for the spirit of Islam." 32
Even Habib Bourguiba, perhaps the most secular politician in recent Arab history, argued that the abolition of the Ramadan fast in 1964 was a "jihad for economic prosperity" for the homeland; and the adoption of the feminist Code of Civil Status was supported by a solid theological justification specially developed by a whole team of legal faqihs.

In general, throughout the history of the Arab-Muslim world, it has maintained a stable model of relations between religious and political power, perhaps resembling that formed in Russia under Peter I, when religious institutions were incorporated into the general system of state institutions.33
The basic formula of this model and Islamic secularism as such can be considered the well-known formula "Islam Huwa ad-din wa-d-daula" (Islam is a religion and a state), according to which the Islamic state is not religious.

However, in the Western world, the understanding of secularism goes beyond the political and legal relations between religion and the state. Secularism can also be understood as

31. Aflyak M. Al-ba'as wa-t-turas. Baghdad, Dar al-hurriyah, 1976, p. 22.

32. Al-Ahmar A. Religious issues through the prism of the ideology of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party // Religion and society in the East. Issue 1. Moscow, 2017, p. 244.

33. The same conclusion is reached, only in relation to the exclusively Ottoman Empire, by Pierre-Jean Luizard: Luizard, P.-J. (2008) Laicites autoritaires en terres d'islam, p. 15. P.: Fayard.

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the decline of religious practices, on the one hand, and as a special system of ideological choice, on the other 34.

Since the analysis of religious practices requires many years of sociological research, which, as far as I know, does not exist in nature, we can only talk about secularism in the most general terms.

It is quite obvious that the existence of Islam as a framework for social relations did not imply a mass rejection of Islamic ritualism. This can be confirmed by the adaptation of state legislation to the requirements of faith in all countries of the region, legislative regulation of a number of religious practices (charity tax), or direct reference to religious principles in the regulatory regulation of certain areas of public life. A clear confirmation of this is the continuing mobilising role of mosques throughout the XX and XXI centuries.35
At the same time, according to various estimates, about 10-25% of the population in different Arab countries can be considered non-religious, that is, they may identify with Islam, but they do not practice it at all 36. Whether this indicator is growing or, on the contrary, decreasing, it is impossible to say.

Finally, with regard to secularism as a system of ideological choice, the situation is twofold. Of course, there is no presumption of non-religiosity in any Arab society - few people would dare to say here that they do not belong to any religion. However, if we follow the logic of M. Imara and other mentioned authors, according to which worldly affairs in Islam are considered to be the most important.-

34. See: Taylor Ch. Sekulyarniy vek [The Secular Age], Moscow: BBI Publ., 2017.

35. The key role of Friday sermons in organizing any mass political actions in the region in the XX-XXI centuries is well known. Depoliticizing mosques was the main concern of both Mubarak and Ben Ali, and controlling them was the cherished goal of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda.

36. In addition, we can talk about atheists, the number of which is quite difficult to calculate. According to Dar al-ifta, Egypt's highest fatwa body , the number of atheists in the country in 2014 was 866. According to a 2012 WIN-Gallup International poll, 5% of the 500 respondents in Saudi Arabia identified themselves as atheists, which is the same as in the United States. In general, the number of people who doubt their religious affiliation in the Arab world is higher than in Southeast Asia or Latin America. See: Dalle, I. (2016)" Ces athees (presque) invisibles dans le monde " Orient XXI. 14.06.2016 [http://orientxxi.info/magazine/ces-athees-presque-invisibles-dans-le-monde-arabe, 1363, accessed on 17.07.2017]"Global Index of Religion and Atheism", WIN-Gallup International, 2012 [http://www.wingia.com/web/files/news/14/file/14.pdf, accessed on 17.07.2017].

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However, the situation is changing, since the reapers are exclusively in the realm of the human and have nothing to do with divine intervention. There is a possibility of choice within Islam itself, which for some can play the role of a regulator of all life, while for others it can only be a source of general ethical principles of rational behavior. Rationalism in this logic turns out to be both an essential element of Creation and an integral principle of Islam.

All of the above leads to the conclusion that there is a special autochthonous form of secularism in the Middle East, which can be designated as "Islamic secularism" - religious and non-religious spaces in it co-exist within Islam.

I would like to emphasize that this is not about "nedosecularism" or some kind of perversion of the ideal Western model, but about the product of our own Islamic culture, which was manifested under the influence of cultural interaction with the West.

The Middle East and post-secularism

So, having made sure of the universality of secularism and the possibility of its specific Islamic version (accordingly, in other regions, it is likely to find others), it is quite acceptable to assume that the situation with post-secularism is similar.

As a hypothesis, we can assume that if the Arab-Muslim version of secularism involves focusing on the problem of the relationship between power and religion and solves it by embedding secularism in Islamic discourse, then in the case of post-secularism, these two points should be observed. The central issue should remain political, and all options for its solution should be within Islam.

To identify the previously mentioned elements of post-secularism in the real life of Arab society, it makes sense to refer to a study of the value views of young people conducted by Tunisian sociologists Otlfa Lamlum and Mohammed Ali Bin Zina in the poor suburbs of the capital 37. This is red-

37. Les jeunes de Douar Hicher et D'Ettadhamen. Une enquete sociologique. Sous la direction de Olfa Lamloum et Mohamed Ali Ben Zina (2015), pp. 147-168. Tunis, Arabesques.

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This is a good example of a study of real religiosity in the Arab world.

For the vast majority of respondents (88.6%), religion plays an extremely important role in life, giving way only to work (88.8%), significantly outstripping family (62.7%), love (48.6%) or politics (10%). 53% of respondents regularly pray, more than a quarter visit a mosque for this purpose (26.2%), and 38.7% said that they also observe additional fasts (60.8% of girls and 23.6% of boys).

The degree of religiosity, according to surveys, is directly proportional to the level of education received. Thus, only 35.7% of illiterate young people regularly pray, while this figure reaches 62.6% among university students and graduates. The proportion of people who do not observe the fast reaches 23.1% among illiterate people and decreases to 3% among university graduates. The discrepancy between this situation and the image of the inverse relationship between education and religiosity, which is common in Russia and the West, can be explained by the specifics of society.

Since the surveys were conducted in the poorest districts of the capital, it can be assumed that the university graduates included in the sample either remain unemployed or cannot find a successful job. Given the enormous importance of working in the respondents ' worldview, in any case, we are talking about the most frustrated group of young people.

As for the non-religious nature of illiterates and the religious nature of students, this is quite a common situation - the illiterate part of society is more or less excluded from the text-centric world of religion.

Speaking about the forms of faith practice, a third of respondents noted that they consider visiting zawiyahs - the graves of Sufi saints-to be a Tunisian tradition, although many saw it only as a prejudice of the elderly. At the same time, about 40% called it bid'a - a sinful innovation. A significant part of young people relate to zawiyas without religious feelings, but with nostalgia, associating them with the historical memory of the country and private childhood memories. This is also the attitude towards Sufi holidays, which are often perceived as an opportunity for family communication.

Despite the fact that the mosque remains for the majority an authoritative source of religious knowledge and a space for religious socialization (61.9% of boys and 35.7% of girls), it is close to the mosque.

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With it, the Internet (about a third of respondents) and television (16% of boys and 20% of girls) became important sources of information.

In case of an unclear situation, young people insist on the need to refer to the Koran, less often-to tafsirs, Sunnah and fiqh. At the same time, among literate youth, there is confidence in their own right to interpret sacred texts and their ability to understand them, which is reinforced by a persistent distrust of official imams.

Respondents ' opinions on acute issues of social behavior (selling alcohol, wearing a hijab, polygamy, tender separation of public space) were very divided. Thus, polygamy is supported by less than a quarter of respondents (30.8% of Salafis and 10.8% of the rest), and only slightly more than a third condemn mixing of the sexes in public spaces.

If the question of whether wearing the hijab is a personal matter or a socially regulated norm causes a lively discussion, then the niqab is perceived sharply negatively by almost everyone - both for security reasons and because of non-compliance with Tunisian traditions.

A significant part of young people oppose Sharia law, especially the Islamic norms of criminal law, considering them difficult to implement and do not correspond to modern reality.

Of course, the above data cannot be automatically extrapolated not only to the entire region, but also to the entire Tunisian region, where there are areas of compact residence of both Salafists and the anti-Islamist elite. However, given the greater degree of religious freedom in Tunisia than in other Arab countries, some very post-secularist trends can be seen in this study.

High religiosity of young people means both belonging to a certain tradition and separation from it (attitude to religions).

This religiosity is accompanied by the desire to build their own strategy of religion (independent interpretation of texts), while borrowing from tradition only those ritual practices and norms of behavior that are consistent with the believers ' view of the modern world or confirm their identity (attitude to Sharia, hijab, niqab, etc.).

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Religion is considered as a source of moral and ethical values, while religious buildings and some religious institutions are considered as guardians of traditions and traditional values (zawiyas, holidays). The mystical component of faith is clearly not visible.

Religious institutions perform a consolidating function for the community (socialization in mosques, meeting with family on Sufi holidays).

Thus, such elements of post-secularism as the individualization of strategies for professing faith, simplification of religious practices and "theological minimalism", the importance of religious identity, the large socio-political role of religious institutions, and the perception of them as guardians of values are found at the local level.

If you go beyond the popular neighborhoods of Tunis, you can find other coincidences.

The absence of a Church and the general institutional amorphousness of Islam often make it difficult to identify individual trends within the established confessional trends, which makes it difficult to talk about the number of denominations. However, in the Middle East, four parallel processes stand out quite clearly.

First, there is the Islamic homogenization of the region, a sharp reduction in the number of non-Islamic religious groups in it. Linked exclusively to conflict and high levels of violence, this process is not directly related to the problem of post-secularism, but in the long run it may lead to the disappearance of non-Islamic Arab public space as such. At the same time, the very religious nature of violence, for example, in Syria, Iraq or Egypt, demonstrates the increased role of religious identity.

Secondly, the aggravation of inter-religious contradictions within Islam (Shiite-Sunni discord). This is partly due to the political instrumentalization of the confessional factor38, both in domestic and regional relations, and partly due to the growth of religiosity

38. See: Aksenenok A. G. et al. The Middle East: the Darkness before the New Dawn? Regional conflicts and the future of the Global World, Moscow: International Discussion Club "Valdai", 2017.

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social and strengthening of confessional identities in comparison with others (civil, ethnic, etc.).

Third, the growth of intra-confessional diversity in the Sunni environment and uniformity in the Shiite one. It is quite obvious that the traditional division of the Islamic socio-political space into modernists, traditionalists and fundamentalists, if it ever corresponded to reality, has long ceased. As well as the division of political Islam distinguished from fundamentalism into moderate and radical, or the division that later appeared into moderate, Salafi and militant. The confrontation between Daesh and Al-Qaeda 39 is not only military, but also purely religious in nature, moderate Islamic parties are located on a wide scale-from the refusing to consider themselves Islamist Ennahda to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is considered extremist in Russia, 40 and representatives of traditional Islam in the struggle for the Ummah are forced to take responsibility for the struggle for the Ummah. arming Salafist ideas and slogans, etc. In general, it is hardly possible to correctly describe today's diversity of Sunni groups.41 At the same time, under the influence of Iranian political activity in the region and due to Tehran's willingness to support Shiite minorities, minority Shiite movements (Alawites, Zaydites) are increasingly approaching the Imamite mainstream in their religious practice.

Finally, and fourthly, the emergence of Shiite communities in countries where they did not exist or were completely insignificant. So, in Tunisia, where the number of Shiites did not exceed a couple of hundred people, today it is estimated at several thousand. In Egypt, during the rule of M. Morsi, the issuance of visas to Iranians was stopped due to their missionary activity. Even in the Gaza Strip, groups that identify with Shiism have emerged. In some cases, of course, it is a question of purely political loyalty to Iran (Gaza), but in others it is a question of changing religious identity. To a certain extent, the sopo situation-

39. Prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.

40. Prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.

41. How sometimes it is difficult to separate the religious component from the political one in them. See for example: Demchenko A.V. Jihadist organizations supporting Al-Qaeda: new players in Palestine. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Series 25: International Relations and World Politics. 2011. N 3. pp. 135-152.

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It is comparable to Latin America and the activity of Protestant organizations in it42.

If the situation is somehow comparable to the Western one in terms of identity and religious diversity, then in the case of "theological minimalism" the situation is more complicated. On the one hand, of course, for the vast mass of believers, religion is reduced to a few slogans or rules that promise posthumous reward or punishment for certain actions. The idea of reward seems to prevail over the fear of retribution, even for DAESH terrorists. However, it is unlikely that there is anything new in all this. At the same time, at a deeper level, we can observe a whole wave of new theological discussions generated by the need to respond to the challenges of radicalism.

It does not make sense to dwell in detail on those features of post-secular society that are related to the problem of interaction between religion and politics. It is clear that all these trends are much more pronounced and more severe in the Middle East than in the West. It is enough to recall the disputes about the place of Islam in the constitutions of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, about the Geneva process of the Syrian settlement and determining the contours of the future Syrian statehood, about the role of the opinion of religious leaders on acute socio-political issues in Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, etc.

Perhaps the only important difference with the West here is that where in the West religious identity is in demand for defining the horizontal structure of society, in the Middle East it is more focused on consolidating or reformatting the vertical structure. A good example of this is Syria43, where militant Sunni Islam is proving to be a means of consolidation and mobilization in the war against the Government, according to the report.-

42. For example, according to the Pew Research Center, the proportion of people who were born Catholic but then consciously converted to another denomination in Latin America has increased in recent years. 84% of Latinos say they were raised Catholic, while only 69% of them consider themselves Catholics. Between 15 % (Panama) and 74% (Colombia) of the region's Protestants previously belonged to Catholicism. "Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region", Pew Research Center. 13.11.2014, pp. 4-5.

43. Sarab'ev A.V. Voprosy mezhkonfessional'nykh otnosheniy v Syrii [Issues of inter-confessional relations in Syria]. Issue 1. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2017, pp. 126-180.

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the latter uses the fear of the jihadist threat to unite religious minorities and strengthen their loyalty to the authorities.

Finally, the last thing that needs to be said in the context of post-secularism is a new epistemological situation that more or less equalizes the rights of scientific and non-scientific knowledge.

It was mentioned above that the development of secularism in Arab-Muslim culture did not imply the appearance of a presumption of irreligion, and hence the dependence of Islam on science. However, it did not suggest the opposite, and the problem that arose in the Middle Ages was solved by Ibn Rushd in his teaching on the dual truth.44
If Western secularism could ask why religion is needed, then in the modern Middle East, being acceptable for some, for others this question is replaced by another: why does Islam need secularism (as a worldview and principle of political life).

Thus, the leading moderate Islamist thinker R. Ghannouchi, discussing the attitude of Islam to secularism, comes to the conclusion that today Islam does not need the protection of the state, on the contrary - more than once and twice the state has become a burden for it. The only thing that Islam needs is the neutrality of the State, the separation of politics as the sphere of human reason and religion as the sphere of divine nature.

If the answer offered by the philosopher is quite consistent with the concept of Islamic secularism, then the question itself, which makes secularism dependent on Islam, is quite post-secularist.

44. Speaking of the dual truths - philosophical and religious - Ibn Rushd himself preferred, of course, philosophical, considering it intended for the Hassa-elite, capable of comprehending the truth through rational philosophizing. The religious path of knowledge, based on imagery and metaphor, from his point of view, is the lot of the amma - mass, which is incapable of philosophizing. In the European tradition, the two paths were actually equalized.

45. Ghannushi R. Al-Muhadara jawla-l - 'almaniyah wa-l-' alaqat-d-din bi-d-dawla min manzur harakat en-nahda / / Markaz dirasat al-islam wa-d-dimukratiyah. 2.03.2012. [http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/20827717?utm_source=Transcript-i-of+Rached+Ghannouchi%27 s+lecture+on+Secularism+-+March+2%2C+2012&utm_campaign=Tumsia+Democracy+Rached+ Ghannouchi+Transition+Center+for-i-1:he+Study+of+ Islam+and+Democracy+%28CSID%29&utm_medium=email, доступ от 05.07.2017].

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Thus, most elements of post-secularism can be identified in the Arab-Muslim environment, but, as in the case of secularism, post-secularism is integrated into the general Islamic space.

Middle East, post-secularism, neomodern

It remains to answer one question-how do Middle Eastern post-secularism and neo-modernism relate, that is, the very "new era" that we talked about at the beginning?

Let me remind you that the idea of neo-modernism is based on a combination of a modernist need for a message, a postmodern way of expressing it, and a pre-modern content.

The pre-modern content, if not necessarily required, seems to imply the rejection of secularism as a function of modernity in favor of pre-modern religiosity. The latter, however, as D. Uzlaner rightly pointed out, is impossible - religion is now returning to the secular milieu, 46 and it is completely unclear what it should look like in this milieu. This applies to the Middle East to the same extent as to the West, taking into account that the secular environment here also exists within the Islamic field.

The idea of post-secularism seems to solve this problem quite successfully. You just need to change the angle of view to see how the triad of neo-modernism is clearly visible in the highlighted features of Islamic post-secularism.

Man demands a new seriousness, answers to the questions of today, the creation of a new image of the future, and finds no solace in the numerous "isms" of the twentieth century. The decline of ideologies in the Middle East and the "confessionalization" of socio-political life are evidence of the demand for a modernist message.

A person turns to religion. Stepping over the legacy of his fathers, he looks for answers in sources, not in tradition or in projects of the future - this is how pre-modern content appears.

Finally, linking one and the other, a person resorts to postmodern irony. He shows commitment to those religious practices, the observance of which does not contradict his ideas about modernity, builds his own way of thinking.-

Uzlaner D. 46. Cartography of the postsecondary.

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It recognizes the social significance of religious institutions, but does not trust their ministers to interpret the faith. He justifies his belief by referring to sources, but restricts their range, which expands the possibilities for independent interpretation.

So post-secularism becomes a function of neo-modernity, just as secularism was a function of modernity.

The last thing worth mentioning is the new balance of relations between East and West, which we see in all these processes.

The idea of neo-modernity as a designation of a new era was initially expressed to indicate new trends in the development of Middle Eastern political reality, and only then began to be applied to the analysis of international relations, including in the Western world.

The idea of post-secularism seems to have been born out of an analysis of Western reality. However, it is characteristic that the authors developing it are from Yu. Habermas to A. Kyrlezhev-they see the source of changes in Islam.

Is it possible to say, based on this, that if in the XX century ideas were spread from North to South (or from West to East), then today the vector has changed to the opposite, as can be seen in the example of neomodernism and post-secularism?

The mechanisms for spreading these new trends are obvious (the development of education, the democratization of the information space, the growth of migration flows, the changing demographic situation in Western countries, etc.), but to what extent these trends should be considered ideas is a question.

After all, the whole thing can be viewed in exactly the opposite way: the "awakening of the South" led to the involvement of traditional masses in the political space - both in the South and in the North, who broadcast not ideas, but archaic ideas about the world and archaic practices, which is what all neo-moderns and post-secularisms are reduced to.

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