Back in the 19th century, as a result of the peculiarity of the country's modernization, a fierce confrontation between two elites emerged in Turkey - the Europeanized modernizing and the Muslim traditionalist elites.

I. L. FADEEVA, Doctor of Historical Sciences

Sultans Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Abdul - Majid II (1839-1861) tried to reform the imperial institutions, inevitably hurting the interests of clerics. And the first president of the country, Mustafa Kemal, dealt the strongest blow to the religious system in Turkey in the XX century.

The military, party, and bureaucratic elite surrounding Ataturk saw modernization, which at that time was associated with Westernization, as the only way out of centuries of backwardness and decline. For the Kemalists, the very existence of the new state was associated with the harsh suppression of traditionalists, which they saw as a guarantee of security and further development of the country. Their most important achievement was the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey as a secular state, which was reflected in the Constitution of 1924. The separation of Islam from the state destroyed both the traditional centuries-old socio-political structure of the country and its external appearance.

The paradox was that, trying to save society from destruction, its narrow stratum actually cut to the quick. Reforms were initiated "from above", the introduction of new institutions was accompanied by the destruction of old ones in the education system, judicial system, etc., and this not only did not contribute to their positive results, but sometimes even led to chaos.

The Ottoman reformist elite, and later the Kemalists, had to ignore the Muslim population, which never supported them and perceived the reforms as innovations alien to Islam. In such circumstances, the support of the officer corps was of particular importance.

Now, as almost a century ago, the struggle between modernizers, whose main support remains the army, and Islamists has flared up again.

ISLAMIST COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Up until the middle of the 20th century, despite the best efforts of reformers, the majority of residents of small towns and rural areas lived according to traditional Muslim norms and customs. In this way, the new and the old, the modern and the traditional, the secular and the religious coexisted side by side.

However, with the gradual liberalization of the regime, the sympathies of a significant part of the population, previously not demanded and not taken into account, turned out to be on the side of politicians who dared to declare their commitment to Islam and Muslim values.

This turn was also marked at the household level. Not only in villages and small towns, but also in large settlements, girls began to cover their heads with a hijab-a traditional Muslim headscarf, and young men began to grow beards, which was rare in the early decades of republican Turkey.

The masses of people who poured into cities from rural areas during the accelerated processes of industrialization and urbanization in the second half of the twentieth century joined the ranks of the more active electorate. The structure of the population of Turkey has changed: if in 1927 12.5% lived in cities with a population of more than 20 thousand people, then from the end of the 90s about 71% of the population already lived in them1.

Many of the new townspeople became mainstays of Islamist organizations and parties. Religious, nationalist, and leftist groups that proliferated in the 1960s significantly aggravated the domestic political situation. The power struggle between supporters of the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) and the resurgent Islamist elite has intensified. Now the Islamists have begun to present their opponents as retrogrades, hindering progress. They advocated multiparty system, new ways of developing the economy, and criticized corruption in the ILP government. And in the end, they succeeded in winning votes.

Gradually, the scales tipped in the direction of pro-Islamist forces, which, of course, did not mean their final victory. The process of transition to competitive politics, which began after the Second World War, acquired, as in Western countries, a cyclical character, representing an alternation of governments professing different ideologies and internal political credos. But at the same time, their positions on key foreign policy issues (the Cyprus issue, their attitude to Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU), etc.) largely coincide.

As a rule, the activation of pro-Islamist forces that come to power as a result of elections was followed by the suppression of their activity through direct or indirect intervention of the army. In turn, Islamist governments are trying, and not without success, to weaken the position of the military.

Under the secular regime, the Islamist elite has noticeably transformed. Since the late 1980s, the leaders of a number of influential Islamist organizations have been well-educated professionals (engineers, doctors, lawyers), whose views combine religious conservatism with flexibility and openness in matters of economic and technological integration with the outside world, although among Turkish Islamists there are many opponents of modernization according to Western models and supporters of power methods introduction of Islamic norms.

Pro-Islamic parties are gaining more and more adherents among graduates of prestigious educational institutions working in various fields of the economy. A significant role in the economic development of small towns is played by the so-called Islamic or "green" capital, which includes financial institutions operating on Islamic principles. These principles include the observance of fair consideration of the interests of the individual and the Muslim community within the framework of the right to property, the prohibition of loan (bank) interest, and the mandatory deduction of zakat in favor of the poor. Islamic banks receive capital from Muslim countries, including illegally in cash. They also attract the accumulation of Turkish guest workers in Europe-those who support pro-Islamist parties.

The ranks of Islamists receive constant support, since they have quite legal conditions for expanding the scope of their activities.

In recent years, significantly more religious schools have been opened than secular ones, and since 1982, teaching the basics of religion in all schools has become mandatory.²

In the late 1990s, the army attempted to contain the growth of Islamist activity. The Government of Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, was dismissed in February 1997 with the participation of the National Security Council (NSC), which includes the top military leaders along with the top officials of the Government. The military intervention was not triggered by the helplessness and inefficiency of a succession of coalition governments or even scandals involving corruption in the highest echelons of power, which were not uncommon among leaders of secular parties. Such decisive actions were caused by the policy of creeping Islamization, which the military then regarded as an attempt on the foundations of a secular state.

FLEXIBILITY AND PRAGMATISM: STRATEGY OR TACTICS?

The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002, has learned from previous pro-Islamist parties that were banned for openly promoting Islamic norms.

The leaders of this party adhere to a more pragmatic and flexible policy, especially in the economic sphere. Before the global financial and economic crisis, they managed to implement a large-scale privatization program and ensure the inflow of foreign capital. The inflation rate in the pre-crisis years was expressed in single digits, which was a great achievement for Turkey. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew rapidly.

The rhetoric of the leaders of the Justice and Development Party differs from the unrestrained criticism of kemalism by their predecessor N. Erbakan. Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also avoid attacking Western politics and culture. They are much less concerned with solidarity with Muslim countries than with the specific task of joining the EU as a full member, that is, integrating with the developed countries of Europe. While accusing Europeans of anti-Islamic bias, AKP leaders also understand the importance of Turkey's cooperation with the West, which benefits the country's economic development.

At a conference in Istanbul in November 2005, Erdogan said :" I don't care if it's Jewish, Arab or Western money. I welcome any"³. For example, in the energy sector, the government cooperates primarily with Russia, as well as with Iran, Greece, and Azerbaijan. Currently, 4 pipelines are already in operation: a) the Russia-Europe-Turkey gas pipeline (Russian gas is delivered to Ankara via Bulgaria); b) the Iran-Turkey (Tabriz-Ankara) gas pipeline; c) the Blue Stream gas pipeline (delivery of Russian gas from the Black Sea coast to the Turkish port of Samsun); d) the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. It is planned to lay several more gas pipelines ⁴.

In general, Turkey's foreign policy, including in relations with Russia and the United States, has become more pragmatic and balanced during the AKP years.

In August 2007, one of the leaders of the AKP, A. Gul, won the election of the President of the Republic of Turkey by the Mejlis. This result became possible after the early parliamentary elections in July 2007, in which the ruling party won a landslide victory. Thus, the Parliament and two of the most important state posts were in the hands of the pro-Islamist party.

The opposition, represented by some parliamentarians, senior government officials and senior military officials, accuses the government of a secret program to gradually dismantle Turkey's secular foundations and turn it into an Islamic state.

Pro-Islamist parties, the AKP's predecessors, openly expressed dissatisfaction with the secular regime and advocated a more significant role for Islam in the state.

The leaders of the current ruling party are more cautious, rejecting accusations of Islamism and declaring their desire to take religion beyond politics. But on occasion they don't hide it either

Erdogan said: "Democracy is like a train that should be used on the way to the desired goal, but from which you can get off when the need for it disappears."⁵. It is difficult to say how much of this speech is true intentions and how much declarative addressed to the supporters of the AKP. Perhaps both are the case.

In February 2008, at the initiative of the AKP, amendments to the law were approved allowing women to attend educational institutions and state institutions in hijabs and in fact abolishing the ban on wearing Muslim headscarves imposed by Ataturk in 1923. In response to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, which banned such headscarves in state secular schools, the Prime Minister said that he should consult with Muslim jurists.

Supporters of Turkey's secular development path have seen the hijab amendments as a threat to the spread of religious symbols not only to higher education institutions, but also to schools. And the demonstrative desire to seek advice from religious figures and the Islamic rhetoric of the Prime Minister, picked up by his entourage, were perceived by Kemalists as evidence of intentions to revive Sharia norms and prepare for the transformation of the secular regime. Thousands of people held rallies in major cities to protest against the actions of the ruling AKP, which are leading to the creeping Islamization of the country.

In March 2008, the Constitutional Court accepted the prosecutor's claim to dissolve the AKP on charges of violating constitutional norms, and in June it canceled the amendments on Muslim headscarves.

The fight in the country over the issue of wearing Muslim headscarves continues, although a certain balance between their opponents and supporters remains. Formally, these headscarves are not allowed in universities, but female students who were expelled for wearing them were given the opportunity to return to school. However, both the president and the prime Minister continue to insist on the official lifting of the ban on hijabs.

THE CASE OF THE "PUTSCHISTS"

In response to the Constitutional Court's decision to overturn the hijab amendment and allow the AKP to be dissolved, the Government launched a counter-offensive. At the end of June 2008, the Supreme Court began considering a criminal case against 86 individuals accused of belonging to the secret society Ergenekon, which allegedly began preparing a military coup. The reason for initiating the case was ammunition found in the possession of one of the retired officers.

This move by the Government did not go unnoticed: a month after the opening of the Ergenekon case, on July 31, 2008, 6 out of 11 judges of the Constitutional Court voted against the dissolution of the ruling AKP.

And in October 2008, the trial of members of the Ergenekon society began in Istanbul.

76 of the 86 accused were brought to trial. High-ranking military officials, including retired generals Veli Kuchuk and Sener Eruigur, were on trial. Former rector of Istanbul University Kemal Yalcin Alemdaroglu, leading columnist of the newspaper "Jumhuriyet" Ilhan Seljuk and other prominent scientists, journalists belonging to political organizations of various orientations - from nationalist to communist-were also involved in the case. In April 2009, a new wave of arrests took place, including a number of representatives of the creative intelligentsia.

If there is one thing that unites them all, it is the opposition to the further Islamization of the country.

The arrest of an influential retired general, Sener Eruigur, who headed the Ataturk Thought Society, is particularly eloquent evidence of the scale of the action taken by the government. Information was leaked that the general's diaries allegedly found contain a detailed plan for a military coup and overthrow of the government under the pretext of economic failures.⁶ In the Ergenekon case, charges were also brought against retired General Levent Ersez, the former head of gendarmerie intelligence, but he managed to escape from Turkey before being arrested.

The court is regarded by the Kemalists, first of all by a significant part of the military elite, as a preemptive strike by Islamists who are afraid of being removed from power, despite the positive decision of the Constitutional Court for them.

Representatives of the current command of the Turkish army, as well as leaders of secular parties, are not on the list of conspirators today. But even without that, the process, which promises to be long, escalates the conflict between two long-standing opposing forces. The ruling party, which was elated by its success in recent elections and won a case against it in the Constitutional Court, relies on the majority of the country's population. It has huge financial resources of Islamic capital, fueled by foreign Muslim countries. Will the pro-Islamist government resist the temptation to end the threat of forcible removal from power with a single blow?

Most likely, it will stand, because, as before, the supporters of the country's secular orientation are backed by the Turkish army, whose top brass also has considerable financial resources and influence in the most educated part of society. They are also supported by a significant part of the press.

Influential army circles have not yet said their last word.

HOW DO I COMBINE INCOMPATIBLE THINGS?

Unlike the United States, the European Union, which Turkey has been trying to join as a full member for several decades, has traditionally supported the tendency to weaken the political role of the army in the country. Under pressure from the EU, the posts of military judges in the State security courts established after the military coup of 1971 were abolished, and these courts themselves were soon liquidated. The long-standing tradition of appointing military personnel to the post of head of the Security Council has been broken.-

national security. The last two general secretaries of the National Security Service came to this position from the diplomatic service. The process of approving the military budget in the Mejlis, which was previously approved almost automatically, has become much more complicated and extended. All this could be considered as stages of democratization, if such actions did not strengthen the pro-Islamist ruling party.

In theory, EU membership could guarantee the preservation of a secular, democratic regime. However, the prospects for Turkey's accession to the European Union are becoming increasingly dim. In addition to various political and economic obstacles on this path, an important role is played by the fact that despite a series of reforms carried out by the Erdogan government at the request of the EU and with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the pro-Islamist nature of the ruling party raises concerns among Europeans. Although the European Union is not a Christian club, many citizens of its member countries are Muslims, and freedom of religion is enshrined in the fundamental documents of the EU, many Europeans are alarmed by the specifics of Islamic ideology, which in most Muslim countries contradicts the secular nature of the state and the norms of the political structure adopted in the EU.

President of the United States B. Obama, on the eve of his visit to Turkey in April 2009, at an informal EU-US summit, called for speeding up its admission to the European Union, but French President Nicolas Sarkozy again opposed it.

The global financial and economic crisis further delays the prospect of Turkey joining the EU. The European Union itself, like the rest of the world, is now preoccupied with measures to prevent the crisis from deepening further and to get out of it, and Turkey is one of the most affected emerging market countries that have shown promise in recent years. Ankara was forced to apply to the IMF for a loan of $ 40 billion. Negotiations have been ongoing for several months, in particular, due to the link between the loan provision and the fiscal (budget, etc.) reform in Turkey.

The crisis led to a reduction in exports, a decrease in foreign investment and foreign borrowing opportunities, a fall in the Turkish lira's exchange rate by a third, and an increase in unemployment to a record level for all 85 years of the republic's existence-13.5% of the working-age population.⁷ The country's GDP is expected to grow by 3.3% in 2008, compared with 4.5% in 2007 and 6.9% in

According to E. Chavez, an analyst at the New York-based J. P. Morgan Chase Bank, Turkey's economic growth may even fall to zero in 2009. However, she believes that the current economic situation in Turkey is much better than in previous years, and the country is ready to cope with this crisis.⁹

The country's financial system has withstood external attacks and, according to Turkish and foreign experts, has a good chance of suffering minimal losses. Turkish banks are characterized by a high level of authorized capital (17%)¹⁰, there are practically no mortgage loans in the country and, accordingly, problems related to their illiquidity . Moreover, unlike in Western countries, firms are credited not only by banks, but also through partnerships or kinship relationships, etc. Finally, the country emerged from the economic crisis only 4 years ago, which ultimately improved both financial institutions and the real sector.

The tourism business expects to maintain its position at the expense of Western Europeans, who will be forced to change their vacation in Spain, Italy or Greece to cheaper Turkey in order to save money.

A year ago, in a rather pessimistic assessment of the prospects for Turkey to overcome the global crisis and its possible impact on the fate of the AKP government, former US Ambassador to Turkey M. Abramovitz wrote: "The AKP rose thanks to economic success, and it will fall along with economic failure.

Only a serious deterioration of the economy will finally lead to the emergence of political parties that will be able to challenge it. " ¹¹

So far, the government has been quite successful in mitigating the effects of the global financial crisis and economic downturn. Turkey is one of the" Big Twenty " leading economic powers in the world. In March 2009, a 5.5 billion anti-crisis economic stimulus package was approved. Turkish liras (3.2 billion euros). USD)¹². However, in the municipal elections held on 30 March 2009, the AKP received 39.1% less votes than expected. The Republican People's Party won 23%, and the National Action Party-16.2%¹³.

In general, Turkey still maintains relative economic and political stability and a more or less stable balance between pro-Islamist forces and supporters of the country's secular development.

^{Kasaba R., Bozdopan S.} 1 Turkey at a Crossroad // Journal of International Affairs. N. Y., 2000, vol. 54, N 1, p. 7.

^{Jego M.} 2 Turquie: la republique bloquec // Politique internationale. Paris, 2001, N 92, p. 92.

^{Bajik G.} 3 Turkey: A New Geopolitical Narrative / / Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2006, No. 3, p. 42.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

^{Turan I.} 5 Unstable Stability: Turkish Politics at the Crossroad // International Affairs. L., 2007, vol. 83, N 2, p. 321.

⁶ Cumhuriyet, 20 - 22.10.2008.

⁷ Unemployment rate reaches historic high in Turkey. Hurriyet Daily News. 10.04.2009.

⁸ The IMF offered Turkey a $ 19 billion loan. 30.03.2009 - www.lenta.ru/news/2008/11/24/imf/

⁹ Antalya Today-Turkey News-Analysts predict a tough year for Turkey. 31.01.09 - www.antalyatoday.ru/ar-ticlerd/antalya-12.html

¹⁰ Istanbul Mortgage's Bahadir Teker: Turkey Is Ready to Deal with This Kind of Credit Crunch. [email protected] 16.01. 2009 - www.knowledge.wharton.up-enn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2140

^{Abramowitz Morton.} 11 The World Economic Crisis and Turkey. Newsweek International, 11.03.2008 - www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=2096

¹² Turkey's Stimulus. 17.03.09 - www.cri-sistalk.worldbank.org/2009/03/turkeys-stimulus.html

¹³ 30.03.2009 - www.news.mail.ru/poli-tics/2469331

Permanent link to this publication: