It is WELL known that Turkey is a country in a state of change. The transit from Kemalist ideology to post-Kemalist ideology, which is the subject of discussion and controversy, has a strong impact on various levels and areas of national life in Turkey.1 The Westernized image of the Kemalist modernization project is beginning to give way to alternative forms and understandings of modernity. Although the process of liberalization began in the 1980s, under the government of Turgut Ozal, it was only in the 1990s that the liberalization of the public sphere and political life collided with the centralist doctrines of Kemalist ideology, in particular, with the understanding of public space as homogeneous, and began to give rise to alternative interpretations of nationalism and secularism2. Intellectuals and columnists openly discuss Kemalist heritage every day, how to adapt Western modernity to the local context, how to preserve and update parts of the Ottoman heritage, how to reformat both secularism and nationalism in such a way as to take into account the hundreds of differences inherent in the Turkish context - religious, cultural

This article is based on the results of the scientific seminar "Multiple Moderns and a global post - secular society", which was held on May 4-6, 2011 at the University of Tor Vergata (Rome). The English version of this article will appear in the collection: Multiple Modernities and Postsecular Societies / Eds. Massimo Rosati and Kristina Stoeckl. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012 (Forthcoming). The rights to publish the article are provided by Ashgate Publishing house.

1. См. Gillalp H. AKP's Conservative Democracy: A Post-Kemalist Liberalism? // Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Hilton San Francisco & Renaissance Parc 55 Hotel. San Francisco, CA, 2004. Dagi I. Why do we need a post-Kemalist Republic? // Today's Zaman, 21/2, 2011.

2. Dressier M. Public-Private Distinctions, the Alevi Question, and the Headscarf: Turkish Secularism Revisited // Comparative Secularism in a Global World. Eds. L. E. Candy and E. S. Hurd. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010. P. 121 - 141.

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and ethnic. This debate has become increasingly intense since the June 2011 general election and on the eve of the promised drafting of a new constitution. Needless to say, the transition from Kemalist to post-Kemalist Turkey is highly controversial and is perceived as a threat to Kemalist sensibility. From international relations (Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is a refined intellectual and theorist of civilisations3) to television soap operas and fiction, Turkey's search for itself is evident. It is very interesting how this process affects the balance of power between secular and military authorities, the state and civil society, the center and the periphery (cultural, ethnic, religious and sometimes geographical). Although it is quite difficult to predict what these processes will lead to, it is quite possible to imagine that they will continue to challenge the image of Kemalist Turkey and contribute to the formation of an alternative modernity, some form of local modernity, to use the expression Nilufer Gele4.

Given the abundance of literature on Turkey devoted to the political, constitutional and philosophical aspects of the processes taking place in it, I would like to look at these processes from a different perspective, namely from the perspective of cultural analysis of the changes taking place in the symbolic and value system of modern Turkey. At the level of dynamics of the main Turkish system of values, one can observe the process of pluralization of the image of modernity, transformation of the concept and practice of secularism, and, above all, the process of forming a post-secular society. The transition from Kemalist to post-Kemalist Turkey is not only reflected, but also accomplished in the struggle for symbols. I will look at three symbols that express different views of modernity and secularism: (1) an old symbol undergoing transformation, (2) a new symbol emerging, and (3) an ancient symbol located between the past and the future. Each of them is contradictory because it is common, as is often the case with symbols. The struggle around these symbols with-

3. Dauutoglu A. Alternative Paradigms. Lanham: University Press of America, 1993. Davutoglu A. Civilizational Self-Perception // Divan. 1997. Vol.1.

4. Gole N. Manifestations of the Religious-Secular Divide: Self, State, and the Public Sphere // Comparative Secularism in a Global Age. Eds. L. E. Cady, E. S. Hurd. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010. P. 41 - 53.

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This creates the context in which the reconfiguration of modernity is currently taking place, which is an alternative to the Kemalist understanding of it - ideologically Westernized, but in fact far from always. After considering these symbols, I will try to draw more general conclusions from the Turkish case regarding the meaning and formation of a post-secular society.

Disputed characters

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: an old symbol undergoing transformation

There is no other image at the center of the Turkish value system that is comparable to that of the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey5. As Esra Ozyurek 6 rightly points out, anyone who comes to the country immediately meets images of Ataturk both in Istanbul and everywhere: in airports and on the streets, in public premises and in private shops, on coins and banknotes. Images of Ataturk, especially statues (the creation of which is regulated in detail), are an integral part of Kemalism as a state doctrine, which has sacred texts, rituals and pilgrimages, shrines and holidays.7 However, it should be noted that in the current context, there is a progressive transformation of the iconography of Ataturk, as well as the meaning of this powerful, universally recognized and practically indisputable symbol, which is protected both by law and by the morally compelling force of public opinion.

There are three main types of body representation of Ataturk: as a soldier, as a statesman, and as a man of the people.8 However if the first two are part of the traditional Republican iconography and symbolize the nez ideal-

5. Shils E. Center and Periphery. Essays in Macrosociology Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975; Mardin S. Center-Periphery as a Concept for the Study of Social Transformation // Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006.

6. Ozyilrek E. Nostalgia for the Modern. State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006.

7. Jenkins G. Political Islam in Turkey. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008. P. 81; Meeker M.E. Once There Was, Once There Wasn't. National Monuments and Interpersonal Exchange // Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Ed. S. Bozdogan, R. Kasaba. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997. P. 157 - 191.

8. Ozyilrek E. Nostalgia for the Modern. P. 96.

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In the case of an independent nation united under the banner of six arrows (nationalism, republicanism, populism, laicism, transformationism, statesmanship - the core of the right - wing corporatist understanding of a society with a charismatic leader), the third is the result of the transformation process that began in the 1990s. Instead of presenting Ataturk as a winning hero, 10 new commercialized images of Ataturk on various media (stickers, posters, T-shirts, ashtrays, lighters, and hundreds of other items) miniaturize his image and often portray him as a simple person "with his own social life and desires", 11 who retains the same Western style and tastes (hat, clothes), but penetrates into a different space. If the monumental images of the soldier and statesman are mainly found in the public space of streets, squares, and public places, then the new miniaturized and" humanized " images of Ataturk are present "in private affairs, in homes, and, more importantly, on the body of private people, that is, outside the direct jurisdiction of the state. In such miniaturized forms, images of Ataturk, while remaining icons of the state, become part of the bourgeois, domestic sphere of the subject. " 12 In homes, images of Ataturk are juxtaposed with wedding photos, and they can also be seen in small hairdressers or pharmacies. This process of miniaturization and, in a sense, privatization of the image of leadership is not only part of a broader process of commodification of life styles and identity symbols, 13 but also expresses, according to some interpreters, the privatization of secularism, the return of secularism to the private sphere under the onslaught of Islam, whose presence in the public sphere is growing. "My Ataturk" is with me at home, at work, in the car or on my body-as a symbol of nostalgia for modernity, despite "your hijabs" 14.

9. Parla Т., Davison A. Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey. Progress or Order? New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004.

10. Giesen B. Triumph and Trauma. Boulder-London: Paradigm Publishers, 2004.

11. Ozyilrek E. Nostalgia for the Modern. P. 105.

12. Ibid.

13. Navaro-Yashin Y. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

14. Ozyilrek E. Nostalgia for the Modern. P. 99.

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However, the transformation of this powerful symbol is not limited to this. It expresses not only a triumphalist Kemalist ideology that includes secularism; or, in its miniaturized and privatized form , the supposed current weakness of a secular, "white" Turkey in comparison with a Muslim, "black" Turkey.15 The image of Ataturk is a symbol so sacred, inviolable and widespread that in recent decades even Islamic movements have tried to reinterpret and appropriate it. For example, during the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Republic in 1998, the then-ruling Islamist Welfare Party showed images of Ataturk participating in public prayer, raising his hands, or images of him next to his wife Latifa in a headscarf. And recently, in October 2010, after months of controversy, President Gul celebrated the founding of the Republic of Turkey with a joint reception, whereas in previous years there were two receptions. Since his election in 2007, Gul has always given two separate receptions: one for military and government officials, and the other, in the evening, for journalists, NGO representatives, artists, and others. The second one was attended by married couples, and the women were either wearing headscarves or without headscarves. However, in 2010, he combined the two parties, and a few days later, his wife, who wears a headscarf, officially received German representatives in this form, walking down the red carpet and greeting Turkish soldiers. By introducing the headscarf into public spaces, Gul tried to make spaces associated with Ataturk's memory (such as the Dolmabahce Palace, where Ataturk died in 1938 and where official receptions are held) open to religious markers; he tried to separate the memory of Ataturk from Kemalism and the Kemalist understanding of secularism. Recently, in an interview, one of the members of Saadet Partisi (the Party of Happiness - the successor of the Islamist movement of Necmettin Erbakan) told me that if Ataturk were alive now, he would become a member of Saadet Partisi! These examples show how much his memory is revered and inviolable, even when it is assigned to someone else-

15. "Black Turks are those Anatolians and Rumelians (from the Balkans) who were excluded from the political and economic system, and white Turks are those who defined this system" (Yavuz M. H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P. 309, n. 31).

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malist groups and when the demythologization of this figure begins, as evidenced by recently published biographies and their discussions 16.

Hrant Dink: The Emerging Symbol

Hrant Dink is a Turkish-Armenian journalist, founder and director of the Turkish-Armenian weekly "Agos", which aimed to heal the torn Turkish memory of the Armenian extermination. He was shot dead on January 19, 2007 in broad daylight outside the editorial office. The killer was a young Turkish nationalist who was soon arrested. However, four years later, Dink's family, friends and public opinion are still waiting for justice: in fact, no one knows who armed the young nationalist, although the Turkish police and other structures are responsible for this, because they were warned about the plans to kill Dink, but they did not protect him. The murder of Dink is part of a more complex picture, reflecting the desire of some deep-seated forces to destabilize the situation in the country and encourage a new military intervention to restore the principles of kemalism (in this connection, they talk about the secret organization Ergenekon). Dink's funeral turned into a mass demonstration of anti-Semalist Turkey for freedom, equality and justice. Every year, on January 19, thousands of people gather at the Agos editorial office to remember Dink and the sacrifice he made, as well as to demand justice.

Today, a number of symbols are formed around the Dink figure (first of all, the white dove, now reproduced, for example, in Mersin, in a public park dedicated to the memory of Dink) and rituals that connect very different sectors of civil society: ethnic, cultural and religious minorities (primarily Armenian and Kurdish); representatives of the main Sunni Islam, who they share anti-Semalist sentiments; left-wing political parties and movements, trade unions, and civil rights activists. Dink is becoming a symbol of a pluralistic, democratic Turkey that is firmly focused on human rights and cosmopolitan values, but also does not deny the values of cultural values.

16. Hanioglu M.S. Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

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and religious differences and peculiarities. The "Friends of Dink" are mostly secular leftists; however, Dink himself, although not a particular fan of religious rituals, was well aware of the significance of religions for individual and collective life and saw them as part of a pluralistic public space. The figure of Dink becomes a symbol of Turkey, which is striving for such democratization, which corresponds to secularism not as a self-confident and aggressive form of repressive control and privatization of religions, but as a condition for equal access of all cultures and faiths to the public space. The memory of Dink is a challenge, first of all, for secular nationalism. From a sociological point of view, Dink does not represent a victorious hero like Ataturk, but rather the process of social construction of sacrifice, which modifies the relationship between the center and the periphery, moving categories that previously belonged to the marginals to the center of society and changing this sacred center itself.17 From a sociological point of view, it is extremely interesting that Dink's memory takes a highly ritualistic form: the annual commemoration next to the Agos editorial office is a spatial form of time, an "unofficial sanctuary" 18 that spontaneously emerged shortly after he was killed. As Dink's friends at Agos told me in an interview, through a ritual event, memories become a sacred space in front of the newspaper's editorial office, the editorial office, and now the Grant Dink Foundation itself. The volume of the article does not allow me to develop this idea here; I will only say that there is a kind of "grammar" of sacred spaces that are associated with ritual and the sacred, as well as with the functions that they perform. Roughly speaking, sacred spaces (including unofficial post-secular sanctuaries) have four features. It is a function of orientation, the ability to reflect a transcendent and more perfect order, to be a meeting place for the human and the sacred, and finally to contain and represent (always in part) sacred. More detailed analysis that goes beyond

17. See Giesen B. Triumph and Trauma.

18. Kong L. Global Shifts, Theoretical Shifts: Changing Geographies of Religions // Progress in Human Geography. 2010. March. P. 1 - 22; Delia Dora Engaging Sacred Space: Experiments in the Field // Journal of Geography in Higher Education. 2011. May. P. 163 - 184.

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This article would show that the temporary sanctuary that arose in connection with the memory of the Dinka corresponds exactly to this grammar and that through ritual actions a new sacred symbol is formed associated with the memory of the Dinka.

Hagia Sophia: The Glimmer of a post-secular Sanctuary

More recently, following the so-called spatial turn, a methodology for studying urban sanctuaries19 has been developed, the aim of which is to investigate how sacred spaces correspond to the affirmation of the virtue of respect for religious pluralism. Post-secular sanctuaries are those urban spaces where religious rituals promote social solidarity in cosmopolitan sociospaces. There is one historical sanctuary in Turkey that is particularly interesting as a possible candidate for a post-secular sanctuary. Its history is not unique to Turkey, there are 20 other sanctuaries with a similar history, but there is none that has the same artistic and symbolic scale. I'm talking about Hagia Sophia, or Hagia Sophia, in Istanbul. Built by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I the Great between 532 and 537, this church was dedicated to St. Sophia, which meant Christ as the incarnate Word, or as Wisdom incarnate. After serving as the Cathedral of Constantinople for 1,123 years, it had to serve as the Hagia Sophia Mosque for 481 years before becoming a museum in 1934. It was turned into a museum by Ataturk himself. Hagia Sophia is not only an amazing architectural monument and part of the universal heritage, but also a multi-layered religious symbol, a frozen memory of different religious communities.

One of the lessons of Maurice Halbwachs is that memories are always particular, since memory is necessarily the memory of a certain group, and in modern societies there are many

19. См. Greve A. Sanctuaries of the City: Lessons from Tokyo. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011; Beaumont J., Jedan C., Molendijk A. L. Exploring the Postsecular. The Religious, the Political, and the Urban. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2010; Knott K. The Location of Religion. A Spatial Analysis. London: Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2005.

20. Another example is the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Khor (Kariye Camii or Kariye Kilisesi), in Istanbul.

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21. Hagia Sophia, the Byzantine Church, is a sacred place that is at the center of the memory of Orthodox Christians; Hagia Sophia, the mosque , is a holy place that is remembered by Muslims. Today, it is a beautiful spatial manifestation of the Kemalist understanding of secularism: turning it into a museum meant neutralizing religious differences and conflicts, banishing them from public space and transforming them into aesthetic differences intended for tourists and art lovers. At the same time, Hagia Sophia is a controversial symbol. If the Kemalists want to keep it as a national museum, the Orthodox Christians want to reopen it as a place of Christian religious worship, and the Muslims as a place of Muslim worship. However, there is another, fourth, group-not so numerous, but including Hrant Dink and consisting of people who would welcome the transformation of Hagia Sophia into a multi-religious sanctuary, a symbol of a multi-religious country. Columnists, academics, and some political figures have suggested opening the space to Christian worship on Sundays and Muslim worship on Fridays, with the rest of the time open to visitors. Leaving aside the technical details, in this case we are dealing with a different understanding of secularism. Hagia Sophia's current status as a museum reflects secularism, understood as the privatization of religion and state control over religious symbols, a form of secularism that is characteristic of the Turkish state tradition. Those Orthodox and Muslims who want Hagia Sophia to be open to only one religion dream of a single memory that prevails, while those who think of a multi-religious sanctuary that performs different functions - among them Orthodox, Muslims and secularists-see it as a symbol of a different understanding of secularism. Again, I cannot go into details here, but I will say that the current state and future of Hagia Sophia has a very important symbolic meaning-of course, for Turkey, but also for a multicultural and multi-religious Europe.22
21. Halbwachs M. The Collective Memory. New York: Colophon Books, 1950; Halbwachs M. On Collective Memory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

22. This was also Dink's opinion (see his article in Agos weekly, 7 July 2006).

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Alternative moderns and the post-secular in Turkey

The transformation of Ataturk's iconography and official political ceremonies dedicated to his memory (such as receptions at the Dolmabahce Palace or Anitkabir, the Ataturk Memorial in Ankara), the emergence of a new symbol such as the Hrant Dink figure, and the controversy surrounding the status of Hagia Sophia are all evidence, among other things, of a major revision of the Kemalist understanding of secularism. However, in accordance with the causal understanding of ritual, according to which ritual is not only an expression of beliefs, but also a generator of them23, I believe that ceremonies that commemorate Independence, the founding of the Republic, or the day of Ataturk's death, and ceremonies that occur on the anniversaries of Dink's death, also have an impact on changes both in the basic value system of the Turkish collective identity and in the understanding of secularism. Hagia Sophia is a symbol of shared memory, but in principle, if we take into account different positions in the polemic about its status, it is a possible symbol of a different understanding of secularism24. Changes in the physical representation of Ataturk and in the use of public places associated with his memory indicate a new balance between Kemalist memory and Sunni Muslim culture above all. Hrant Dink, a symbol still controversial because of Kemalist hostility to minorities, becomes a symbol of a different view of national identity, open to the rights of minorities and to cultural and religious differences. Both the new memory of Atatürk and the memory of Dinka take the form of a ritual-a ritual that has all the features of a liturgical ritual, 25 since: these acts of remembrance are performed in holy places - although not in the religious sense-that are real sanctuaries; they are performed regularly; they correspond to a certain protocol, they have a certain value. a structure that has developed over the years, but is able to maintain a balance between the canons.-

23. См. Rosati M. Ritual and the Sacred. A Neo-Durkheimian Analysis of Politics, Religion and the Self. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

24. The status of Hagia Sophia is not currently being considered, but it is an issue that has been discussed from time to time.

25. For the difference between liturgical and mystical rituals, see Rosati M. Ritual and the Sacred.

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and they produce performative effects.

The overall effect of these ritualistic performances is that they challenge the basic Kemalist value system. As already mentioned, this process began in the 1980s, had its roots in the 1950s, after the end of the one-party system, and received a new impetus first in the 1990s, and then during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AK Parti). AK Parti is a key actor for understanding the current changes in Turkey and the current debate around the idea of secularism26. It can be seen as the last (temporary) result of the liberalization process initiated by Ozal and the (temporary) result of the transformation of the National Outlook Movement (Milli Gorus). Under the influence of structural factors (political participation, neoliberal economic policies and market expansion), as well as due to its own efforts (reinterpretation of religious tradition), AK Parti made the transition from an Islamic / Islamist movement to a party that is conservative in terms of social morality (and religiously inspired in its vision of tender roles, family life, etc.AK Parti is close to the Reagan-Thatcher ideology of neoliberalism in terms of economic deregulation and is fully committed to the language of human rights. 27 Although it is more often seen as modus vivendi-oriented, AK Parti is still concerned with building bridges not only between Turkey and Europe, but also between different sectors of Turkish society: Kemalists and Islamists Kurds and Turks, Turks and Armenians, Sunnis and Alawites, Muslims and other religious minorities. It is difficult to say whether those experts who believe that AK Parti is driven by pragmatic considerations and does not have a vision for the future of Turkey are right. It seems to me that it would be strange to be included in a very risky poly-

26. See Tere S. Beyond Sacred and Secular. Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008; Yavuz M.H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey; Cizre U. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. The making of the Justice and Development Party. London: Routledge, 2008; Hale W.M., Ezbudun E. Islam, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey. The Rise of the АКР. London: Routledge, 2009.

27. Yavuz M. H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey; Cizre U. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey.

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the process of so-called "democratic openness" (which concerns the solution of the Kurdish issue, but also other minorities, as well as the reconciliation of cultural and religious differences), without such a vision. In recent years, it seems that AK Parti's ability to democratize the country has been exaggerated, and many lament the weakening of its original reformist stance. There are limitations and contradictions in the government's activities, as well as manifestations of authoritarianism towards the media and indecision regarding "democratic openness". However, it is obvious that the main obstacle to further democratization of the country is still the Kemalist opposition.

As for secularism, the position of AK Parti and intellectuals close to the ruling party 28 is unequivocal: secularism is an integral part of Ataturk's legacy, an integral part of Turkish identity, a fundamental constitutional principle and, above all, a necessary condition for living together. However, we need to live together while preserving our differences. In other words, the position of AK Parti is also unambiguous in the sense of challenging the Kemalist interpretation of secularism.

It is useful to distinguish between French Laicism, on the one hand, and religious freedom in the Anglo-American context, on the other.29 In the first case, the separation of religion and politics, usually in a situation of religious monopoly, means controlling religion and expelling it from the public sphere: this is a form of anti-religious secularism, tolerant out of a sense of duty, but at least skeptical when it comes to the value of religions. In the second case, religious freedom aims to protect religions, usually in a situation of religious pluralism, from State interference and encourages religions to reveal their ability to generate social capital in the public sphere. Depending on several other variables, such as reli-

28. См. Karasipahi S. Muslims in Modern Turkey. Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals. London: I.B.Tauris, 2009.

29. Yavuz M.H. Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere and the February 28 Process // Journal of International Affairs. 2000. 54. P. 21 - 42; Yavuz M. H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey; Diotallevi L. Church-State relations in Europe and the crisis of the "European model" // Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe / Eds. G. Motzkin and Y. Fisher. London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2008. P. 125 - 139.

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religious pluralism, doctrinal beliefs, etc., this type of division can be assessed from the point of view of the religions themselves, whose integrity is supposed to be protected from the corrupting effects of more direct involvement in secular and political affairs. In principle, the above argument may be a good reason for secularism to be accepted from a religious point of view.30
The Turkish case is particularly interesting and complex. The type of secularism that was characteristic of Kemalist elites at various stages of the republic's history - during the one-party system (1924-1950), during the multi-party system (1950-1983), during the neoliberal revolution (1984-1999), and finally during the last period of AK Parti's rule-is a clear example of a self-confident, militant, comprehensive, or metaphysical (in Rawls ' words) secularism. In Turkey, State secularism can actually be understood as a form of colonization of the life world by a political system, 31 aimed at repressing religious and cultural differences - which are perceived as a threat to the integrity of the State and the republic - in order to create a homogeneous public space.32 Secularism has taken shape (and still takes shape in significant sectors of the political and cultural system) Jacobin Laicism, which is closely connected with the downward process of nation-building, which for a long time in the relevant specialized literature was understood as the only and almost "natural" way to modernize and democratize the country.33 In the light of old theories of modernization, often linked to orthodox theories of secularization, even the authoritarian aspects of Kemalism are difficult to understand.-

30. See Taylor Ch. Modes of Secularism // Secularism and its Critics. Ed. R. Bhargava. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

31. Habermas J. The Theory of Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity, 1984.

32. Yauuz M.H., Esposito L. (eds). Turkish Islam and the Secular State. The Giilen Movement. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003; Parla Т., Davison A. Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey; Meeker M.E. Once There Was, Once There Wasn't. National Monuments and Interpersonal Exchange // Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Ed. S. Bozdogan, R. Kasaba. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997. P. 157 - 191.

33. Berkes N. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. New York: Routledge, 1998; Lerner D. The Passing of Traditional Society. Free Press: Glencoe, 1958; Lewis B. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

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whether it is justified from the point of view of theories of tutelary democracy34.

Habermas ' concept of colonization of the world of life is particularly relevant in understanding this process of secularization as creating obstacles to religious influence in various areas: education, the economy, the family, dress codes, language expressions, and everyday practices that relate to almost all aspects of life. As a process of colonization, secularism in Turkey meant not just the separation of politics and religion and the neutrality of the state, but also the creation of means of controlling religion (Islam) in two ways: through the construction of the eastern "other", on the one hand, and through the formation of national Islam through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, on the other 35. Lailik in Turkey implies both separation and control 36. In my opinion, a common but at the same time most characteristic feature of Kemalism's efforts to create a secular nation-state was "skepticism, or fear of society"37, understood as something fundamentally anemic. However, in modern Turkey, there are other views on secularism. According to Yavuz, there are currently three positions in the secularist camp: (1) a rigid Kemalist version of militant secularism (self-confident, metaphysical); (2) " a conservative Turkish-Muslim understanding of secularism as controlling religion; (3) a liberal concept of secularism with an emphasis on separating politics from religion (freedom of religion)"38. The first version leaves no room for any religious tradition in any form, the second version gives place to Sunni Islam, but ignores the popular Islam of the Tariqahs 39, Alawites 40 and others-

34. Parla Т., Davison A. Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey. P. 4.

35. Yavuz M. H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey.

36. Davison A. Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey. New Haven: Yale, 1998.

37. Yavuz M. H., Esposito L. (eds). Turkish Islam and the Secular State. P. xxiii.

38. Yavuz M. H. Cleansing Islam. P. 153.

39. See Ozdalga E. The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey. Surrey: Curzon, 1998; Ozdemir A., Frank K. Visible Islam in Modern Turkey. Houndmills: Palgrave / MacMillan Press, 2000.

40. См. Clarke G. L. The World of the Alevi. New York: AVC Publications, 1999; Shankland D. The Alevis in Turkey. The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition. London: Routledge, 2003.

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religious minorities 41, while the third version is "protected by Istanbul's big business, some politicians and the Alawite community" 42.

As I will emphasize below, I am skeptical of this description of the situation. According to the most widespread opinion, Turkey will move, or should move, from an offensive Kemalist secularism to a passive form of secularism, and this difference parallels the difference between secularism as a comprehensive doctrine and secularism as neutrality in the context of the coexistence of different worldviews. This opinion doesn't really convince me. If all this is true, then Turkey is, so to speak, "simply" moving from one Westernized model of modernity to another, from France (although the Kemalist model of secularism was not French, officially France was the model and source of inspiration) to England. Despite the fact that I like this route, I don't think it corresponds to reality. In my opinion, Turkey is interesting (theoretically, sociologically, and perhaps also from a normative point of view) precisely because it is experiencing something like a "local modernity", following an alternative path to regularize the relations between politics and religion, religion and society, relying on its own resources and its Ottoman past. It seems to me that Turkey, with the help of its political and cultural post-Kemalist but also post-Islamist elitists43, is trying to transform huzun (a sense of "deep spiritual loss", according to Orhan Pamuk, the true soul of Istanbul 44) into a positive resource in order to create a new modernity and find a new way of treating religions (plural) in a post-secular way. an epoch.

The process of change that was crucial for the transition from a secular to a post-secular Turkey has been going on in waves since the 1980s. Turgut Ozal's reformist policy was focused on economic, social and political issues.

41. См. Kieser H. -L. (ed). Turkey Beyond Nationalism. Towards Post-Nationalists Identities. London: I.B.Tauris, 2006.

42. Yavuz M.H. Cleansing Islam. P. 153.

43. См. Karasipahi S. Muslims in Modern Turkey.

44. См. Isin E.F. The Soul of a City: Huzun, Keyf, Longing // Orienting Istanbul / Eds. D. Goktiirk, L. Soysal, I.Tureli. London: Routledge, 2010. P. 35 - 50.

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liberalization. In fact, as early as the 1960s, the new bourgeoisie began to express doubts about the understanding of modernization that was typical of the civil-military bureaucracy. However, it was during Ozal's rule that the strong Kemalist iron cage began to weaken, and "the new Anatolian business class, together with Istanbul's entrepreneurs, grew stronger." 45 This process, described here in almost "Marxist" terms, has opened up - in Mardin's apt phrase-new spaces of opportunity, primarily in the economic sector, but also in the social and political spheres. Especially important, from a sociological point of view, was the role played by media networks, 46 the Said Nursi movement, 47 earlier, and the Fethullah Gulen movement later, 48 in opening up new public spheres (plural 49) to religious influences and in local contextualization of modernity.

Contrary to the early modern theories of modernization, in this case the process of modernization (for example, liberalization in the economic sphere) did not imply either a secularist trend or a reactionary resistance to modernity, but was the creation of hybrid forms of life, practices and beliefs. To fill the gap created by these new opportunities, 50 conscious Muslims have initiated discussions in the public sphere about a new understanding of justice and modernity. Sociologists, and here it is necessary to mention, first of all, the pioneering and authoritative work of Nilufer Gele, can now give us a detailed, informative and impressive description of the socio-cultural practices that, creating tension in Turkish society, transform it at the molecular level. Religious education and the problem of headscarves -

45. Yavuz M. H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey. P. 16; see also Tugal C. Passive Revolution. Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

46. Yavuz M.H., Esposito L. Turkish Islam and the Secular State (ch. 5).

47. Mardin S. Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. The case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. New York: State University of New York Press, 1989.

48. Yavuz M.H., Esposito L. Turkish Islam and the Secular State.

49. Qinar A. Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey. Bodies, Places, and Time. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008; Grigoriadis N. Trials of Europeanization. Turkish political Culture and the European Union. Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2009.

50. Yavuz M.H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey.

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these are perhaps the most obvious and well-known of the relevant phenomena.51 From a sociological point of view, the post-secular in Turkey manifests itself, in my opinion, in such things as the opening of Muslim cafes, where men and women discuss tender roles, like literature, which describes new images of women and men, like architecture and music, in which rationalistic and ideal types are combined with the Islamic renaissance, and item no. 52

Turkey and Multiple Modernities: towards a common definition of the post-secular

During the republican period in Turkey, the question of the relationship between religion (s), politics and society was solved in different ways. Although in this case I am interested in the current processes taking place in the Turkish context, I am sure that the Turkish experience allows us to draw more general conclusions regarding the correlation of modernity (s) and religion (s). In the past, what is happening in Turkey was viewed in the light of old theories of modernization and secularization, but now, when the crisis of old theories of modernization is accompanied by a crisis of orthodox theories of secularization53, we can learn something from the Turkish experience that is relevant to possible new ways of interpreting the relationship between modern societies and religions. Trying to summarize the above considerations, we can say that since 1923, there have been three different forms of correlation between religion (s) and secular politics in Turkey: (1) mutual non-recognition of religious and secular forms of life; (2) authoritarian secular politics versus religion; (3) paternalistic domestication of religion (s) from the side of politics. Although the story,

51. Gole N. The Forbidden Modern. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996; Gole N., Amman L. Islam in Public. Turkey, Iran, and Europe. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University, 2006; Ozdalga E. The Veiling Issue; Cinar A. Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey.

52. Yavuz M.H. Islam Political Identity in Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; Komegoglu U. New Sociabilities: Islamic Cafes in Istanbul // Islam in Public. Turkey, Iran, and Europe. Ed. N. Gole, L. Ammann. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 1996; Cayir K. Islamic Novels: A Path to New Muslim Subjectivities // Islam in Public. Turkey, Iran, and Europe.

53. Beckford J.A. Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 (ch. 2); Davie G. The Sociology of Religion. London: Sage, 2007 (ch. 3).

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Of course, much more complex than this scheme, I would say that mutual non-recognition was the main form of correlation between secular politics and religion (s) in 1923-1950, authoritarian politics took place in the 1950s and 1980s, when, faced with authoritarian Kemalist elites, religions began to play a democratizing role, and paternalistic politics took place in the 1950s and 1980s. form-in 1980-2000, during the creation of the Islamic-Turkish synthesis. The period from 2000 to the present is characterized by an ambiguous and uncertain process of creating a post-secular modernity.

At the end of our trip to Turkey, which is too short to take into account the complexity of this amazing country, my theoretical suggestion is that perhaps we should try to extract a four-part model from the Turkish case in order to analyze the relationship between religion (s) and secular politics, the analytical usefulness of which should be tested on other examples in other countries. contexts. Empirically, it is created by generalizing the Turkish experience, theoretically-by focusing on the place and role of the idea of reflexivity in both religious and secular worldviews. I cannot now fully describe the way in which I came to analyze these two dimensions - religious reflexivity and the reflexivity of secular modernity-namely, to reconstruct the reading of Western modernity proposed by two very different (but, in my opinion, complementary) authors: Habermas and Seligman.54 From a theoretical point of view, it is enough to say that the four-part model is the result of crossing these two dimensions: the reflexive capacity of Western modernity and the reflexive capacity of religious traditions. The reflexivity of modernity means the ability to rationally discuss reasoned claims, the ability understood as the sole source of legitimacy of the social and political order, and the ability that modernity must realize in relation to the assertion of reason itself in order to fully satisfy the need for meaning and the functional needs of modern societies.

54. Rosati M. Postsecular Modernities: A Sociological Reading, report delivered at the annual conference of the British Sociological Association in Birmingham (unpublished. 2011).

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As far as religion is concerned, this reflexive ability of modernity manifests itself in the rejection of imperial pretensions through reason and in the rejection of self-destructive secularism. The mutual recognition of reason and faith for each other's limitations led Habermas to define the post-secular as a process of complementary learning from faith and reason, religious and secular worldviews.55 On the other hand, the reflexivity of religious traditions, a concept that goes back to Seligman's categories, means the ability of religious traditions to deal with modernity, understood as civilization, without abandoning their own characteristics, without resorting to assimilation, but finding internal, specifically religious resources in order to articulate a principled position that presupposes tolerance and pluralism. The reflexivity of religion means the recognition of religious differences as explicit and internally grounded practices of individuals and groups and the affirmation of" fundamental tolerance", capable of recognizing the internal and external" other", based not on liberal, but on religious grounds proper.

My point is that the reflexivity of modernity, on the one hand, and the reflexivity of religions, on the other, are two defining dimensions of the idea of a post-secular society, at least from a sociopolitical point of view. But this is only one aspect. In fact, these are not only the two defining dimensions of the idea of post-secular societies, but also the two constitutive dimensions and even the conditions of actual post-secular social practices. Roughly speaking, we can say that the highest levels of modern reflexivity and religious reflexivity will start the process of mutual learning of secular and religious forms of life, which in turn will creatively give life to hybrid social practices, rearrange the boundaries between the two domains, make identity, role and space a subject of discussion, etc. Post-secular forms of life depend on post-secular social practices, which in turn depends on the levels of reflexivity of modernity and religions. Based on these two variables, we have four possible types of relationships between modernity and religions.

55. Habermas J. On the Relations Between the Secular Liberal State and Religion // Political Theologies. Public Religions in a Post-secular World. Ed. H. de Vries, L. E. Sullivan. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006. P. 251 - 260.

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The first option (A) denotes a state of affairs that I call "mutual non-recognition", reminiscent of the first phase of secularization theories, when it was expected that traditional religions would disappear from the modern horizon, and science would replace them as a new faith, and when religions were at war with the main cultural and socio-political features of modernity. This state of affairs corresponds to post-revolutionary France, but also to the current disputes between neo-Atheists and religious integralists, who share the same Cartesian anxiety. In Turkey, this corresponds to the" golden age " of the Kemalist republic, the period of the one-party system between 1923 and 1950. In this situation, no mutual learning process is possible.

The second state of affairs (B) is a completely different picture. Here we have a low level of modern reflexivity and a relatively high level of religious reflexivity. I call this situation "authoritarian modernity" because in this case religious movements acquire a democratizing orientation in relation to the larger society. A classic example is Solidarity in Poland. By demanding religious freedom, social movements are paving the way for other categories of rights. Often, when they talk about religious rights, they consciously adopt the language of human rights, reinterpreted from within their own language, and defend not only the rights of Catholicism, Islam or other traditions, but also the rights of others.

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authoritarian, but quite modernized regimes. The assimilation of the human rights discourse shows that religious movements are able to enter the public sphere and defend their right to be actors in it, without abandoning their symbols and signs, but also without separating themselves into certain "liberated zones"56, separated from modern society. In this situation, religions are on the periphery, but tend to penetrate the hostile center, whereas in situation A, they are not necessarily on the periphery of the social system. In Turkey, the situation corresponds to the phase between 1950 and 1980, when religion (here Sunni Islam) gained political representation in the democratic party and began to move towards the center of the Turkish symbolic system.

The third possibility (D) represents the opposite situation. Here we have a relatively high level of modern reflexivity, but a low level of religious reflexivity. I would call this a state of paternalistic suppression of religion. This state is typical of contexts characterized by a strong religious monopoly, which forces secular actors to interact strategically with at least the main religious tradition. In this situation, secular forces, instead of a confrontational approach, choose the path of instrumentalization of the main religious tradition in order to use it in a functional way. This is neither an a priori rejection of religion, nor a sincere recognition of it, but an instrumentalist exploitation of its resources (integration, identification, etc.). Religion is considered not as a religion, that is, sincerely, but as a functional resource. On the other hand, religious reflexivity is very low, because religious actors are torn between a radical refusal to have anything to do with the secular world, on the one hand, and a willingness to be used in exchange for public recognition, on the other. In Turkey, this corresponds to the phase between 1981 and 2000, when secular politicians exploited primarily Sunni Islam for nationalist purposes, in the form of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and when the Refah party chose a confrontational approach towards the secular state.

Let us now consider the fourth possibility (C), which indicates a post-secular situation. It's kind of counterintuitive.-

56. Roy О. The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.

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It is similar to situation A and indicates how two different situations must meet in order for a post-secular society to be actualized. Such a society should have highly reflective contemporary social, cultural, and political subsystems, on the one hand, and highly reflective religious social and political domains, on the other. This is the only way to launch a fruitful mutual learning process. Society should be, as Davey puts it, "quite modern and quite religious."57. Needless to say, this configuration runs counter to "orthodox" theories of secularization. At the same time, the presence in the public sphere of highly reflective contemporary structures and highly reflective religious actors means that the idea of a post-secular society has little in common with the idea of a desecularized society.58 If this is not the case, then the concept of a post-secular society will lose its meaning as an analytical tool for considering societies that have never been fully secularized or in which religions have always been public religions in the Casanova sense (such as Italy or Spain, for example) .59 We must free ourselves from the notion that the post - secular era is an obscurantist return to the Middle Ages.

More analytically speaking, the post-secular situation requires:

1) reflexivity, historical consciousness, and the activity dimension, i.e., the three features inherent in any axial civilization.;

2) co-existence of secular and religious worldviews;

3) the deprivation of religious movements that claim to be publicly recognized as communities of faith that adhere to specific belief systems and practices;

57. Davie G. The Sociology of Religion. P. ix.

58. Berger P. The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Washington: Eerdmans Publishing, 1999.

59. Thiebaut C. Secularizing traditional Catholicism: Laicism and laicite // Philosophy & Social Criticism. 2010. March. 36. P. 365 - 380 (special issue on Postsecularism and Multicultural Jurisdictions. Reset-Dialogues Istanbul Seminars 2008 - 2009).

60. Axial Civilizations and World History. (Eds. Arnason J. P., Eisenstadt S. N., Wittrock В.). Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2005.

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4) pronounced religious pluralism (which is provided not only by the so-called new religious movements, but also by traditional religions), which encourages religious movements to strengthen their reflexivity and excludes monopolism;

5) secular citizens and groups who, in the words of Habermas, "do not immediately exclude the possibility of truth in religious concepts of the world and do not challenge the right of their fellow believers to make their contribution to public discussion expressed in religious language." 61;

6) a new introduction of authentic axial representations as an expression of the sacred; the sacred cannot be expressed in civil symbols alone (flag, constitution, political religions, etc.) and cannot take exclusively immanent forms.

If these conditions are met, then in principle new post-secular social practices can generate hybrid forms of life at both the social and political level. At the sociological level, post-secular practices can create new relationships between the sexes and roles, a new understanding of public and private, generally accepted codes of decency, etc. At the political and constitutional level, they can create new institutional arrangements that are more or less different from the liberal ones. This is by definition an open process that is very context-dependent, so it is impossible to describe or predict it in detail. We can only say with confidence that it will work as a potential multiplier of the forms that modernity can take. The result of post-secular social practices will be not only a multitude of moderns, but also alternative forms of modernity, or "local moderns" .62 Moreover, the formation of a post-secular society involves a major reconfiguration of the relationship between the center and the periphery and the multiplication of centers with complex relations between the center and the periphery.-

61. Habermas J. On the Relations Between the Secular Liberal state and Religion. P. 260.

62. Gole N. Interpenetrations. L'Islam et l'Europe. Paris: Galaade Editions, 2005; Eisenstadt S.N. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, 2 Vol. Leiden: Brill, 2003; TaylorCh. Two Theories of Modernity // Alternative Modernity. Ed. D. P. Gaonkar. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001.

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between them and their relations to multiple peripheries. In my opinion, Turkey can be considered as a laboratory in which a post-secular society and a local form of modernity are generated.63
Translated from English by Alexander Kyrlezhev

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