To all the economic and social problems that have been shaking Yemen for many years, a new protracted internal ideological and political crisis has been added in the northern province of Saada1 Bloody clashes between government forces and followers of the Zaydite spiritual leader Sayyid Hussein al-Houthi, which began in June 2004, escalated into a large-scale, chronic war. The novelty of the conflict in question for Yemen lies in the presence of signs of militant Islamism in the actions of both the rebels and the government. An important role in it belongs to Wahhabism imported from neighboring Saudi Arabia. Yemen's new religious ideology seems to have become a factor of domestic politics. For the first time in modern history, Yemen has become the scene of sectarian clashes. The internal political situation in Yemen, the only Arab state with a republican system, is becoming increasingly explosive.

SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

After the extradition of about 850,000 Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in late 1990 as punishment for their anti-American stance

1 According to the 2004 census, Saada province has a population of about 700,000 people, an area of over 11,000 square kilometers and includes 15 districts.

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As a result of the 1994 civil war, which caused an estimated $ 10 billion in economic damage, Yemen was on the verge of bankruptcy. The country's population grew rapidly and reached 20 million. At the same time, the standard of living of more than half of the residents fell below the poverty line, and unemployment reached 35%. The real scourge of the Yemeni economy was galloping inflation with a jump in prices for basic consumer goods [Yemen Economic..., 2002].

In 1995, Yemen agreed to cooperate with international financial institutions - the IMF and the World Bank, which developed special programs for it and monitored its economic situation. As part of these programs, dozens of inefficient factories from a small number of industrial enterprises in the country were closed; subsidies for socially important goods were reduced, the prices of which increased several times as a result; thousands lost their jobs due to the reduction of the state apparatus. Yemenis did not hide their attitude to the IMF and the World Bank and publicly protested against the government's cooperation with them. However, economic problems forced the management to continue working with these institutions in the hope of receiving support from the United States. In addition to the resumption of aid from Western countries, it was expected to facilitate Yemen's entry into the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes all the Arabian monarchies - the largest donors to developing countries in the world.

In 2001, after the tragedy of September 11, Yemen's strategic partnership with the United States in the war on international terrorism became official. The US interest in Yemen, in addition to the factor of its geopolitical position, was caused, in turn, by the obvious threat of the spread of Islamic extremism from there. According to the British BBC news agency, about 40,000 people have returned to Yemen. Yemeni "Afghans" hired in the eighties to fight the Soviets [Yemen's Catalyst..., 2002]. Yemen has become a hub for Islamist groups linked to al-Qaeda. At the turn of 2000 they organized a series of terrorist attacks in the country, which affected Western tourists and the US military. The greatest resonance was caused by the explosion of a boat with a suicide bomber on board the USS Cole in the port of Aden, which claimed the lives of 17 American sailors, and also caused serious damage to the French tanker Limburg in 2002. [YemeniPresident..., 2000]. In addition, in Yemen, the recruitment of militants for the war with American troops in Iraq was in full swing.

As part of a partnership with the United States, US military advisers and intelligence officials have been deployed to help the regime train Yemeni units to fight al-Qaeda terrorist cells and strengthen border guards. The new anti-terrorist special services are headed by the president's son, Colonel Ahmad Ali Abdullah, who previously headed the National Guard, the elite of the Yemeni army.

The main item of the country's budget expenditures, despite the fact that Yemen is among the poorest countries in the world in terms of basic economic indicators, was the army and special services subordinate to the President and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. About 8% of the budget was spent on financing military expenditures (according to experts, the total cost of the military unit is 40%), and according to this indicator, Yemen ranks sixth among Arab countries. [List of Countries...; Phillips, 2006].

Failures in the economy have contributed to a decline in the prestige of the government, compounded by the spread of corruption in the state apparatus and numerous scandals involving high-ranking officials, including many relatives of the president. Mass rallies and demonstrations in cities under anti-American slogans exerted strong pressure on the government of the country and forced it to

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to hide from the public many aspects of cooperation with Washington, so as not to provoke new outbursts of indignation.

A distinctive feature of Yemen's domestic policy after 1994 was the noticeable strengthening of the Islamic factor. Many years before the declaration of war on terrorism, as part of a partnership with the United States, the state took a number of steps that allowed militant Islamism to take root in the state apparatus itself.

A network of religious colleges established in the early 1970s played an important role in the politicization of Islam in Yemen (maahid ilmiyyah), operating under the patronage of Sheikh Abdullah Hussein Al-Ahmar and generously funded by Saudi Arabia. The new network was impressive in its scale: between 900 and 1,000 colleges were established before 1997, with half a million students and a budget of $ 50 million. These colleges were dominated by teaching Wahhabism. They explained to students that previous generations were bad believers, kuffarami; their parents ' marriages were made incorrectly with inappropriate dancing and nasheeds (songs), and Friday visits to the tombs of revered saints were a manifestation of reprehensible innovations - bidaedit [Leveau, Marmier, Steinbach, 1999, p. 178].

Maahids were especially popular in rural areas, as they came from tribes (kabili) they were able to imitate the former elite by sending their children to study religion. In addition, people sought to gain the favor of the powerful Sheikh A. H. al-Ahmar, the curator of colleges. Many Ma'ahid graduates have joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood2, which became the core of the new "Political Association for Reforms" (Islam), created on the basis of Law No. 66 of 16.10.1991 "On parties and political organizations", which allowed multi-party membership. The organization was headed by the same Chairman of the Parliament, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. the sheikh confederations of tribes hashed A. H. al-Ahmar, and the second person of Islam and the head of its Islamic wing was Sheikh Abdul-Majid al-Zindani3, whom the United States, declaring him the spiritual mentor of the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, demanded to be extradited to organize a trial over him.

From the moment of his appearance, Islah began to fight with activists of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) under the slogan of defending Yemeni identity against the "Western threat", which, in their opinion, was expressed in the demand of the YSP to build a state based on secular principles. Islam's position on this issue was "heard" by the President immediately after the victory of the ruling pro-presidential party, the General National Congress (GNA), in the 1993 parliamentary elections, when the second place was taken not by the YSP, but by the Yslah.

The demonstrative inclusion of the odious figure of Sheikh A. - M. al-Zindani in the Presidential Council in 1993, along with A. A. Salih (VNK) and A. S. al-Beid (YSP), was a sign of the president's departure from the agreements reached during the unification of the two countries and evidence of the beginning of a split. The President chose Islamism as the main tool of mobilization against the socialists of the "south" in the struggle for leadership. It is noteworthy that this motive did not arouse much suspicion on the part of the United States and most Western countries at that time, despite all the efforts of the South Yemeni socialists to make public the facts of terrorism committed by Islamist militants against the leadership and cells of the YSP.

2 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in north Yemen in the late 1950s, and after 1970, it began to flourish with the activities of the Ma'ahid ilmiyyah network of religious schools.

3 Sheikh AM al-Zindani is a member of a prominent Zaidi clan, converted to Wahhabism, and heads the largest Islamic University in Yemen, Al-Iman, which has 4.5 thousand students from different countries.

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Sheikh A. H. Al-Ahmar himself, not being a religious figure, openly sympathized with the concept of an Islamic state. After overseeing the largest network of religious schools in Yemen, the Sheikh welcomed the promotion of Wahhabism, a self-proclaimed religion. lamazhabiya, that is, a teaching that is beyond all doubt. madhhabs, a kind of universal Islam4 Did he not see this orientation as the way to create a hybrid republic with the Islamic state?

After defeating the South Yemeni separatists in 1994, the country's parliament, at the initiative of Islam, adopted an amendment to the constitution recognizing Sharia law as the sole source of law. The socialists ' positions in the state apparatus were taken by active Islamists co-opted into the ruling VNK. This injection served as a catalyst for the emergence of new types of conflict for the country. Having established itself in state structures, militant Wahhabism has contributed to the aggravation of relations between the state and influential religious figures from traditional Yemeni communities (such as zeyditskoy, as well as shafi'i).

This was the situation at the beginning of the strategic partnership with the United States in the fight against terrorism. On the one hand, the Yemeni state participated in the fight against Islamic extremists on its territory, and on the other, it opened a wide road for their militant co - religionists to penetrate into all the structures of the state apparatus. It is noteworthy that since 2002, Yemen has launched a program of "dialogue" with detained Islamist terrorists, which is being conducted by a commission specially created by the State with the aim of re-educating and rehabilitating them [Terrorism Monitor, 2005]. Thanks to this, many perpetrators escape punishment and are released.

An example of the state's ambivalent policy towards extremists is the detention and then the escape from prison of the Yemeni Political Security Service (SPS) of all the main suspects involved in the bombings of an American destroyer and a French tanker. The disappearance of 23 defendants from the cell of the Central prison of St. Petersburg Sana'a in November 2006 through a three-hundred-meter underground passage aroused suspicions among newspaper reporters of involvement in the escape of St. Petersburg itself. It occurred a day before the trial of the main defendant in the organization of the explosion of the American destroyer - Hamdi al-Ahdal [Yemen Times, 918, 2006].

The regime's failures in domestic and foreign policy have caused ferment in the highest echelons of power and sharpened the rivalry between the parties, leading to the virtual isolation of the GNK. In 1990-2001, it was the strategic alliance of the VNK and Islakh (whose leaders were relatives-President A. A. Salih and Chairman of the Parliament Sheikh A. H. al-Ahmar, respectively) that first ensured the victory of the northern Yemeni power elite in the war with the "southerners", and after 1994-maintaining the stability of the regime through a solid position in the elections of key republican government agencies5.

However, in 2001-2003, the alliance of the ruling parties-the VNK and the second most important political force - the Islah organization-split, which significantly changed the balance of power in the country. In 2002, Islakh joined the opposition bloc formed by six political organizations. They were given the name" Joint Meeting Parties " (JMP). It is noteworthy that the PSP was initially not even considered seriously as a political bloc due to the existing intractable ideological differences between its participants. The three main parties in the PSP - Islah, YSP, and Al-Haqq-declared each other to be the main ideological ABMs-

4 In fact, Wahhabism is considered a late branch of the Sunni madhhab of Imam Ibn Hanbal.

5 In 1999, Islah supported the candidacy of A. A. Salih for the post of president, which gave him a victory of 96% of the vote, in 2001. Islah voted for the presidential amendments to the constitution, which allowed him to increase the presidential term from 5 to 7 years.

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almost in the program documents! The Wahhabi-dominated Islamic wing of Islah made a major contribution to the defeat of the YPG in 1990-1994. Wahhabis, on the other hand, are implacable enemies of Shiites, including the Zaydites of the Al-Haqq party. The Zaydi Al-Haqq Party, in turn, explicitly declared Wahhabism its main ideological enemy in its 1990 founding manifesto and denounced it as" imperialism in an Islamic guise "and" an irrational and intolerant version of our religion " (Leveau, Marmier, Steinbach, 1999, p.181). The YSP, which retained its secular orientation after the 1994 defeat, found itself for the first time in the company of parties with a clearly religious orientation.

After the parliamentary elections of 2003, there was a smoothing of differences within the PSP on the basis of antagonism towards the ruling GNK. In the 2006 presidential election, which was won by incumbent President A. A. Salih, they were even able to field a single candidate (former socialist F. Bin-Shamlan), which would have been impossible just five years earlier.

In our opinion, the main role in the politicization of Islam in the country belonged to proselytism. Traditional movements and sects of Yemen (Shafi'is, who made up more than 70% of the population, and Zaydites-about 25%) they are very close, despite belonging to different religious and legal schools of Islam. They share the concept of Islamic law (fiqh) Imam Shafi'i, which has long provided a uniform understanding of sharia throughout the country, despite the political fragmentation of Yemen in the pre-revolutionary past6
The most important doctrinal difference between Shafi'ism and Zaydism was the question of the imamate, but this did not disrupt their peaceful coexistence for many centuries.

In modern Yemeni Zaydism, there are two main trends. First - hadawiya (on behalf of the first Yemeni Imam Al-Hadi Ilal-Haqq, who died in 911) holds the view that the imam must necessarily be a worthy representative of the family alidov7 - descendants of the Prophet's daughter Fatima and his cousin Ali bin Abi Talib. The second, relatively new trend believes that the main thing for a ruler is his ability to correctly interpret divine revelation, and not his blood relationship with the Prophet. The origins of this trend are also found in the interpretation of the judgments of Imam Zayd bin Ali, the great-grandson of Ali bin Abi Talib, the founder of Zaydism (revered by the Zaydites as the "fifth" imam). This position was further developed in the founding manifesto of the Zaydi Al-Haqq party of 1990, which denies the eternal value of the teaching of the imamate. It, according to the manifesto, brought discord among Muslims and only led to discord in the ranks of the Alids themselves, as well as quarreled them with the sheikhs of the tribes, who also wanted to claim spiritual power. The manifesto proclaims the right of any Muslim to be elected as a leader of the faithful for their personal qualities and commitment to the law. The status of such a leader, according to this concept, is defined as a "paid servant" - ajir [Leveau, Marmier, Steinbach, 1999, p. 187 - 193].

The evolution of the views of modern Yemeni Zaidi theologians took place in conditions of distrust and suspicion of them on the part of the state

6 The revolution took place in Northern Yemen on September 26, 1962, and in Southern Yemen on October 14, 1967. Prior to these revolutions, Yemeni society remained potestarny, politically fragmented into many douls. State institutions were in their infancy. Tribes and urban communities maintained relative sovereignty, and laws were determined by tribal customs (urfom) and sharia law, which were within the competence of special privileged social strata (sada and cadi, or Masha. - in the south), which had a high informal status.

7 In this publication, the term "alid", that is, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through Ali bin Abi Talib and the Prophet's daughter Fatima, is used as a synonym for the term "sayyid", as they are called in Yemen.

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After the overthrow of the Imamate in 1962, the Zaydi schools established by Imam Yahya (madaris ilmiya) Religious books were closed, mosques were restricted, and attempts were made to ban Zaydite religious holidays (Phillips, 2005).

Ideological vacillation in the community in the post-revolutionary period partly explained the mass disillusionment that led the Zaydites to convert to other groups of Islam, as well as earlier to participate in left-wing radical movements that were brutally suppressed by President A. A. Salih with the participation of Muslim Brotherhood fighters at the turn of the 1980s.

Proselytism is most widespread in the northern border province of Saada, which was historically a stronghold of Zaydism and the heart of the Imamate from the 9th century to 1962. Among the main promoters of Wahhabism in this province was a local resident, Sheikh Mukbil Hadi al-Wadia, who, while working as a security guard in Mecca, became acquainted with Wahhabi literature, which revealed to him "numerous distortions of true Islam" in his homeland related to the Zaydi teachings. After receiving training in Saudi Arabia, he returned home with the missionary idea of instructing his fellow citizens in Islam. In the 1980s, with the support of high-ranking members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, he established a large Wahhabi training center in Dammaj (Saada province). According to his own testimony, there were between 600 and 700 students studying at the same time, and the students were not only Yemenis, but also citizens of many countries, including the CIS [Shaikh Muqbil, 1999]. The results of proselytizing in Saad were described in an article based on the field research of the British Museum author Shelah Weir, entitled "Clashes of Fundamentalisms" (Weir, 1997). Already in the 1980s and 1990s, the Wahhabis began to push the Zaydites out of their mosques and build their own, pointedly demonstrating the ritual differences between them during worship services. Tensions between Zaidis and Wahhabis in the province reached their maximum intensity during the Shiite holiday Eid Ghadir8. The presence of a crisis in the Zaydi community was probably the impetus for Sayyid Hussein al-Houthi's political activities.

Speaking about the signs of discrimination against Zaydism at the state level, it should be noted that the top leaders of the regime belong to tribes hashed, who themselves belong to the Zaydites. However, during the civil war of the 1960s, these tribes fought on the side of the republic against the Zaidi Imam because of long-standing feuds between the family of the Supreme Sheikh Hashed and the last imams of Yemen.

The political stratification within the Zaidi community during the revolution, therefore, also had an intertribal aspect, since among the royalists who were defeated in the civil war were primarily Zaidi tribes shoe covers, those who remained loyal to the Imam. Although the two major Zaydite tribal confederations mentioned above are considered descendants of their siblings (Hashed and Bakil), this, as often happens, did not prevent them from acting as age-old rivals for leadership.

After the 1990s, the political interests of the Zaydi community were expressed by the Al-Haqq Party, whose leadership in 1991-1997 included Sayyid H. Al-Houthi. The party defended the Quranic ethical principle "make way for the righteous and forbid the wicked", calling on everyone to be fair and observe Sharia law [Leveau,

8 The holiday is dedicated to the memory of an important event for Shiites - the announcement of the Prophet as his heir Ali bin Abi Talib during his last Hajj to Mecca before his death in 632 during a stop at the village of Ghadir-Humm. According to legend, at the same time, the Prophet bequeathed to all his companions to protect their descendants as one of the two "priceless inheritances" left to them (in the first place, he called the "book"). Shi'ites accept the accuracy of the information about this event without reservation, while Sunnis consider it questionable or not so significant.

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Marmier, Steinbach, 1999, p. 181]. In 1994-1997, Seyid Kh. al-Houthi was also a member of parliament from this party, then allegedly worked to create his own political organization, leaving both jobs. In the mid-1990s, with the help of the authorities, he founded a network of religious schools, which served as the base for the Shabab Almuminin (Believing Youth) movement he created. After 2001, as part of a general program to combat religious extremism, the State sharply reduced funding for religious educational institutions, and most of the Zaydi schools had to be closed.

Hussein's father, Sayyid Badruddin al-Houthi, a well-known Zaydite cleric, had reached the age of 82 at the beginning of the events. His brother, Yahya, was a member of Parliament for the independents and lived in the capital, Sana'a. In total, Sayyid Badruddin's family had thirteen sons. The activities of other members of the al-Houthi family prior to the events, as far as is known, were not related to political activities.

The al-Houthi clan enjoyed a high status in the traditional system of social relations, which remain relevant in some parts of the country. He held an informal title hijras, which meant recognizing him as an arbiter and spiritual leader among the tribes loyal to him. In exchange for the obligation to perform these functions, such clans received protection from "their" tribes from any encroachments from outside, which was based on the sacred customs of the tribes that are still observed today. - urfa. In many agreements between Sayyids and their loyal tribes, which are still in force today, there is even a special clause confirming the priority of ur-fa over the laws of the state in matters of protection granted to them [Dresch, 1993, p. 142-143]. When there was a threat to their spiritual leader, the hijra, the tribes had to leave all internal differences and come to his defense in a single formation with weapons in their hands (ard).

At the same time, due to the rapid modernization of society in recent decades, the status of Sayyids in Yemen as a whole has noticeably declined. This objective process developed in two directions. On the one hand, the state policy was aimed at transferring the traditional functions of the Islamic aristocracy to the relevant state structures. On the other hand, attacks on their status continue because of traditional ethnic differences between the Alids and the rest of the indigenous Yemeni population, including the tribes. The former belong to the northern Arab branch - Adnanids (and are considered aliens), and the second - to the southern Arabs - the Kakhtanids.

This motif in the fight against Alid exclusivity has long been used by local ulema from traditional Yemeni sects, but it was completely new in the mouths of Wahhabi teachers. In popular Islam throughout Yemen, the central place was occupied by the veneration of the ancestors of the Islamic aristocracy, which included both Alids and famous figures from non-Alid strata of society. They were revered as saints of God and figures who made outstanding contributions to the development of local communities. Ziyara (pilgrimage) to the burial sites of these individuals was one of the means to consolidate the high status of their clans in general and to foster a specific Yemeni patriotism. From the point of view of Wahhabism, this custom shows only the polytheism of its followers, is alien to Islam and must be eradicated by any means. It is Wahhabism that seems to have challenged Yemeni identity, becoming a tool for instilling religious intolerance in the country, affecting the feelings of believers from traditional communities throughout Yemen.

UNDECLARED MUTINY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The bloodshed in Saada province began on June 18, 2004, when followers of Sayyid Hussein Badruddin al-Houthi were attacked by security forces near Sobornaya Square

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mosques of the administrative center of the province - the city of Saadi. The reason for the attack was their refusal to stop chanting the slogan " Death to the United States and Israel! Victory for Islam!", which became part of their Friday ritual after the occupation of Iraq by US forces in March 2003. Backbone khusistov They were members of Shabab al-Muminin. The skirmish that broke out in Saada echoed small-scale skirmishes at other mosques in the province. This was immediately followed by the gathering of large army formations there, and the actions of the Houthis were officially qualified as"mutiny". The authorities brought two mutually exclusive lists of charges against them:

1) In an attempt to overthrow the regime in order to restore the Zaidi imamate in Yemen and in plans to prepare the leader of the uprising to declare himself an imam (Phillips, 2005). In the same row, there were accusations of involvement in the rebellion of members of the family of the deposed Hamiduddin dynasty, who had citizenship of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, although in this case, H. al-Houthi, therefore, did not plan to proclaim himself an imam, but acted only as a tool of the former imam. [Yemen Times, 781, 2004].

2) aiding and abetting the Iranian special services, which did not set the goal of restoring the imamate in Yemen or seizing power, but sought to create a powerful religious dissident movement in the country, similar to the Lebanese Hizbullah, to put pressure on the regime and undermine Yemeni unity [Goliath, 2004].

The contradictory nature of the accusations is probably due to the fact that many circumstances of the sudden conflict remained unclear. It seems that the call for the restoration of the imamate - Yes. it would have to be spoken openly to provoke a reaction. But in this case, that wasn't the case. Moreover, Sayyid H. al-Houthi's former associates in the Al-Haqq party and other prominent Zaydite clerics immediately stated that the Shabab al-Muminin leader expresses only his personal position and does not represent the Zaydite community in the country [Middle East Online, 2005].

Charges of aiding the Iranian security services and switching to the Iranian Shiite sect (ja'afarism) also highly questionable. Concealment of the fact of the change of sect for leaders of the al-Houthi level seems unlikely due to the refusal of the Zaydites from taqiyi (admitting to conceal one's true religion in certain circumstances). Perhaps the reason for such suspicions was the fact that the head of the uprising was sympathetic to the Iraqi Shiite movement and to the Lebanese Hizbullah movement, whose examples he is said to have been inspired by.

Suspicions of Iran's involvement later served as a pretext for launching a diplomatic war with it [Yemen Times, 1050, 2007]. However, the transfer of any funds or weapons to the rebels from Iran has not been established, despite the complete blockade of the rebel province by Yemeni special services and troops shortly after the crisis began. The references made by Interior Minister R. al-Alimi in May 2007 to sympathetic broadcasts by some Iranian radio stations in connection with the plight of the Saada population can hardly be considered an argument [Yemen Times, 1054, 2007]. Relations with Libya also soured after contacts between the brother of the Houthi leader, a member of the Yemeni parliament, Yahya, and the leader of the Jamahiriya.

Most likely, the crisis was caused solely by internal reasons, and its development into a rebellion was not without provocative efforts on the part of very influential people within the ruling elite.

Since the beginning of the events in Saada, the situation of religious extremists from the Wahhabi movements has noticeably improved due to the fact that, according to analysts, the authorities have shifted from a policy of persecution to a policy of cooperation in order to involve these cadres in the war against the Houthis. Some of them even received an officer's degree-

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they also became instructors of army units [Asharq Alawsat, 2006]. One of the leaders of Islam, Sheikh AM al-Zindani, who has acquired the image of a militant Wahhabi, was given the opportunity to perform in the toga of a peacemaker, since Islah, along with the PSP, took an openly critical position in relation to the actions of the authorities in Saad [Yemen Times, 757,2004]. The position of the military bloc has also been strengthened, within which, as it turned out, many active adherents of Wahhabism have settled.

Just three days after the above-mentioned skirmish at the mosque, on 21 June 2004, the Government unexpectedly announced that the army, armed with tanks, artillery and helicopters, was blocking the rebels in the Maarana Mountains [Arab News, 2004]. The military's actions were led by the commander of the northwestern military flank, Major General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a cousin of the president, who became one of the main actors in the crisis that began [Eshel, 2007]. There were reports about the involvement of American military advisers in the events. Through them, special equipment from Afghanistan, intended for waging war in the mountains, was urgently transferred to Yemen. In early September 2004, Washington officially announced the lifting of a 14-year ban on the supply of American military equipment to Yemen and its support for the Yemeni authorities ' efforts to suppress the insurgency. [Yemen Times, 771, 2004].

Together with Yemeni officers, the Iraqi military ("Saddam officers"), who emigrated to Yemen after the occupation of Iraq by the Americans, were brought to command units for the war against the rebels. The government group also included mercenaries from Islamist extremist organizations and even recruits from tribes (mainly from the tribes of the confederation). hashed) [Yemen Times, 1037,2007]. The authorities also actively called on local tribes from the Bakil confederation to wage war against the Houthis. One could not help but see that the threat of a local skirmish between security forces and a handful of Zaydi dissidents turning into a tribal confrontation was beginning to take shape, especially given the complexities of relations between the Hashed and Bakil tribes, including in the recent past (Dresch, 1993).

The crisis that began took on a multi-layered character (political, tribal, and ethno-confessional), which made it particularly dangerous and unpredictable, and this was reflected in subsequent events.

In Yemeni circles, many of the Government's steps in this crisis caused acute bewilderment. For example, the involvement of tribes in the Government's military operations openly contradicted the authorities ' repeatedly announced policy of disarming the tribes, as well as a sharp reduction in the arms trade, which has become a national disaster in Yemen. The leaked information about the involvement of Islamist militants from extremist groups, with whom the government also fought just a year before the events in Saad, also came as a shock!

Perhaps the authorities were betting on achieving a lightning victory over the rebels in order to teach a lesson to all potential enemies of the regime. Hoping for a quick, convincing victory that would strengthen the regime, they simply did not pay attention to the consequences of their unusual emergency actions. This version is supported by the impressive preponderance of government forces over the Houthis, which immediately reached almost tenfold (10 thousand well-armed soldiers and mercenaries against 1-3 thousand Houthis) [Yemen Times, 754, 2004].

Simultaneously with the army operation in the Ma'arana mountains, large-scale police operations began in the main cities of Saada province and neighboring provinces, aimed, according to the authorities, at identifying and arresting al-Houthi supporters. There were hundreds of suspects in prisons. For the extradition of Seyid Hussein, a reward of about 55 thousand dollars was appointed, as for a dangerous criminal. [Global Security, 2006].

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Another surprise was that in the first three weeks of fierce fighting, in which hundreds of people were killed, a handful of Shabab al-Muminin fighters were not defeated.

In early July 2004, a group of Zaydite theologians from Saada sent a message to President A. A. Salih, calling for the lifting of the military blockade on the province, since the only reason for the military operation, as they found out, was hostile statements against the province. USA and Israel by the followers of Sayyid Hussein [Aljazeera.net, 2004]. The PSP also demanded that the authorities immediately resolve the conflict peacefully. In a statement, the PSP accused the Government of using excessive force and deliberately using the al-Houthi situation to intimidate all opposition movements. [Yemen Times, 754, 2004].

On 22 July 2004, President A. A. Salih ordered a one-week ceasefire and the start of a mediation mission [Yemen Times, 760, 2004]. A 26-person commission consisting of representatives of Parliament, party leaders and tribal sheikhs was sent to negotiate with the rebels. It was headed by a high-ranking figure from the Islah party. Among the parliamentarians was Sayyid Hussein's brother, Yahya al-Houthi. At the time of the meeting with members of the mediation mission at the location of the leader of the uprising, witnesses noted provocative actions on the part of the military, who began shelling the positions of the Houthis in order to disrupt the negotiations. Sources from the scene also reported that during the days of the declared truce, the army continued to concentrate troops in areas where Houthis gathered, and instead of the promised amnesty, more and more prisoners were being sent to prisons.

Fierce fighting continued for a total of 13 weeks, until September 10, 2004, when the leader of the uprising was rounded up and killed. His body was transported to Sanaa, where it was then shown to journalists. [Al-Ahram, 2004].

The total losses of the parties in the 2004 clashes were estimated at 500-1500 people killed and several thousand wounded. The exact data of losses until the end of the conflict, apparently, will not be published. Several hundred people suspected of having links with the rebels were jailed. About 1,000 families (i.e. 8,000 people) in the affected province were left homeless. The government spent about $ 1 billion on the operation. [Phillips, 2005].

The authorities promised to provide the province with the necessary assistance to restore economic facilities destroyed by the war, compensate the population, release detained suspects and grant amnesty to the rebels after they surrender their weapons.

At the beginning of the conflict, numerous comments on the events were published on Yemeni websites and in the press. As the crisis dragged on and escalated, the SPB established an information blockade of the events in Saad and began to harass publications that violated this order. Some websites and newspapers were shut down on charges of slandering the president or sympathizing with the rebels.

After the death of the leader of the uprising, his brother Abdul-Malik, along with the sheikh of one of the tribes loyal to the clan, Abdullah al-Razami, led the Houthi side. His other brother, a member of the Yemeni parliament, Yahya, left the country and settled in Berlin, from where he informed the Yemeni and international community about the events in the province, for which he was stripped of immunity and membership in parliament. An elderly father, Sayyid Badruddin al-Houthi, reportedly took over the spiritual leadership of the uprising. The main condition for laying down arms and descending from the mountains, the Houthis put forward the release from prison of about 800 arrested people who played the role of hostages. [Yemen Times, 783, 2004]. In January 2005, Sayyid Badruddin arrived in the capital, Sana'a, hoping to meet with the President to resolve this issue.

Meanwhile, the situation in the province remained tense. More arrests and lack of government assistance to injured civilians-

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People whose homes were destroyed or used as barracks provoked an increase in anti-government sentiment. The military blockade of the province prevented the normalization of life [Ad-Diplumasi..., 2004]. Military or tribal roadblocks were set up on all roads, which made road traffic extremely difficult, blocking the supply of not only military, but also conventional cargo and food to disaster areas. Hundreds of injured people were left without any medical care.

The humanitarian disaster in the affected province was gaining momentum. As a result of the indifferent policy of the authorities, a new source of division in the province was formed at this stage. Some of the tribes sided with the government forces, believing that this would help to normalize life in the province as soon as possible. Another part considered that the promised help from the government could only be obtained by force, thus taking the side of the uprising.

In March 2005, Sayyid Badruddin al-Houthi, who was permanently in Sana'a, made a second unsuccessful attempt to secure the promised release of his supporters from prison. When he returned to Saada, he accused the authorities of breaking all their previous promises, and on March 19, government forces began bombing Houthi positions in Ruzami, where his residence was located [Yemen Times, 831, 2005]. Soon, the fighting in the rebellious province broke out with renewed vigor. The Government side waged war using all branches of the armed forces and heavy weapons. On April 13, 2005 alone, when troops attacked one of the rebel strongholds, 120 people were killed or wounded in the fighting, and more than 250 people had been killed on both sides since the fighting began. [Global Security, 2004].

After the April 13 strike, the rebels switched to guerrilla warfare tactics, operating in small groups and conducting sniper attacks against the troops stationed there. Small groups of them entered the capital, where they organized explosions at the buildings of government intelligence services. In the capital, mass purges by the St. Petersburg police began. All civil servants suspected of sympathizing with the rebels were subject to dismissal or detention. The actions of the SPB, whose prisons and working methods were particularly secret and uncontrolled, were similar, as observers noted, to settling scores with all political opponents. In total, during the spring period of fighting in 2005, according to official estimates, about 700 people were killed. [Yemen Times, 880,2005].

In mid-May 2005, Sayyid Badruddin al-Houthi again appealed to the President to fulfill his previous promises and declared his readiness to stop the resistance after that. The Houthis were ready to lay down their weapons for the duration of the negotiations, but did not stop chanting anti-American slogans. [Yemen Times, 844, 2005]. The government has said it will end the war and keep its promises. A stalemate has been established.

Throughout the summer of 2005, Yemen was seething with riots in cities caused by a doubling of fuel prices due to the cancellation of government subsidies under the World Bank and IMF programs (Phillips, 2005). In the end, Prime Minister Abdul-Qadir Bajammal, who was blamed for the price spike, replaced the Prime minister's chair with the one previously held by the president, but the president still agreed to run for the September 2006 presidential election [MERO, 2006].

The next one, 2006, was marked by elections. It began with encouraging developments in the Saadi problem. Chief among them was the March presidential decree on the release from prison of a group of 627 people suspected of involvement in the rebellion. However, after the September presidential election, in which A. A. Salih won a landslide victory, the situation in Saad began to heat up again.

On January 17, 2007, the largest military operation during the crisis began, which already involved 30 thousand soldiers and mercenaries. [Sa'dah insurgency, 2008]. Special anti-terrorist sub-attacks were launched against the Houthis-

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divisions trained by Americans. The US Embassy once again expressed official support for the Government's efforts to eliminate the insurgency [Mohamed Al-Azaki, 2007]. The country's parliament also supported the use of force [Yemen Times, 1024, 2007]. The main target of the attacks was the second largest city in the province - Dahyan and its surroundings with a population of about 25 thousand inhabitants. Dahyan, which is one of the oldest Zaydite theological centers, was subjected to rocket and artillery attacks and put under siege. Most of the city's residents fled [Yemen Times, 1035,1037,2007]. The military campaign called for an attack on the Houthis in a broad front from west to east, with the aim of pinning them to the Saudi border, where Saudi troops were already concentrated to attack them. 12 of the 15 districts of Saada province were affected by the fighting [Yemen Times, 1049, 2007]. A new flow of refugees from the war zone began, reaching about 35,000 people by May 2007. The total number of refugees approached 75 thousand people, which accounted for 10% of the province's population. [IRIN 2007].

One episode in January 2007, when the Houthis issued an ultimatum demanding that the Jewish community of 45 people living in the vicinity of Saada urgently leave their homes and leave the province, received a resonance. Obeying the ultimatum, she moved to the capital, where the victims were provided with accommodation in one of the best hotels in Sana'a, as well as security guarantees and government support. They decided to stay there until the conflict was fully resolved. Due to the state of information blockade in the province and the disconnection of telephone communication, information about the situation of the remaining tens of thousands of internal refugees in Saada is mainly received in world publications from activists of the International Red Cross. Due to difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid, as well as food and medicine, they are in a humanitarian disaster zone, and limited assistance is provided to a minority of victims. [Worldpress, 2007]. The tragedy continues, as the military objectives of the 2007 campaign were not achieved and the scale of the disaster is growing.

In March 2007, the Al-Ayam newspaper reported losses in Saada since the beginning of the year: about 500 people were killed and about 5,000 wounded among government forces. At the same time the article indicated a figure of 136 people killed among the rebels [Yemen Times, 1036, 2007].

In May 2007, two significant events related to the situation in Saada were held in Sana'a. The first is a conference of religious leaders of the country dedicated to this issue, which was attended by the President and commander of the troops, General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. At it, the president unexpectedly announced that he was transferring all the powers to resolve the conflict to the court of the assembled Ulema, and they, in turn, surprised the public with full support for the military option proposed by the government. They called the "refusal of the rebels to negotiate"an argument in favor of such a decision [Yemen Observer, 2007].

The second event was a meeting of the PSP on the same topic, which adopted a joint statement on the situation in Saad, strongly criticizing the Government. It referred to the " threat to national unity due to the incitement of sectarian and ethnic contradictions." Chairman of the executive Committee of the Union of Popular Forces M. al-Sabri said that the main mistake of the government, in his opinion, was the political decision to use the army and tribal units to fight the Houthis. He also called the decision of the conference of religious leaders irresponsible and "dangerous". The PSA proposed to immediately return the powers to consider this case to the country's parliament [Yemen Times, 1052, 2007].

The situation was somewhat relieved only by the launch of Qatar's high-level mediation mission, which was announced by A. A. Salih in a speech on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the country's unification on May 22, 2007.

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The leader of the uprising, Sayyid A.-M. al-Houthi, immediately agreed to negotiations and stressed that he was committed to the republican system and the constitution, and described all the events in Saad as" forced self-defense " of the population in the face of army attacks.

Meanwhile, the war continued in the area of the Saudi border and the city of Razih. Moreover, for the first time it was reported about strikes by Saudi forces from the territory of neighboring Najran on the positions of Zaydi rebels. [Yemen Times, 1057, 2007].

Only by June 16, 2007, when a truce agreement was signed in Doha, the capital of Qatar, did the military operations stop. Details of the agreement were not made public, but it became known that the leaders of the uprising (A.-M. al-Houthi, his brother A.-K. al-Houthi, as well as Sheikh Abdullah al-Razami) with their families were granted asylum in Qatar until special permission from the Yemeni authorities to return them.

However, hopes for a settlement soon began to fade. By September 2007, it became clear that neither of the conflicting parties was satisfied with the other party's compliance with the terms of the agreement [Yemen Times, 1078, 2007].

In December 2007, the leaders of the uprising sent messages to the PSP accusing the authorities of plotting to eliminate the Zaidis in favor of the Wahhabis and calling the policy of the authorities in Saad a genocide against the Zaidis. Earlier, they also informed about the new name of their organization - "Mujahideen Group" [Arables Trends, 2007]. Badruddin al-Houthi's family had lost four sons and three grandchildren by that time, and Abdul-Malik, showing high morale, showed that he was ready to go to the end.

A new outbreak of violence began with the authorities ' ban on Eid Ghadir celebrations, which occurred on December 27, 2007. The Haidan district became the center of the fighting. Dozens of dead and hundreds of wounded were reported, heavy weapons were used by the army, and the population fled en masse to safety and to the provincial capital of Saada. An employee of the headquarters of the commander of this military district, A. Zueil, during a prayer service in a local mosque, called the supporters of A.-M. al-Houthi "heretics" and made the following appeal: "Kill all Houthi Shiites in the name of Allah, not in the name of President Ali Abdullah Salih!" [Yemen Times, 1109, 2007]. This call only reinforced the Zaydites ' suspicion that the Wahhabi military was responsible for the failure of all agreements.

Simultaneously with a new outbreak of conflict in the north of the country, on December 29, 2007, the death of Parliament Speaker Sheikh A. H. Al-Ahmar was announced. In recent years, he has sharply criticized the president, including in connection with the Saadi tragedy.

Fighting around Haidan continued throughout January 2008 and was interrupted by the resumption of the Qatari mission and a new settlement agreement of February 1, 2008. At the request of the rebels, General AM al-Ahmar personally participated in the negotiations, and many considered him to be the main culprit of disasters in the province due to his close relations with the Saudis and his commitment to Wahhabism [Eshel, 2007]. The brother of the leader of the uprising, Sayyid Yahya Badruddin al-Houthi, also flew there. Following good faith, Qatar agreed to allocate an additional $ 25 million to the conflict settlement fund. as compensation to the local tribes.

An uneasy and uneasy peace has been established in the provinces. Despite the fact that both sides have received cease-fire orders, there are no guarantees against new outbreaks of violence. Both groups have forces that are not subordinate to either the military commanders or the leaders of the uprising. These include not only special forces units, but also tribes and religious fanatics who were involved in the conflict.

Obviously, the regime cannot afford to declare the war lost, and the "war faction" is still strong in it. However, there is hope that Yemeni patriotism, the ideals of preserving the republic and Yemeni unity will overcome short-term ambitions and the country will embark on reforms that will allow it to find a way out of the crisis.

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the resulting deadlock. All political organizations in Yemen are waiting for the parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2009, and until then, unfortunately, many have taken a wait-and-see approach. Thus, the conflict still threatens to escalate into a hot phase. Any prolongation of the crisis, in our opinion, only contributes to the rebirth of the democratic alternative embedded in the Yemeni model of the state, in its opposite, which the Yemenis themselves have already come up with the name jumluqiyya ("respunarchy").

list of literature

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Al-Ahram. N 708, 16 - 22 Sept. 2004 (Peter Willems, Al-Houthi's Ghost) // http://weekly.ahram.org

Aljazeera.net (Lawrence Smallman Husain al-Huthi: Wanted Dead or Alive). July 08, 2004 // http://english.al-jazeera.net/English/archive/

Arab News. 23 July 2004 (Khaled Al-Mahdi, Yemen Army Ordered to Halt Assault on Rebel Cleric) // http://www.arabnews.com

Arables Trends. Ed Blanche. Beirut, May 2007 // http://www.zawya.com/printstory

Asharq Alawsat. (Arafat Mudabish, Jihadist Groups in Yemen) 2006 // http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news

Dresch P. Tribes, Government and History of Yemen. Oxf., 1993.

Eshel D., The Zaidi Shi'a in Yemen - Iran's Next Objective to Reach the Horn of Africa? 2007 // www.defense-update.com/analysis/

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IRIN. (YEMEN: Peace Agreement with Northern Rebels in Jeopardy? Sanaa, 22 Aug. 2007) //http://www.globalse-curity.org/

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MERO. (Jan. 13, 2006, Gregory D. Johnsen, Salih's Road to Reelection) // http://www.merip.org/mero/

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Mohamed Al-Azaki. On the Brink of Sectarian War. March 15, 2007 // http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/2715.cfm

Mohammed bin Sallam. More Displaced Persons as Sa'ada's War intensifies. Dec. 12, 2007 // http://www.relief-web.int/rw/

Phillips S. Cracks in the Yemeni System. July 28, 2005 // http://www.merip.org

Phillips S. Foreboding About the Future in Yemen, April 4, 2006 // http://www.merip.org/mero/mero040306.html

21Phillips S. Yemen: Economic and Political Deterioration. Carnegie endowment. Sept., 2005, Vol. 3 // http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/phillips1.pdf

Sa'dah Insurgency // http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa'dah_conflict

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Weir S. A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen // MEreport. July-Sept. 1997.

Yemen Economic Update. Dec. 2002 //http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/MNA/mena.nsf/Attachments/Yemen+Update+1 1/$File/Yemen+Update+11.pdf

Yemen Observer (Nasser Arrabyee). May 19, 2007 // http://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10012214.html

Yemen Times // http://yementimes.com/

Yemeni President Cites "Positive" Developments in Cole Attack Probe. Oct. 25, 2000 // http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/10/25/uss.cole.03/

Yemen's Catalyst for Change by Brian Barron. 16 Feb., 2002, 13:41 GMT // http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/

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