A. A. RAZLIVAEV

Candidate of Political Sciences

Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came as an unpleasant surprise with the results of municipal elections in March 2009.Although it retained its leadership in terms of the total number of votes cast for its candidates, the opposition forces significantly increased their number of supporters, and the AKP's rating declined for the first time since its creation^. The consequences of the global financial and economic crisis played a certain role in this: By the end of 2008, the unemployment rate in the country reached 13.6 %, production began to fall, and the country entered a period of recession.

However, the AKP remains the largest and most influential party in the Turkish political space, with which no other existing associations can compete on an equal footing.

COMING TO POWER. ISLAMISTS OR REFORMERS?

In municipal elections, competing parties, primarily the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), tried to focus primarily on socio-economic issues - high unemployment and other problems caused by the global economic crisis, public denunciations of a number of government officials involved in corruption scandals, but practically did not touch on their favorite topic.

Namely, the problems of splitting Turkish society into a secular part and supporters of Islamization of the country, which has been hotly debated since the AKP came to power and is heated on the eve of every election race. Among the opposition forces, the Justice and Development Party is considered to be at the forefront of the political movement of Islamists seeking to destroy the Republic and the secular nature of its regime.

The basis for such suspicions is the "Islamist past" of a significant part of the AKP leadership and its rank-and-file members. The party was formed on August 14, 2001 by people from the Islamist socio-political movement "National View" (NV), headed by its permanent leader and former Prime Minister Necemettin Erbakan. After the forced resignation of Erbakan under pressure from the military on June 18, 1997, his Welfare Party (Refah - the political wing of NV) by a court verdict, it was dissolved. The reformist-renovationist faction broke away from the" old generation " of Islamists who remained loyal to the former leader and his ideas, and announced the creation of its own Justice and Development Party.

From the very beginning, the AKP positioned itself as a party of "conservative democrats", emphasizing loyalty to the traditional values of the Islamic religion and the national Turkish culture, combined with a desire for modernization and a liberal-democratic discourse. Its program outlined the primacy of the basic principles of the secular republican system: the rule of law, civil society and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. The party's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a former mayor of Istanbul, has repeatedly proclaimed: "Secularism, the principle of secularism, is the most reliable defender of religious freedoms. We are the guarantors of the secular path, and our deeds will prove it. " ²

In the field of foreign policy, the AKP announced a course to integrate Turkey into the globalization processes and to join the European Union.

Thus, the party managed to form a broad socio-political platform. By actively promoting the image of a" people's " party that opposes the interests of the capital's republican elite, the AKP has successfully won the support of a large traditionally minded population of the Anatolian provinces, the poor and least educated strata. The liberal-democratic component of the AKP's ideological image and calls for democratic reforms have also won the sympathy of the middle class. At the same time, the main political rivals - the ILP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) - looked rather pale and were perceived as supporters of authoritarianism, relying on the support of the army, the guardian of the state ideology of Kemalism.

In the November 2002 general elections to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA), the AKP won a significant victory, receiving 34.5% of the popular vote.³ The results of the parliamentary elections, according to most Turkish experts, eloquently demonstrated not so much the ideological commitment of a third of the electorate to the Islamic tradition, but, above all, the discontent of voters with the economic and social policies of the former leadership of ^the country4.

After the election, the main question remained whether Erdogan and his current associates really are-

niki rejected the ideology of the Islamist movement "National View" of Erbakan. Among the country's irreconcilable secularist establishment, there remained confidence that the Islamists now represented by the AKP had simply become much more cautious, but in fact, while maintaining their focus on turning Turkey into a theocracy, they would try to achieve this goal not with radical reforms, but with quiet steps, step by step pushing the current secular elite away from the levers of political influence.

The new government tried to avoid mentioning the political past of many prominent members of the AKP and previous ties with the National Movement, and accusations of Islamism were unequivocally rejected. The founders of the AKP claimed that they seek to create an image of a moderate and responsible political movement that takes religious issues beyond politics. Party functionaries in their speeches focused mainly on the program of democratic changes, emphasizing that the implementation of the AKP's election program involves the reorganization of state and public structures based on the revision of the former principles of Kemalist nationalism and "managed" democracy. The process of democratization of the country's political system was linked to its foreign policy guidelines.

COURSE FOR REFORM

In the program of the AKP government, ⁵ presented by the VNST at the end of November 2002, the need to replace the current constitution with a new, much more liberal one was justified, among other things, by the desire to comply with EU standards, and EU accession was declared one of the top priorities.⁶ The EU's decision to start negotiations with Turkey on its full membership in the European Union on October 3, 2005, was perhaps the most impressive achievement of the Erdogan government.

The new authorities did not hesitate to review first of all those legislative principles that did not meet the Copenhagen criteria. In June 1993, in the Danish capital, the European Council defined the general criteria that candidate countries should meet as prerequisites for EU membership: the stability of institutions that guarantee the democratic process, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities; the existence and functioning of a market economy, and the ability to compete on an equal footing in the European market, the ability to meet the obligations arising from EU membership, including contributing to the achievement of the goals of political unification, as well as economic and monetary union ⁷.

The reforms affected relations between the army and the government, the judicial system, civil liberties and the economic sphere. In addition, Turkey has signed all the fundamental international agreements on human rights, and the recognition of the priority of international conventions over national legislation in this area has been enshrined in the basic law.

One of the most sensitive issues of the functioning of the Turkish political system is the role of the military in the country's political life, or rather, the rather noticeable and active influence of the latter on the process of making major decisions.

In the context of bringing Turkish legislation in line with the Copenhagen criteria, the Turkish Parliament, with the AKP coming to power, initiated numerous legislative changes aimed at strengthening civilian control over the army, as well as amendments to the Constitution that revoked the excessively broad powers of the National Security Council (NSC) of Turkey.⁸

Improving the state of the Turkish economy was one of the successes of the new government and to some extent testified to the competence of the AKP government. Erdogan's cabinet has made significant progress in reviving the national economy and improving the welfare of the population, as well as implementing reforms in the field of education and healthcare. The AKP government was credited with curbing nepotism and corruption, as well as attracting large foreign investments. Turkey has reached a stable and at the same time quite high economic growth rate. From 2002 to 2008, annual GDP growth averaged 6.8%⁹. For the first time in the last 30 years, the annual inflation rate was reduced to 9.5% (based on the results of 2008)^.10 As a result, the AKP won the support of the broadest segments of the population.

BATTLE WITH THE REPUBLICAN ELITE

Despite the fact that the main economic indicators of the country demonstrated the effectiveness of a one-party government, many saw the problem in the fact that the AKP, which had an overwhelming majority in parliament, had acquired excessive influence and was now trying to control all levels of power.

Accusations of authoritarian methods of government, as well as suspicions of the participation of high-ranking representatives of the party in numerous corruption schemes, supported by controversial and scandalous bills of the party on the reform of religious education and on criminal prosecution for adultery, have repeatedly given public opinion and representatives of the expert community to doubt the AKP's policy of building an open democratic secular system. The Turkish media often expressed the opinion that the AKP is still "probing the ground" and is gradually preparing for much more decisive actions in anticipation of the moment when the influence of the generals discredited in public opinion, including under external influence (from the European Union), will weaken.

In the spring of 2007, the conflict between the parliamentary opposition in

The conflict between the oldest CHP on the Turkish political landscape and the ruling AKP has sharply escalated. 11. The AKP, which had a parliamentary majority, proposed a close ally of the Prime Minister, Abdullah Gul, who was then head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, for this post. This initiative of the AKP has caused fierce resistance not only in the parliament, but also in general from the secularist forces of society. Secularists could not even accept the idea that a representative of an "Islamist" party could become president, the guarantor of the constitution and a secular regime. ¹² Quite serious arguments have been put forward that the AKP's unconditional control over the Parliament, Government and President runs counter to the principle of separation of powers, and that such an alignment of forces distorts the real picture of the political preferences of citizens who gave the AKP only 34.5% of the vote in the 2002 elections.

The general staff came out in support of the opposition, publishing an open letter on its official website on April ²⁷, 2007,13 which warned of the imminent intervention of the armed forces if the ruling party and its Government undertake to revise the secular foundations of the Republic.

Based on the opposition's appeal, the Constitutional Court (CC) annulled the results of the first two rounds of voting on the presidential candidacy (April 27 and May 6, 2007), in which A. Gul won the majority of votes.

Chairman of the Central Election Commission M. Aydin has scheduled early parliamentary elections for July 22, 2007. In these elections, the AKP won another convincing victory, moreover, improving its previous result, having already received 46.7% of the vote, which again enabled the AKP to form a one-party government. ¹⁴ The parliamentary elections were followed by the election of Gul as President of the Republic of Turkey. In his inaugural speech in Parliament, he emphasized his commitment to the fundamental principles of the Republic, democracy, secularism, citizens ' rights and freedoms, as well as the importance of Turkey's entry into the European Union.¹⁵

It is interesting to note that even before the parliamentary elections, a significant number of new people joined the AKP leadership and membership, including former members of the center - left and center-right parties. The list of candidates for deputies from the AKP has also changed significantly. In total, more than 100 members of the old AKP Parliament lost their seats in 2007 to new generation politicians.¹⁶

A certain evolution has taken place within the AKP over the past few years. The party began to represent a wider range of political views, including liberals and Social Democrats.¹⁷

The victory of the AKP in this pre-election "battle" with "irreconcilable secularists" was regarded not only by its supporters, but also by many representatives of the liberal intelligentsia as a victory for democracy over the threat of another military intervention, which increased public support for the current government.

As a result, the AKP emerged from the electoral battles as the most influential player on the political field, retaining control over key state institutions. Later, the AKP deputies decided to take a very bold and risky step, initiating amendments to the law on education, which provided for the abolition of the ban on women wearing the traditional Muslim headscarf-turban (hijab)¹⁸.

It seems that the AKP, while pursuing liberal reforms, could not have delayed lifting this ban any longer, if only because it was indebted to the traditionalist part of its electorate for the support provided to the party during the last elections. Moreover, a further postponement of the issue of turbans would inevitably create a risk of disillusionment with the AKP not only among the religious traditionalist strata, but also among the part of the electorate that supported the party's declared course towards democratization and European integration, which considered this step in the context of respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.

The fierce controversy that unfolded around this issue has sharply inflamed domestic political life in the country, giving the problem a sharp political connotation. Turkey is on the verge of a deep internal political crisis.

Disagreements within society have highlighted a kind of ideological split. For some, the turban became a religious symbol, for others-a symbol of backwardness and obscurantism, while others regarded the AKP's actions as an act of long-awaited recognition by the state of the basic rights and freedoms of the individual - the absolute foundations of democracy.

Irreconcilable secularists in extreme polemics sometimes reached the point of calling for the need for another military coup as the only way to revive the trampled ideals of the Republic.¹⁹

Thousands of people protested in major cities against the actions of the ruling AKP, which, according to the opposition, led to the "creeping Islamization" of the country, destroying the Republic by undermining its secular foundations.²⁰

AKP AND SYMMETRICAL RESPONSE

Obviously, expecting that the " turban law "would be only the first decisive step of the AKP, followed by others that are much more" revolutionary " in relation to the established tenets of Kemalist ideology, the old secularist elite went on the offensive. March 31, 2008 COP

The Supreme Court of Cassation's Chief Prosecutor, Abdurahman Yalcinkaya, has accepted a lawsuit to close the ruling AKP and the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (PDO)^.21

The AKP trial was immediately called a "judicial coup". But the role of the Kemalists and the army (as the vanguard of the secularist elite) in initiating this process was more than obvious to almost everyone. It should be noted that such a move by the "secularists" was not unexpected. The Turkish press actively discussed the options for the development of events after the ratification of the "law on turbans"by President Gul. In particular, information was leaked that the prosecutor of Yalchinkaya collects information about the activities of the AKP and materials containing public statements of its representatives. On the eve of sending the "turban bill" to Parliament, the prosecutor's office warned Erdogan's party about the inadmissibility of violating the current constitution.²²

One of the main charges brought against the AKP was that it was pursuing a policy of deception. The concern for democracy, according to the Turkish Chief Prosecutor, "is only a cover, and the real goal of the AKP is to introduce Sharia law in Turkey." ²³

In the text of the indictment, the Prosecutor General cited 61 statements by Erdogan and other party members, allegedly indicating the intentions of AKP functionaries to undermine the Republican regime in Turkey. The indictment stated that "even before the AKP was established in 2001, R. T. Erdogan and his colleagues publicly attacked the Republic and its main achievements, claiming, in particular, that" sovereignty does not belong to the people, but only to God... Secularism will be rejected if the people so desire" [ ... ] " The Sharia system undoubtedly includes jihad. And the democratic system can be destroyed both by extremist methods and through democratic procedures, as the Nazis did, " the document said. It also said that the party could resort to religious war if it despaired of overthrowing the republican regime by democratic methods: "The practice of jihad, which means violence, is a real possibility."

Given that the Constitutional Court accepted the case by 9 votes to 2, the process did not portend a positive outcome for the AKP. And the Constitutional Court's annulment of the "turban amendments" adopted on June 5, 2008, finally convinced many that the ruling party would soon be dissolved, and the Republic itself would enter the phase of another deep crisis with unpredictable consequences.²⁴

But the AKP launched a counteroffensive. On 28 June 2008, the Supreme Court opened a criminal case against 86 individuals, including retired military officials, accused of plotting against the legitimate Government. Among those arrested on charges of participating in a secret ultranationalist group called Ergenekon, ²⁵ were journalists, including a leading columnist and the bureau chief of the Jumhuriyet newspaper, ²⁶ in Ankara. However, according to the opposition, these arrests are political in nature. The government, which consists of moderate Islamists, is trying to settle scores with political opponents.

A month after the start of the Ergenekon case, on July 31, 2008, the Constitutional Court announced its decision in the AKP case. 6 out of 11 judges of the Constitutional Court voted to close the ruling party (according to the current Constitution, a positive decision banning the activities of a political party requires 7 votes). At the same time, 10 judges of the Constitutional Court recognized that the party pursued a policy directed against the secular nature of the state, and in connection with these violations ordered to halve its state funding.²⁷

It seems that the Kemalist elite, taking into account the level of support for the AKP among the population, decided not to escalate the crisis, but at the same time the decision of the Constitutional Court is a clear signal to the representatives of the ruling party that the Kemalists keep the situation in the country under control and are able to resist the government at any time. This interpretation of events is reinforced by the words of the President of the Constitutional Court, H. Kilic, who stated that the Chief Prosecutor has the right to continue the case against the AKP initiated by him "if he sees fit." ²⁸ " This is a serious warning to the party. I hope that they correctly understood the meaning of the message addressed to them, " he added.²⁹ This statement, together with the final decision of the Constitutional Court, demonstrates the determination of Kemalists to resist actions that damage the republican foundations.

After the outcome of the trial, which was favorable for the ruling party, the overwhelming majority of experts agreed that the Erdogan government will continue to modernize the country's socio-political life, and in foreign policy it will try to intensify negotiations with the EU, which is also dictated by the current alignment of political forces. According to M. Akjel of the Turkish Daily News information and analytical portal, "the safest way to move away from the authoritarian past and quasi-authoritarian present is through the movement towards the EU" ³⁰.

All these dubious, from the point of view of democratic procedures, proceedings within the ruling elites subsided against the background of the first consequences of the global financial and economic crisis, which hurt the national economy of the country. Turkey, which is highly dependent on foreign investment and the external economic environment, is among the most vulnerable countries in the world.

countries most affected by the global crisis ³¹. In the first half of 2009, the national economy declined by 14.2%, the inflow of foreign direct investment decreased by 57.1%, ³² and the budget deficit increased 13-fold.³³ However, by the end of 2009, the first signs of economic recovery were beginning to appear around the world, and the IMF's autumn forecasts for real GDP growth in Turkey in 2010 (3.7%) are encouraging.³⁴

At the same time, as soon as it became clear that an economic catastrophe was likely to be avoided, the confrontation between the ruling AKP and Kemalist circles resumed. Now the initiative has passed to the ruling party.

The slow-moving Ergenekon case received a new boost when, on June 12, 2009, the liberal and military-critical newspaper Taraf published a copy of a secret document allegedly prepared by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, entitled " Plan to Combat Islamic Fundamentalism." It was alleged that this "Military Action Plan" was aimed at discrediting and destabilizing the ruling AKP and its government, as well as the most influential Islamic religious movement in Turkey, F. Gulen, by planting false evidence and compromising information about their anti-state extremist activities in the media.

Some pro-government publications claimed that they believed the document was genuine, while secular newspapers reported that it was a fake.

Two weeks after the publication of the so-called "Action Plan", the military Prosecutor's office issued a statement on the non-involvement of the General Staff in the preparation of the scandalous document, the original of which could not be found.

At a special press conference held at the end of June 2009, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General I. Bashbug, said that "this document is just a piece of paper", and its appearance in the press is nothing more than an organized action aimed at discrediting the army through the media, and part of a psychological war. "The army will no longer tolerate such campaigns... Hands off the army!" Bashbug warned. The general also unequivocally dismissed all accusations that the military is involved in attempts to overthrow the current government. However, the Chief of the General Staff stressed that the investigation of the case will remain under the control of the military.

However, by a strange coincidence, it was in July 2009 that President A. Gul approved a law passed by Parliament restricting the powers of military courts.³⁵ In principle, this step fits into the logic of the Turkish government's move towards the EU through the reform of political institutions and the development of democracy. The excessive influence of the generals on political processes in the country, including through legalized judicial procedures, is a serious irritant for the European Union and a constant topic of complaints against Turkey. In this regard, the reform of the courts, regardless of the real goals of the ruling party figures, in any case, looks like a logical and reasonable step towards further modernization of the political system. Under the new law, cases of military personnel who have committed serious crimes, including war crimes, must be transferred from tribunals to civilian courts.³⁶

For the first time in history, the civilian authorities decided to take such a bold step to limit the judicial power of the military. The new judicial practice, in fact, removes the army from participating in the investigation of crimes related to anti-state and terrorist activities.

At one time, in the hands of the military, this was a legitimate, and therefore serious and extremely effective mechanism for combating dissent and a way to "prevent" any objectionable activity on the part of the opposition. Now, according to experts, the adopted law will become a kind of "safeguard" for Turkey against possible military coups that have occurred three times in the last half century.

However, the pluralism in the party and socio-political life of Turkey, which has been cultivated for more than half a century, reflects not so much the development of democratic institutions as deep contradictions within society on a number of important national issues. This largely explains the instability of the Turkish political system, which is characterized not only by conflicts between the two main political elites, but, above all, by deep ethnic and religious contradictions, which are repeatedly reinforced by serious economic inequality in the regions.

* * *

The potential for civil violence and uncompromising political struggle remains high in Turkey. The latter was clearly demonstrated by the political crisis of 2007-2008 and the ongoing politically motivated trials.

Assessing the phenomenon of the AKP, it should be noted that it certainly cannot be attributed to the usual Islamist parties, whose invariable characteristic is the desire to ensure compliance with strict moral norms, to put conservative social, moral and religious issues at the top of the political agenda. It is noteworthy that the party does not appeal to class, language, religious or ethnic differences, as well as exclusively to the Muslim or ethnic Turkish electorate.

The AKP's ideology is universal and aims to create a broad national consensus. Coming from a "counter-elite" cultural background, the AKP leaders managed to formulate a broad political platform and gain the support of the broadest segments of the population in conditions of a high level of conflict.

However, at present, the freedom of action of R. T. Erdogan's party is significantly limited by the army, the Kemalist bureaucracy, the highest hierarchs in the judicial system, education, and a significant part of big business. Taking into account the suspicions of Turkish secularists regarding the AKP's "real" political goals, any attempt by the government to cross the boundaries outlined by secularists, in particular, to introduce religious norms into national legislation, would cause serious internal political tension, not excluding the intervention of the army.

It seems that the logic of the historical development of the political system of republican Turkey from an authoritarian model to increasingly open democratic forms dictates to the AKP, including for the sake of its own political future, the need to activate modernization processes and maintain the course of joining the EU.

Further democratization of the Turkish political system will lead, firstly, to a gradual decrease in the political role of the army, and secondly, to the expansion of the influence of religious and public associations on the political life of the country.

¹ According to the results of the voting, the main political parties ranked in the electoral preference rating in the same order as in the previous local elections of 2004 and the parliamentary elections of 2002 and 2007: the AKP took the 1st place (39%), followed by the CHP (23%), and the Nationalist Party took the 3rd place. movements (16%).

² The New York Times, 4.11.2002.

³ The AKP also benefited from the specific nature of Turkey's electoral system. The extremely high level of vote spread across different parties was limited by the 10% electoral barrier. The AKP, with 34.5% of the vote, won 66% of the seats in Parliament.

^{Carkoglu A. H.} 4 Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning? // Middle East Review of International Affairs, Dec. 2002.

⁵ См.: http://www.bashbakanlik.gov.tr/

⁶ The AKP program stated: "Turkey is in close relations with Europe historically and geographically. Therefore, relations with European states should continue to be at the top of the list of Turkey's foreign policy agenda." "Turkey must fulfill its promises to the European Union and meet the conditions imposed by the Union on any candidate state as soon as possible. At the same time, the issues discussed should not be artificial." - See the AKP program (Adalet ve kalkinma partisi programs) on the party's official website - http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html

⁷ http://europe.rsuh.rU/journal/journal3.2001/6.htm

⁸ In December 2003, the Law "On Repealing certain articles of the Law on the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Secretariat"was adopted. The National Security Service was transformed into a body, in fact, with a purely advisory function. The special funds that were previously at the disposal of the National Security Service are now exclusively under the control of the Prime Minister. Measures have been taken to increase transparency in spending on the armed forces, and they have also been significantly reduced. // BBC Russian Service, 31.07.2003.

⁹ Turkey 2008 Progress Report. Commission of European Communities. Brussels, 5.11.2008. SEC (2008) - http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2008/nov/strategy_paper_en.pdf

¹⁰ Data from the State Statistics Office of Turkey. Cumhuriyet, Vatan, Radikal, Zaman, 1.04.2009.

¹¹ According to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the Head of State is elected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

¹² The post of President, by virtue of the legislative functions assigned to it by the Constitution, serves as a serious counterweight to the initiatives of the Parliament and the Government. So, since 2002, the then President A. N. Sezer rejected 60 bills. Despite the fact that the parliament overcame the presidential veto on some of them, the president sent some of them to the Constitutional Court for evaluation. The AKP government has stated in this regard that presidential vetoes hinder the country's development, as these laws are aimed at increasing budget revenues and improving the economic situation. Along with this, Sezer blocked most of the appointments, in particular, in the structure of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In total, Sezer blocked the appointment of more than 2.3 thousand officials, including 15 ambassadors. AKP representatives even claimed that Sezer is acting not as the country's president, but as the leader of the opposition party. Thus, relations between the previous Parliament and President Sezer were very complicated. - See: Mosaki N. Z. Election of A. Gul as President of the Republic of Turkey - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2007/30-08-07a.htm

¹³ http://www.tsk.mil.tr; for excerpts from the memorandum of the Turkish Armed Forces in English, see: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm

^{Guryev A. A.} 14 On some results of the parliamentary elections in Turkey - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2007/24-07-07.htm

^{Mosaki N. Z.} 15 Edict Op.

^{The name itself is Mark.} 16 Erdogan, the triumph of the mutating Islamist / / Liberation. 23.07.2007 - inopressa.ru

^{Mammadov-Pashabeyli Fuad.} 17 The Turkish dilemma - http://i-r-p.ru/page/stream-event/index-14904.html

^Turban 18 in Turkey refers to the headdress of Muslim women covering the head, neck and shoulders. The ban on wearing headscarves was maintained for more than 80 years. - See Kanli Yusuf for more information. A New Era // TurkishDailyNews, 11.02.2008 - http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=62106&mailtofriend=1

¹⁹ Cumhuriyet, 12.02.2008.

^{Kanli Yusuf.} 20 Op. cit.

²¹ Battle of Constitutional Law // Sabah, 01.04.2008 - http://english.sabah.com.tr/895DCB2F729A4CE4A178B9150F24C7E7.html

²² http://rian.rU/world/20080314/101362516.html#lj

²³ АКР Installs Shariah by Using Democracy, Prosecutor says // Turkish Daily News, 17.03.2008 - http://www.turkishdailynews. com.tr/article.php?enewsid=99170

^{Demirtas Serkan.} 24 Shaken Ankara Full of Scenarios in New Era of Political Engineering // Turkish Daily News, 17.03.2008 - http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=99180

²⁵ Ergenekon is the name of a mythical land that became the ancestral home of the Turks. The story of the Ergenekon case began on June 12, 2007, when a search of a house in Istanbul's Umraniye district revealed a cache of weapons and computer files belonging to an organization of ultra-nationalist conspirators. Since the beginning of 2007, more than 200 people suspected of belonging to a secret organization have been arrested in connection with the investigation into the preparation of several coup attempts.

²⁶ Jumhuriyet, a secular-leaning daily newspaper, is particularly critical of the ruling Justice and Development Party.

²⁷ Turkish Top Court Draws Secularism Red Lines for AKP // Hurriyet-English, 01.08.2008 - http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=9565068

^{Demirtas Serkan.} 28 Verdict a Message to All // Turkish Daily News, 1.08.2008 - http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=111364

²⁹ Ibidem.

^{Akyol Mustafa.} 30 The verdict: Politically Good, Legally Awful // Turkish Daily News, 2.08.2008 - http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=111467

³¹ http://turtsia.ru/rus/index/news?id=13624

³² Cumhuriyet, 13.08.2009.

³³ Milliyet, 16.07.2009.

³⁴ World Economic Outlook. October, 2009. Sustaining the Recovery. International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/pdf/

³⁵ Hurriyet, 29.06.2009 - http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11961279_p.asp

^{Svistunova I. A.} 36 On the question of changing the role of the army in Turkey - http://iimes.ru/rus/stat/2009/18-07-09.htm

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