Yu. G. ALEKSANDROV. CAN RUSSIA BECOME THE "EURASIAN TIGER", MOSCOW, INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 2007, 480 p.

L. Z. ZEVIN (Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences). The publication of Yu. G. Alexandrov's book at the end of 2007 turned out to be very timely: the results of two terms of V. V. Putin's presidency, prospects for its further development, and positioning in the region and in the world were actively discussed in the country. The author, in fact, offers the reader his understanding of the whole complex of these most complex problems. It seems that this approach has become both a strength and a weakness of the study. It is distinguished by its balanced approach, coverage of various points of view, and the desire to engage the reader in a discussion about the fate of Russia during the completion of the transformation process and the choice of a long-term development strategy. Among the advantages of the work, of course, should be attributed to the author's suggestions for solving a number of topical problems of economic growth in Russia.

However, the desire to cover the problems of the fate of socialism, the situation in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its relations with the CIS countries and non - CIS countries, with regional and global centers of economic power within the framework of the declared, relatively narrow topic - the possibility of repeating the path of the "Asian tigers" - made the construction extremely difficult, blurred the emphasis, from what starting points the research begins and by what criteria it is necessary to determine the possibility or impossibility of repeating the experience of the "Asian tigers". Since our discussion is focused not on reviewing the book, but on possible ways of developing Russia, I will focus further on the related aspects of Yu.G. Alexandrov's work.

First of all, you need to decide on the subject of research. Judging by the name, we should be looking for an answer to the question: is Russia capable of making a leap into the future in a mode close to the path of the "Asian tigers"? The author approaches the problem differently: he is more interested in changing the social system than in the effect of the chosen economic policy. The first page begins with the title "Russia between socialism and the Golden Billion", i.e. it highlights the process of transition from socialism to capitalism, to its most successful group of countries. But this is not the main thing for the book's theme.

In fact, Russia has been making a leap into the future since the middle of the first decade of this century, when the question of the type of social structure has been resolved in principle - development is moving in the direction of a socially oriented market economy. So, in my opinion, a more appropriate title would be: "Russia between the' billion at the bottom 'and the ' golden billion'"1. The possibility of repeating the path of the "Asian tigers" for more than a year.

1 This is what Oxford University professor Paul Collier called the counterweight to the "golden billion" in his book "A Billion at the Bottom" (Paul Collier. The Bottom Billion. OUP, 2007).

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It is justified to consider it in the context of eradicating poverty, increasing the well-being of the population, reducing property inequality, and modernizing traditional and inefficient economic structures. Almost none of the researchers suggest challenging the social structure of the "Asian tigers".

It seems that the author is too categorical in denying the possibility of an Asian experience. Moreover, the conclusion says that the book "... does not call for rushing after the "Asian tigers" along the path already trodden by them. On the contrary, as it is always emphasized, it is too late to do so" (p.473). But does such a conclusion mean that such aspects of their experience as the ability to maintain double-digit economic growth rates for a long time, more than three decades, a high level of savings, the paradoxical combination of undemocratic and even authoritarian regimes with a relatively high level of economic freedom, the quality of education, the use of traditional philosophies to reform the economic structure, the maintenance of flexible balance of relations between personnel and management.

Yu. Mr. Alexandrov is right, of course, that the Asian experience cannot be used in the "package" - the differences are too great. The economic structure of Russia (and especially the Soviet Union) is fundamentally different from the "tigers", so under no circumstances would it allow us to occupy the export niches that the Asians have mastered. In addition, Russian reforms began at a time when the limits of export-oriented models based on cheap labor were already becoming clear due to the beginning of the transition to the post-industrial stage. "Tigers" solved the tasks of catch-up development mainly at the national level. Russia has a different situation. It has remained the successor of a superpower and seeks to preserve and strengthen its status as a great Power and regional leader. Therefore, its integration into the changed world requires solving a set of tasks that significantly exceed the content and scope of the tasks facing the "Asian tigers". It is enough to mention the need to restructure the powerful industrial structure already created in the Soviet period, with an excessive emphasis on "heavy" and defense industries, and to create a new organization of the former single economic space of the region, high-quality implementation of the function of a link between Europe and Asia.

Finally, we should talk about the feasibility of using not only the positive, but also the negative experience of the "tigers". Here you can see a number of common serious problems. To understand their scale and complexity, I will mention some of them. By the end of the last century, the "tigers" began to feel the negative effects of economic growth, devoid of its own scientific and technical base and based mainly on imported technologies and knowledge. This is one of the manifestations of the phenomenon called "growth without development": satisfactory growth rates are maintained without progressive changes in the structure of the economy. Unfortunately, this situation still persists in the economy of Russia and most of the CIS countries. The second problem is the reaction of the population to the reforms. Its calm step in the "Asian tigers", although it caused, especially after the crisis of 1997 - 1998, traditionalist and anti-Western sentiments, generally allowed to keep the situation under control. "Shock therapy" in Russia, with its ruthlessness, unjustified references to the emergency situation, led to conflicts, delayed the economic recovery for many years, caused nostalgia for the Soviet period and increased in society anti-Western sentiments.

Thus, it is illogical to take an unambiguous position in relation to the experience of the "tigers": either accept it or reject it. The relationship here is much more complicated; for many, even fundamental positions, it is clear that its use is inappropriate. At the same time, the exchange of experience in overcoming emerging problems (for example, the development of-

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It is in the interests of both parties to ensure that the "tigers" emerge from the 1997-1998 financial crisis and the Russian default in 1998.

It is not always possible to agree with the criteria for assessing the situation in Russia. In section III, which deals with the impact of global trends on Russia, I think there is a certain simplification: the analysis is conducted in the context of "globalization-Russia". Global processes are strong, but their operation is much more complex than direct interaction under the "globalization-country" scheme.

First, regionalism is widely represented in the world, which can be considered the progenitor of globalism and which currently interacts and competes with it (an example of the first direction is "open regionalism", the second is the functioning of about four hundred regional and bilateral trade agreements with a regime different from the WTO rules, the creation of free trade zones certain preferences for participants, etc.)2. Now more than [1/3 of the world trade volume is carried out in the mode of such structures. Given Russia's status as a regional leader in the CIS, this factor should be more fully reflected in assessing the state and prospects for the development of the Russian economy.

Secondly, the inclusion of regionalism in the "global processes - national economy" scheme does not yet fully characterize the content of modern international economic relations. It seems that they are built according to the scheme "globalism-regionalism-national economy-local education". The relationship of the first two links is described above. Then the picture gets more complicated. The "globalization-national economy" scheme includes regional processes. As applied to our discussion, this means that when analyzing the impact of global processes on the Russian economy, it is necessary to take into account the regional factor, in particular the current state and potential of the existing economic groupings (EurAsEC, the Union State of Belarus-Russia, GUAM, etc.), as well as the CSTO and SCO. In my opinion, the book underestimates the potential of the regional factor. Perhaps the author is pessimistic about the regional factor in the post-Soviet space, based on the fact that the integration groups of weak and medium - developed countries, while remaining open to the outside world in an environment of fierce global competition, are not able to significantly increase the level of domestic integration. consolidation - usually the share of domestic trade in them does not exceed 1/5 of its total volume. In the associations of developed countries , the opposite is true: domestic trade accounts for the vast majority of trade turnover. In the foreseeable future, Russia has every chance of making great progress in improving the structure of its economy and the quality of its management, approaching the level of highly developed countries, which will significantly increase the opportunities to consolidate the post-Soviet economic space and, accordingly, its geo-economic positions.

Third, emphasizing the role of the regional factor is particularly important at present, when an increasing number of national economies are being drawn into global competition. Historical experience confirms that even in the pre-globalization era, large economic structures (countries with a vast territory and a large population, empires, and various economic unions) developed most successfully. In the global era size of the economic structure

2 In this context, Pascal Lamy, Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), made an interesting speech at the opening of the Growing Multilateralism of Regionalism conference (September 10, 2007): "We need to look at how regional trade agreements work and what are the effects of their activities on opening up trade and creating new opportunities for economic development... we should also consider whether regionalism harms multilateral trade relations" [http/www. wto. org / english/news_1/spp1 / _1/sppl-e htm].

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Moreover, it is becoming one of the leading components of economic growth and improving its quality.

I will explain this thesis with some examples. In terms of a commonly used measure of economic development - the size of per capita income at purchasing power parity and/or exchange rates - China is far inferior to any developed European country. Nevertheless, relying on its financial and intellectual resources, cheap labor, and somewhat easier access to borrowed technologies, it is able to implement space projects and the most complex complex scientific, technical, and defense programs. A much more developed country, but smaller in size and population, can make individual breakthroughs, but it is not able to carry out large-scale projects and programs without participating in any integration structure. A similar situation was observed in relation to the Soviet Union: it was significantly inferior to the United States in important indicators, but relying on huge natural resources, intellectual potential and a domestic market with a capacity of more than 250 million people, it managed not only to master many modern technologies, but also to outstrip a stronger rival in space, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in a number of types of military equipment. India, which has taken a strong position in the global software market and has mastered many modern technologies, also successfully uses the factor of the size of the economic structure.

Russia in its current framework is not yet able to fully use the size factor in order to accelerate growth and improve its quality: the 140-million-strong market capacity and the level of state management of the economy are not sufficient to create an effective economic structure according to global criteria. Creating an optimal structure should be an integral part of any Russian economic development program. This question is not reflected in Yu. G. Alexandrov's construction: the country develops "by itself". Unfortunately, it is not elaborated in the forecasts of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and other similar documents, which reduces the reality of implementing large-scale growth plans for the Russian economy. In the speeches of Russian leaders, the problem of organizing the CIS economic space is periodically raised and even called a priority, but the directions and tools for forming an optimal market-a necessary link in an effective economic structure-have not yet been determined, although the structure of the Russian economy will largely depend on their choice.

An organization of the CIS economic space in its full format (a market with a capacity of more than 270 million consumers) could, in principle, lead to the emergence of an economic structure with sufficient natural, financial and intellectual resources to create a viable economic structure. However, its" Achilles 'heel" would be the lack of technological equipment and the need for some financial support, without which it would be difficult to maintain the necessary level of competitiveness. Judging by the current situation, we can't expect to solve this full-scale problem yet. None of the existing economic groupings in the former Soviet Union meets the requirements of global competitiveness. Nevertheless, strengthening the consolidation of the CIS space should remain a priority of Russia's economic policy. Without this, Russia's access to non-CIS markets and sales of high-value-added products will be significantly complicated.

Russia will have to decide on the choice of directions of its orientation to the far abroad. Here we can see two options with very different consequences for the domestic economy. The first is further concentration on the euroat-

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in the Arctic region. This is already a fairly well-developed area, a reliable market for fuel, raw materials of metals and products of the lower floors of processing, a source of modern technologies and lending. Russia shares its geographical proximity and civilizational roots with Europe. As they say in such cases, " all cards in hand." One crucial question arises: will Russia be able to sell the products of a resurgent industry and new technologies on this market in the already oversaturated market of a group of more developed countries? There remains one more option - focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and Africa. In this area, we can count on expanding the sales markets for industrial products, modern medium-complex technologies and services. However, focusing on this area will limit access to global financial and technological resources.

If you choose to focus on one of the three areas (CIS-Euro-Atlantic-Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Africa), then in each case you will have to create a different economic structure, linking it to the dominant markets. It seems that an unambiguous choice cannot suit Russia. Only the combined option meets Russia's interests, and its adoption should be reflected in the medium - and long-term forecasts. It seems that so far all developments are being carried out without due consideration of the external factor. Moreover, in the context of the growing importance of foreign countries, it becomes insufficient to consider economic relations with the outside world as a balancing, additional factor: they should become an integral part of Russia's development, and special attention should be paid to the immediate environment. Obviously, the idea of prioritizing cooperation with the CIS countries should be interpreted in this way, and not in quantitative terms.

Therefore, we cannot agree with Yu. G. Alexandrov's statement that "for fifteen years, many efforts have been made instead of striving for a globalized world economy to propose the slogan of priority political and economic integration of the CIS as a national idea" (p.306). First, if the slogan had been proposed as a" national idea", it would have lived no longer than 1994, when the single currency, the Soviet ruble, which had been functioning in the CIS, ceased to exist; second, the idea of regional integration, even in the initial period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, did not exclude participation in global processes (more on this Third, the conclusions about the fate of integration in the post-Soviet space, based on the statements of one author, one former minister, and several official communiques, look strange. The correlation between globalism, regionalism and the national economy in relation to the post-Soviet space was discussed above. This triad is joined by another component - local formations. TNCs - a leading player in the globalization field-they interact with the object of their efforts, bypassing not only the regional, but often also the country level. In the context of the weakening of the state's regulatory functions in the first years of the CIS, this globalizing influence began to gain strength, I will add to it the dollar's circulation, the influence of international financial and economic organizations, so there is no reason to seriously talk about abandoning globalism, although, of course, there are opponents of finding the optimal combination of trends in the "globalism-regionalism-national economy" system- local formations " were, are and probably will be.

The further development of the situation in the CIS economic space largely depends on the choice of a dominant in interaction with non-CIS countries. The continuation and especially strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic region's position is likely to become a hindrance to the region's consolidation; the choice in favor of the Asia-Pacific region is best

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In this case, it will not be an obstacle to the economic structuring of the post-Soviet territory. Reaching the optimal ratio between the two directions, for example, 60 : 40 in favor of the first one, can become one of the structure-forming factors of the organization of the CIS economic space.

Considering the problems of the post-Soviet space, the author applies a "binary approach" - either globalization, or regional integration, or with Russia, or with the West. The drift of new state entities towards the latter is explained by the failure of attempts to solve problems in the framework of interaction with Russia without indicating a powerful external expansion. The theoretical and practical question remains aside: did Russia, as a regional leader, have any chances to organize the CIS economic space in any format?

Our analysis of almost two dozen integration associations in underdeveloped and medium - developed countries has shown that the possibility of stable functioning of a large group (say, over 100 million people each) depends primarily on three factors: the capacity and internal market, the quality of public administration (the latter was calculated using the World Bank methodology), and the level of development (income per year). per capita at purchasing power parity)3.

In terms of population (market capacity) - about 280 million people - the CIS meets global criteria. Calculations of the quality of public administration have shown that it is not yet able to ensure the sustainable development of the economic structure of the CIS scale and is slightly below the required level for the EurAsEC. At the same time, this indicator would allow the planned CES-4 association (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) to function successfully and stably if implemented. Calculations on the level of per capita income (level of development) revealed that it is able to support the stable functioning of an integration association of about 257 million people, which is less than the population of the CIS region, but it is quite sufficient in relation to the EurAsEC and even more so to the CEP - 4.

The results obtained, of course, should be treated with caution, since they do not take into account all the factors affecting integration processes. Nevertheless, these calculations allow us, at a minimum, to conclude that there are objective prerequisites for the post-Soviet economic space, if not for integration, then for its consolidation in order to accelerate the growth of national economies and strengthen the region's position in the global economy. The study was based on data from the middle of the current decade. The last 2-3 years have been successful for most CIS countries (GDP growth, management quality), which confirms not only the existence, but also the strengthening of the objective basis of regional centripetal trends. However, at the same time, there is an increase in external influences and a lack of interest and/or political will among some of the leading elites of the post-Soviet states to strengthen regional cooperation. The outcome of this fateful confrontation for the region is a matter of the future. At present, the process is going on at two levels: at the sub-regional level - groupings with and without Russia's participation; at the regional level-centrifugal and non-regional groupings. unifying trends. Analyzing these processes, it would be wrong to see them only as intra-regional problems and interests; they largely reflect contradictory global processes - the consolidation of economic structures, on the one hand, and their fragmentation, primarily state - owned, on the other.

3 See for more details: L. Zevin, A. Liebman. Optimal economic space: the problem of size // World of Change, 2007, N 4, pp. 130-142.

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The proposed methods of cutting the "Gordian knot" also need to be discussed (pp. 318-325). And here the "binary approach" mentioned above can be traced. According to the author, the society is divided into two groups when it comes to choosing a strategy for economic growth: those who support finding a way to get rid of dependence on world commodity prices through export diversification, and those who believe in the exceptional potential of the Russian domestic market. Such a confrontation takes us back to the 1990s, when there were sharp disputes between adherents of the export-oriented and import-substituting growth models. Even then, the position of proponents of an integrated approach began to emerge, namely, the use of super-revenues from the fuel and energy sector as a result of redistribution to create anti-import production facilities to meet domestic needs and increase exports of complex and high-tech products and services. The author's position on the "locomotives" of modernization and transition to an innovative development model remains unclear. On page 319, quoting V. V. According to Putin, he refers to high-tech industries (modern energy, communications) as "locomotives"., space, aircraft construction and export of high-tech services); the conclusion of chapter 8 deals with the change in the position of the Russian leadership in this area, and the next chapter "Oil and gas as" locomotives of development "" again returns to the fuel and energy sector.

The author's pessimistic assessment of the possibilities of Russia's breakthrough to foreign markets is quite understandable, since the problems and difficulties are very large. But Russia has a chance: its traditional specialization in heavy energy and transport engineering, defense technology, the peaceful use of atomic energy and materials with specified properties, plus the above-mentioned industries and the huge potential of its geographical location can provide it with several competitive positions in the international division of labor, provided that it makes an optimal choice of foreign economic partners.

We can agree with the author that the oil and gas sector is given a leading role in the new geopolitical and geo-economic strategy of Russia, and the entire final section of the book "Russia as the" Eurasian Octopus "" is based on this position. Perhaps it would be appropriate to say that this construction is a kind of transitional stage of maturation on the way to the final goal, when the country's geopolitical and geo-economic positions will be determined not so much by the state of the fuel and energy sector, but by an advanced model of investment and innovative development. The fundamental difference between Russia and the" Asian tigers "is to a lesser extent determined by the chosen path of achieving the goals set, the rejection of"catch-up development". The main difference is in the content and scope of these goals: in addition to the tasks of the "tigers", Russia will have to maintain its position as a regional leader, increase its contribution to the structuring of the post-Soviet economic space, strengthen its geopolitical and geo-economic positions, and complete its civilizational positioning. Tasks are much more complex and involve more risks, but progress towards the goal will move you country up in the bundle "Billion at the bottom" - "Rich billion".

A. V. AKIMOV (IV RAS). Simple-looking questions in the social sciences can be very difficult to answer, as the book by Yu. G. Alexandrov clearly shows. The authorities, entrepreneurs, the media, and the expert community are now discussing how to develop Russia. The role of Orientalists in this discussion may be twofold. On the one hand, the Eastern countries are a storehouse of experience in successful economic development using a variety of strategies. On the other hand, Asia is a growing producer of a wide variety of products in the global economy and a consumer of growing quantities of raw materials. Thus, external processes, mi-

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The growing economy and globalization, taking into account the processes taking place in the countries of the East, are becoming the most important factors determining the development strategy of Russia.

Yu. G. Alexandrov is very sober about the plans for modernizing the Russian economy related to the development of high technologies, emphasizing that "the problems of the high - tech industrial sector are due to the fact that it arose and for a long time existed almost exclusively in the system of the Soviet military-industrial complex ..." (pp. 270-271). Currently, nanotechnologies are considered a potential locomotive that should put Russia on the rails of innovative development. In the version that now dominates, the approach itself does not look market-oriented. The issue of products that will be produced and released to the market is not discussed, and who will be the buyer and consumer is out of sight. This is an important point. Even such a well-known company as Motorola lost $ 2 billion a few years ago and closed the Iridium global telephone service project, because it did not study the market prospects beforehand. The project itself was very innovative and technically perfect. New technologies and new products are generally risky. In our country, however, risk management is still very far behind international standards, so we need to invest a lot of money in new technologies. you can, but the result is unclear. In addition to the market, a shortage of personnel and necessary production facilities raises many questions, since only a very high overall production culture, perfect production and control and measurement equipment, as well as components can ensure the success of a complex technical project. If all this has to be imported, the macroeconomic efficiency of the development of this sector may not be very high.

In addition, nanotechnologies, according to experts in this field, do not represent a single complex, but complement existing industries and technologies.1. Defense and aerospace industries, chemicals, electronics, semiconductor manufacturing, medical products and equipment, metallurgy and energy can win. In the conditions of our country, budget areas (defense, partly medicine) may be more priority in this list. The buyer here will be the state, and the development of commercial products may not take place. Thus, the market effect of nanotechnology with the growth of the corresponding sectors of the economy may not be.

As for other sectors of the high-tech sector, Russia does not even have ambitious development plans, although the level of the nuclear industry and the aerospace complex is still high. Joining the race for far-ahead competitors in electronics is already unpromising.

The concept of Russia's rapid transition to the latest technologies is very ambitious from the point of view of the formulated tasks. In practice, it implies the return of Russia to the list of scientific and technical leaders. At the same time, it is very expensive and has little focus on effective demand from both firms and the population. The state is not able to ensure its implementation at the expense of budgetary funds. The economy, with the current structure of the economy and existing problems, does not need most of the developments, since it is not able to use them.

Thus, the success of this strategy may mean the creation of another export enclave in the domestic economy, focused on and dependent on Western markets. From the point of view of the interests of industries working for the domestic market, this will be something similar to the oil and gas complex in its modern form-focusing on exports, importing equipment for their own needs, high intra-industry earnings and working for the domestic market as a payment for

1 Expert Advisor, No. 15, April 14-20, 2008, p. 90.

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ability to export. In addition, this strategy can simply degenerate into a "brain drain", which has repeatedly happened to developing countries.

In developed countries, there is a rather complex multi-stage support for technical innovations, taking into account the large risks of this business and the different needs of inventors at different stages of innovation development to the finished product. At the first stage, research is supported by grants. Those who successfully complete the first stage receive the support of so-called "business angels". This institute exists to assist projects in the development of production. At the third stage, firms that have grown up on the basis of scientific developments either become independent with the ability to borrow a lot of money for further development, or are acquired by large firms already operating in the relevant industries. There is no such system in Russia. The path of Russian developers to the Western business system is shorter and easier than in the domestic economy. Thus, Russia is unlikely to become the" Eurasian Tiger " in high technologies.

At the same time, there are quite reliable markets in the world, which are gaining more and more weight in modern conditions, and it is in these markets that Russia can be among the leaders. The first group of markets, as Yu. G. Aleksandrov writes, is fuel and energy markets2. The second group includes food markets.

One cannot but agree with the author regarding the assessment of the importance of the role of the domestic industrial complex in the development strategy of Russia. The rate on the fuel and energy complex is not unfounded, if only because it is practically implemented. Raw materials are Russia's real wealth, and the technical infrastructure and commercial mechanisms for exporting oil and gas have now been created. A significant part of the country's income is generated from these exports, and it is necessary to assess the prospects for this sector of the economy, as well as to improve the methods of using the income received.

Russia has large reserves of coal, oil and gas. Coal reserves make up 17.3% of the world's reserves, and the multiplicity of reserves (the number of years that the proven geological reserves will last at the current level of production) is more than 500 years. In terms of oil reserves, Russia ranks seventh in the world, with reserves of 6.6 billion tons, a multiplicity of 22 years. In terms of gas reserves, Russia is firmly ranked first in the world, having more than 1/4 of the world's reserves and almost twice ahead of the second largest country in terms of reserves - Iran. The multiplicity of gas reserves even at the current high level of its production is almost 80 years3.

The success of the extractive industries of the Russian fuel and energy complex allows us to speak about Russia as the leading energy power in the world, able to take part in solving the global energy problem. Nevertheless, it is necessary to make a few comments that are intended to show both the possibilities of this strategy for solving global problems and the advantages that Russia can get with more targeted regulation of the development of the fuel and energy sector than at present.

Russia occupies a leading position in global oil production and is the largest producer of natural gas. The problem is that maintaining leadership in the production and export of gas and oil is associated with a significant increase in capital intensity, firstly, due to the deterioration of mining and geological conditions, and secondly, due to the need to develop remote territories or off-shore deposits.

2 "Huge reserves of hydrocarbons are considered in it (the new strategy of the Russian state. - A. A.) as a unique wealth and invaluable comparative advantage of our country, which only needs to be properly used. " (p. 476).

3 The reserves are listed according to the British Petroleum database.

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Nevertheless, if there is a sufficiently solid resource base, the development of oil and gas exports in the coming years turns out to be quite a viable strategy, even with the high capital intensity of the fuel and energy sector. In the short term, the task is to try to turn the oil and gas complex, which is becoming an enclave in relation to the domestic economy, into a "locomotive" of economic development for other industries (metallurgy, mechanical engineering). Another task is to establish a balance between Russia's external partners, with whom it is possible to build long-term relations without the threat of critical dependence on them. This applies primarily to gas trading with pipeline deliveries, since this method strongly binds the supplier to the consumer.

As for domestic equipment for the oil and gas industry, import substitution is probably only partially possible, since projects for the development of new fields need to be developed right now, and mechanical engineering is not able to provide the necessary products. However, it is necessary to determine what can be done to avoid critical dependence on foreign producers. Domestic oil and gas firms are indifferent to the source of equipment supplies, so establishing inter-industry relations becomes the task of the state.

Export projects in the oil and gas sector are focused on two markets: Europe and Asia. It seems that moving flows to the second direction is more promising. Asian countries will be major consumers of fuel and energy in the 21st century. Access to these markets is very promising. The planned oil pipelines to the east from Western and Eastern Siberia can form stable ties between Russia and China and other Asian countries in the energy sector. So we can only agree with Yu. G. Alexandrov that " there are two main nodes of problems in the Far Eastern geo-economic direction. The first of them is to organize the export of Russian oil and gas to the countries of Northeast Asia, and in the longer term to the Asia-Pacific region" (p. 424).

In the coming decades, the needs of China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea will grow rapidly. The author calculated the projected demand for fuel and energy resources in these countries based on the forecast of the population size and per capita consumption standards with a catch-up type of development. Under these hypotheses, the level of per capita consumption in all countries of the region will tend to that which currently exists in Japan. This is about 5 tons of conventional fuel per person per year. In Japan, this level will remain unchanged. China will have to reach the level of modern Japan by the middle of the twenty-first century, and growth by 2060, when the population is expected to stabilize, will be 6.5 times. This is an average of about 3.2% growth per year. As a result, China's needs will exceed those of North America and Europe combined.4
Russia's involvement in solving the energy problem in Asia may require joining forces with other CIS member states in this area. As the data on oil and gas reserves show, the Central Asian countries can become Russia's partners in this area, filling economic cooperation within the Commonwealth with concrete content. Yu.G. Alexandrov writes about the problems of interaction between Russia and the Central Asian countries in chapter 12, paying great attention to the energy aspects.

4 The forecast methodology is described in more detail in my article "Strategy for including Russia in the world division of labor through participation in solving global problems" in the collection "Economics of Developing Countries", Moscow, 2004.

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In parallel with the change in exports via pipeline routes, it may be a useful step to switch to gas export deliveries by gas carriers, which will require the creation of appropriate infrastructure, but will avoid the economic and political dictates of the buyer if he is connected to the supplier by pipeline.

Another task on the way to turning the fuel and energy complex into a steadily developing part of the domestic industry is the technical re-equipment of the power industry, taking into account all trends in the development of technologies in this industry. Large emerging economies such as China and India are likely to develop in the coming decades using the same energy-wasteful technologies that are used by modern developed countries. The most striking example of this is the development of motorization in these countries. It is clear that any strategy for the development of modern civilization will inevitably require sufficiently large amounts of energy. Technological changes are designed to meet these needs even when mineral fuel reserves are exhausted. Russia has the potential to remain at the forefront of energy development even after the depletion of oil and gas reserves.

There are several directions of these changes. First, it is the improvement of the existing stationary power industry with a reorientation to coal fuel. In this area, there are still large domestic research and design organizations, as well as factories that can re-equip the thermal power industry. This is necessary both to preserve the production potential of this industry in Russia, and to maintain energy-intensive industries based on cheap electricity, which even if Russia joins the World Trade Organization will be competitive on the world market.

The second direction is the improvement and development of nuclear power and mechanical engineering for it. Nuclear power was developing quite successfully in our country before the Chernobyl disaster. It should be noted that the general cooling towards nuclear power in the world after Chernobyl had little effect on some countries that continued to successfully develop this industry. Among them is France, where high technological, economic and environmental performance indicators of the electric power industry have been achieved with the dominance of nuclear power plants in electricity production. In particular, the French energy sector produces a very small amount of carbon dioxide, since fuel combustion is small with a large share of nuclear power plants, which makes the energy sector of this country as a whole more environmentally friendly than when focusing on thermal power plants.

As early as 1999, Russian NPPs exceeded the level of electricity generation in 1990 and are successfully increasing it. The share of nuclear power plants in total electricity generation has consistently exceeded 15% since 1999.

Studies of patenting patterns of technologies and their implementation in the stationary power industry in such countries as Russia, the USA, France and Japan show that in the first 15-20 years of the XXI century, there will be an increase in capacity and production in the nuclear power industry5 The development of research in the field of nuclear technologies, even without accelerating the development of nuclear power plants in Russia, should inevitably occur both because the country needs to maintain an appropriate component of the armed forces, and because the country already has large reserves of nuclear power plants.-

5 N. M. Timofeeva, E. A. Deryabina. Forecasting the development of the electric power industry based on the theory of technological cycles // The Future of Russia, the CIS and the Eurasian Civilization: a scientific and technological aspect. Materials for the XV Interdisciplinary Discussion. Moscow, RAGS, May 17, 2001, pp. 180-181.

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These materials will remain radioactive for many decades to come, and appropriate technologies are needed for their safe storage and processing.

Nuclear technologies in the military-industrial complex and the electric power industry make it possible to create and implement programs of national significance that could combine high technologies, defense significance and economic growth in infrastructure and mechanical engineering. As an example of an attempt to implement such opportunities in practice, we can mention projects for the production of small floating nuclear power plants. These installations use technologies used in the nuclear fleet. They are quite safe and highly mobile. A number of foreign countries have shown interest in them, including Arab countries that intend to use them as desalination plants, and China.

Potentially drastic changes in the energy technology market can be caused by fuel cells, which make it possible to use hydrogen energy in transport. Russia does not have production facilities for producing high-quality internal combustion engines running on gasoline and diesel fuel, but a radical change in technology gives it certain advantages. In particular, palladium is a catalyst in fuel cells, and about 80% of its global production is accounted for by Norilsk Nickel. This direction of development allows us to return to the issue of high technologies, but already in close connection with the specific needs of the development of the Russian economy.

Writing about Russia's second export strategy, agriculture, when discussing the book by Yu. G. Alexandrov, a well-known expert on agricultural issues, is somewhat risky, but now there are reasons for this. The growing food shortage in the world, which has caused an increase in prices for it in almost all countries, is a serious reason for discussion. For many years and even decades in Russia, it has been customary to consider agriculture a "black hole" that absorbs resources from other sectors of the economy without corresponding returns. This judgment is erroneous. Russia has significant natural advantages: a large territory with highly fertile soils, sufficient precipitation, and relatively stable ecological systems. The term "risky farming", which was used by Soviet agricultural leaders and is sometimes still used today, is an example of successful " PR " when economic policy failures were attributed to natural difficulties. Farming is risky everywhere, but the risks are different: tropical typhoons, too strong monsoon rains that wash away the soil, agricultural pests that are very numerous in the country. In conditions of hot and humid climates, droughts, etc. For many countries with developed agriculture, the problem is the limited or high cost of agricultural land. In recent years, Russia has been implementing a number of successful projects in agriculture and animal husbandry, many of which are implemented by large industrial holdings that bring modern management and investment to agriculture. Russia has become an exporter of a number of agricultural products.

The strategy of Russia's participation in solving the global food problem is to apply agricultural technologies that exist in Western Europe, where soil and climate conditions are similar to those in Russia, and American technologies that are suitable for Russia, to increase agricultural productivity in Russia both to meet the needs of the country and for export to developing countries (for example, Iran, Arab countries, China), which are solvent, but due to the rapidly growing population and limited territory, will be in dire need of food imports in the coming decades.

The author made an assessment of the resources needed to bring Russia to high levels of agricultural efficiency. For the calculation, we used

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the method of cross-country analogies. Thus, Sweden can be considered as an analog of Russia in terms of natural indicators. If the entire area of arable land in Russia, equal to 135.11 million hectares, is reached with a yield equal to the Swedish one, then the grain harvest in Russia can reach 5749.9 million tons, or 575 million tons, which would put Russia on the first place in the world.6.

Large investments are needed to achieve this level of production. To increase investment in Russia per hectare to the Swedish level, annual investments of 29.3 - 46.6 billion rubles are needed. USD at the 2003 exchange rate The average value is approximately $ 38 billion. per year. This level is about two times lower than the needs of the industry. Although the total need for investment in agriculture is quite high, the investment program of agriculture is not a program to restore the level of the USSR, but to become a world leader.

Foreign investment and technology are needed to boost agriculture in Russia. Western companies, especially European ones, have very small opportunities for growth due to the limited land resources in European countries. Providing them with the opportunity to work in Russia provides prospects for increasing production and sales of products both in Russia and in Asian countries with growing effective demand. In this case, Russia receives an increase in agricultural output, a source of economic growth focused on domestic demand, import substitution and modern technologies in agriculture. The possibility of eliminating subsidies to European agricultural producers, which is being discussed in the EU countries, may be a step that will stimulate European interest in production in Russia.

Investment from Western Europe in Russian agriculture may be an acceptable strategy for both private firms and governments. For the Russian side, the argument may be a reference to the liberalization of trade provided for by the rules of the World Trade Organization and the reduction of subsidies to local producers. The development of agriculture in different regions of the country may differ both in the form of organization, and in terms of the technologies used, orientation to certain markets, etc. In the North Caucasus, it may be intended for Arab countries. The Volga region has export potential to Iran and Transcaucasia.

In all cases, it is necessary to develop the institutional framework for transformation - to create organizations that will implement programs of such cooperation, including legal, foreign trade, both for the sale of agricultural products and for the purchase of means of production for the agricultural sector, as well as special bodies or units for the protection of property in rural areas.

Modern agriculture is a growing market for high-tech technologies, primarily biotechnologies. The development of the agricultural sector encourages their practical application, thereby creating a source of funds for financing scientific developments in the field of biotechnology.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia found itself in a state of acute need to solve many issues of public life and economic development, to be determined in a rapidly changing world. Among the issues that needed to be urgently addressed were the choice of the development direction, in particular, determining the orientation to certain markets and countries, as well as the possibility to use the experience of foreign countries in developing a national strategy for economic development and the foundation of the state budget.-

6 A. V. Akimov. World Food Problem: a chance for Russia in the 21st century? Moscow: Vostochny Universitet Publ., 1999.

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the economic policy based on it. Orientalists actively participated in the discussion of these problems. Time passes, but in economic life, many issues are still relevant. It is necessary to continue discussing them in order to avoid making erroneous decisions.

P. M. MOZIAS (Moscow State University). Calling one or another successfully developing country another economic "tiger" has become very popular. For example, Ireland, which over the past couple of decades has gone from being a backward fringe of Europe to becoming one of the world's leaders in information technology, is often referred to as the "Celtic tiger". Belarus, which was one of the first countries in the post-Soviet space to restore the positive dynamics of economic growth, was considered a candidate for the "Eastern European tigers"some time ago. But for the purposes of a meaningful analysis, and even more so in the search for an answer to the question of whether Russia can become a "tiger", it makes sense to clarify this very concept, with all its figurativeness and conventionality, for which we should go back to the origins. It is important to clearly understand what was meant when "tigers "were called a group of East and South-East Asian economies that made a leap in their development in the second half of the 20th century and received the status of" new industrial countries " (NIS) in international classifications.

When people talk about the "economic miracle" of East Asia, they mean maintaining high rates of economic growth for several decades without significant fluctuations. The main source of such economic dynamics in the Asian NIS was a consistently high rate of capital accumulation, supported by a high rate of savings. As backward agricultural economies in the early 1960s, these countries experienced accelerated industrialization in the following decades, which was accompanied by export expansion - their active development of world markets for manufactured goods. Economic development took place in parallel with progressive social shifts (earlier and sharper than in other countries, the demographic transition - a decrease in the birth rate and an increase in life expectancy; the rapid spread of primary and then secondary education, etc.). One of the facets of the "Asian miracle" is that, contrary to the predictions of the theory of economic development, embodied in the so-called Kuznets curve, rapid economic growth in the initial stages of industrialization in the United States is not a problem. The growth of the NIS was accompanied not by an increase in social polarization, but, on the contrary, by a smoothing of income inequality.

There are still lively discussions among experts about how these results were achieved. The first explanations of the "Asian miracle" were given in the 1970s and 1980s within the framework of the most popular concepts describing the economic dynamics of developing countries at that time: the left - wing "dependency theory", on the one hand, and the liberal neoclassical version of the theory of economic development, on the other. From the point of view of the proponents of the "dependency theory", Asian NIS represented "export platforms" where multinational corporations created production based on the use of local cheap, unskilled labor resources. The " Asian miracle "in this interpretation looked like one of the varieties of" dependent development " on the periphery of the world economy, which occurs as a result of the interaction of an underdeveloped economy with foreign capital and under its control. The fact that the" Asian tigers "were allowed to raise their status in the world economic hierarchy and move to a" semi-peripheral " position was explained by unique circumstances - the strategic importance of these countries and territories for the West during the Cold war-

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access to US financial assistance and sales of goods on the US domestic market, etc.

According to neoclassicists, the economic success of the "Asian tigers" was due to the consistent commitment of the governments of these countries to the principles of liberal economic policy. It was about relying on private entrepreneurship and self-regulating market mechanisms, ensuring macroeconomic stability, opening up the economy and its export orientation. Moreover, the latter was understood as a free flow of economic resources under the influence of market price signals to industries in which the country has a comparative advantage (at the early stages of development, these are labor-intensive industries that are competitive due to the cheapness of labor).

Such ideas have been gradually overcome in the theory of economic development since the 1990s, thanks to the efforts of a number of researchers. Using figures and facts, it was proved that attracting foreign capital has never played a decisive role in the development of Asian NIS (except for Singapore). For example, in Taiwan, during the 1970s, the share of foreign investment in the national accumulation fund fluctuated between 3 and 10%. The policy towards foreign investors in East Asian countries was quite independent and highly selective. There were special regulations that divided the branches of the national economy into those where foreign investment was encouraged, and those where it was restricted or prohibited altogether. So, the engines of the economic breakthrough of the "Asian tigers" were not TNCs (although cooperation with them, of course, was of some importance), but capital and entrepreneurs of local origin.

In fact, the Asian NIS maintained a fairly conservative macroeconomic policy, and thanks to fiscal and monetary restraint, the inflation rate was maintained at a relatively low level. But the facts show that it is absolutely wrong to say that the role of the state in economic development was limited only to this. The governments of the East Asian countries carried out a targeted impact on the structural and sectoral proportions of the economy, stimulated the development of priority industries and industries, i.e. they implemented an active industrial policy. In the Asian NIS, there was a practice of indicative planning of economic development. The public sector in basic industries and infrastructure was significant, especially in Taiwan. Representatives of the state bureaucracy maintained close contacts with the owners and managers of the largest private corporations (the most typical example is the South Korean financial and industrial group Chaebol). The state influenced the distribution of credit resources in the economy through banking systems that were almost entirely in the 1960s. - 1970's. in the state property sector, among other things, low interest rates were practiced in comparison with the equilibrium ones and the use of concessional loans as structural policy instruments. Investors implementing priority projects were granted tax incentives and direct financing from special state funds. Export activities were encouraged by fiscal and credit incentives; state insurance and marketing organizations provided services to exporting companies; successful development of foreign markets was interpreted as a national achievement, for which firms were awarded prestigious awards.

In general, the specific feature of such a policy, which distinguishes it from other cases of state dirigism in developing countries, is the "isolation" of state interventions on exports. It was believed that it is the increase in exports by companies that receive state support that is the most important factor in Crete-

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efficiency of state economic policy. At the same time, not only export, but also import - substituting capital-and technology-intensive industries developed under the auspices of the state. The role of import substitution was twofold: on the one hand, it provided satisfaction of the demand for investment goods presented by exporters, and on the other hand, it provided "proactive" development of new industries in anticipation of the exhaustion of the existing export specialization. Initially, such new industries worked mainly for the domestic market, and the state protected them with measures of foreign trade protectionism. At the same time, they were encouraged to start their export activities as early as possible. Thus, it cannot be said that public policy in the Asian NIS simply followed a comparative advantage. It was about "modeling" future export specialization by the state. Hence, the gradual increase in the technological level of exports from Asian NIS, shifts in the structure of commodity exports: from textiles and clothing, first to consumer electronics and electrical engineering, and then to more advanced technologies. complex products of mechanical engineering, information technology, etc.D. The integrity and integration of the national economic complex achieved through a combination of export orientation and import substitution have largely ensured conditions for a relatively even distribution of income in society.

The role of the state in the East Asian economies did not remain unchanged. It gradually weakened as the institutions of the market economy developed - national private entrepreneurship gained strength, financial markets became more mature, the degree of monetization of the economy increased; incomes of the population grew and, as a result, domestic effective demand became more active. But it can be argued that export orientation has also made a significant contribution to this long-term liberalization process. Thanks to it, both individual companies and the economy as a whole experienced the disciplining effect of world market prices, and learned to live in a highly competitive environment. It was in those areas where the institutions of the national economy interacted with the outside world that the impulses for liberalizing economic reforms gradually matured.

Is it possible to borrow the experience of Asian NIS in Russia? In its pure form, obviously not. Asian "tigers", in any case, of the "first generation" were small countries that did not have any significant mineral reserves. Whereas Russia is a resource-rich country with a significant population and, accordingly, a large domestic market. The foundations of the" economic miracle " of Asian NIS were laid at the stage of primary industrialization, when the process of reallocation of labor resources from the traditional to the modern sector of the economy was underway, this ensured an overall low level of labor costs and, as a result, the price competitiveness of exporting firms. In modern Russia, we are talking about the structural restructuring of the industrial national economic complex, which developed in the XX century under specific conditions and experienced a deep transformational decline in the 1990s. The average per capita income level in Russia is relatively high compared to most developing countries, and this limits the development of export-oriented labor-intensive industries in our country.

However, the answer to this question will be different if the reason for the success of the "Asian tigers" is seen not in the choice of specific branches of export specialization, but in the very foundations of the economic development policy implemented there - complex; internally complex, but integral; dynamically changing over time. In fact, certain analogies can be drawn between present-day Russia and the Asian NIS of the second half of the 20th century. First, although the contours of the Russian manufacturing industry have been formed for quite a long time, but only in the following areas:

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Over the last decade, with the resumption of economic growth in Russia, national industrial enterprises began to develop the domestic market of their own country and establish export activities, focusing not on the instructions of planning authorities, but on signals from effective demand. In the course of this process, the chains of inter-firm and inter-industry relations that were formed in the context of the command system, and then largely destroyed by the crisis, are being reformatted. In this respect, the logic of structural adjustment of the modern Russian economy is very similar to the logic of industrialization. Secondly, what Russia and Asian NIS have in common is the implementation of structural adjustment in parallel with the formation of capable market institutions in the national economy.

Due to these two circumstances, it is not only possible, but also necessary, for Russia to adopt the experience of the "Asian tigers". Post-Soviet economic realities strongly suggest that using purely liberal economic policy prescriptions, it is possible to solve short-term problems, such as filling the consumer market and suppressing inflation. But given the immaturity of national market institutions, long-term structural problems of the economy can hardly be solved without the participation of the state, which compensates for the underdevelopment of market mechanisms for resource redistribution. In this regard, the experience of Asian NIS is not just useful. It is close to the archetypal version of successful market modernization, tested by most Western countries, when the domestic economy combines the development of private entrepreneurship and an active industrial policy of the state for a relatively long time, and the "opening" of the economy by stimulating national exports coexists with protectionist protection of the domestic market.

After economic reforms began in China at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s and high rates of economic development were achieved there, many experts began to consider China as another representative of the "East Asian development model" - along with NIS. Indeed, China shares with the" Asian tigers " not only belonging to the same region, but also the use of many elements of the export-oriented policy, including reliance on the development of labor-intensive industries. In turn, what China and Russia have in common is that both countries are making the transition from an administrative-command system to a market economy. Therefore, it seems logical to assume that Russia should focus more on borrowing positive aspects from the experience of China, rather than NIS. Moreover, the Chinese version of gradual economic reforms, carried out while preserving the foundations of the former political system, really looks very advantageous against the background of the economic and political cataclysms that Russia experienced in the 1990s. But, as Yu. G. Aleksandrov rightly points out (p. 152-163), that the reforms in the two countries they went different ways, due not only to the short-sightedness of the Soviet perestroika leadership, which carried out economic reforms clumsily and sanctioned accelerated political liberalization, but also to the different starting conditions.

In contrast to the Soviet Union, with its industrial economy and urbanized society, China was a predominantly agrarian country at the beginning of the reforms. By the end of the 1970s, about 80% of the then almost billion-strong population of China lived in rural areas. There were objective conditions for the activation of economic development through the emancipation of the economic energy of the most dynamic part of the peasantry, which did not lose any during the years of the Maoist revolution.-

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experience the skills of creative work on the ground. It is no coincidence that the reforms in China began with the de-collectivization of agriculture. The acceleration of economic growth could also be achieved by moving labor resources from the agricultural sector to the emerging industrial sector. Moreover, the abundance and cheapness of labor made it possible to create industrial production facilities that were already initially export-oriented and had price competitiveness in world markets. All these factors seem to have largely determined the specifics of institutional transformation in China. Unlike Russia, China has for quite a long time been able to create the private sector of the economy not only and not so much on the basis of the public sector, but along with it, i.e. not by privatizing existing state-owned industrial enterprises, but by creating new, initially non-state production facilities. Thus, the evolutionary course of the industrialization process largely created the prerequisites for the implementation of gradual reforms in China.

Its advantages are obvious, but Russia obviously could not go "step by step" with China, especially after the collapse of the former economic and political structures in the early 1990s. In addition, the practice of China's socio-economic development, especially in recent years, shows that the long-term coexistence of the old and new economic systems can in itself create serious problems. The Chinese economy is developing at a high rate, but economic growth is accompanied by an accumulation of imbalances between industries and regions, between large-scale expansion of sectors of the economy focused on foreign markets, and much more modest indicators of the development of sectors serving domestic demand. The Chinese economy is constantly teetering between the threat of high inflation on the one hand and falling into a deflationary trap on the other. Social problems are also becoming more acute: income inequality is deepening, and the general population is experiencing difficulties in accessing quality health care and education. All this leads many experts, both Chinese and foreign, to state that from the "East Asian model of development" China is moving away from the "East Asian model of development". It is moving towards the "Latin American model", which is characterized by the constant reproduction of a dual socio-economic structure, when the zone of modern production with a sufficiently high level of income is adjacent to a vast zone of backwardness and poverty.

In many areas (privatization of the state sector in industry, creation of a system of commercial banks, liberalization of financial and foreign exchange markets), reforms in Russia have gone much further than in China, and in these areas China should take into account the Russian experience, rather than vice versa. In my opinion, two aspects of the Chinese version of reforms are still relevant for Russia's borrowing. First, it is possible and necessary to implement an active industrial policy in a transition economy, including through the implementation of state scientific and technical programs; through the implementation of a tax policy differentiated for different groups of enterprises; through the creation by the state of "business incubators" for small knowledge-intensive firms and free economic zones of various types. Secondly, it is a pragmatic and de-ideologized foreign economic policy that combines the policy of "opening up" the economy with the protection of national interests, gradual liberalization with reasonable protectionism.

So, based on the experience of the East Asian countries, the following recipe can be formulated for achieving positive results in economic development: implementation of industrial policy and export orientation while maintaining a stable economic environment.

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macroeconomic stability and promotion of private entrepreneurship. However, no amount of reasonable recipes will not work if you do not take into account the individual characteristics of the country to which they are offered. In the case of Russia, it is necessary to take into account, firstly, the level of industrial maturity of the economy; secondly, the existence of conditions that create the potential for competitiveness not only in industrial, but also in more promising post-industrial sectors; and, thirdly, the specific source of structural distortions and macroeconomic imbalances-the existing export dependence on raw materials the Russian economy.

The "Dutch disease" effect is often attributed to the fact that the growth of commodity exports leads to a strengthening of the real exchange rate of the national currency, and this undermines the price competitiveness of the non-resource sector. This interpretation can also be found in the book by Yu. G. Alexandrov. Moreover, in his opinion, the "Dutch disease" is peculiar only to developed economies, where by the time large - scale exports of natural resources began, a diversified complex of industries and services had already developed (pp. 249-252). Meanwhile, in economic theory, there is a more fundamental explanation of this phenomenon based on Rybchinsky's theorems, it asserts that an increase in supply and a reduction in the cost of any factor of production (not necessarily natural raw materials, but also capital, labor, etc.they lead to the transfer of economic resources to the industry where this factor is used most intensively, with a parallel reduction in production and income in those industries where this factor is used less intensively. A special case of this pattern is the "Dutch disease": the raw materials sector draws capital and other resources from other sectors of the economy. It is clear that with this approach, the problems associated with the "Dutch disease" are particularly acute in cases of transition or developing economies that need structural adjustment.

The abundance of raw material reserves in the country and, consequently, the flow of capital to extractive industries give economic growth specific features. The fact is that the multiplier effect of the commodity sector on the rest of the economy is usually significantly lower than in situations where the leading sectors are manufacturing or services. The investment demand presented by raw materials industries has a distinct specialized orientation, and therefore it has a stimulating effect only on a narrow circle of related industries. Technological improvements in the raw materials sector are relatively slow; the results of R & D also tend not to be applied in industries that are not directly related to resource extraction. This inevitably affects the rate of accumulation of physical and "human" capital in the country. Raw materials industries are among the capital-intensive ones, where relatively few people are employed, and production is usually carried out in marginal regions, and this imposes objective restrictions not only on the growth of consumer demand in the economy, but also on the rate of increase in employment and income equalization.

Another problem associated with the" Dutch disease " is the dominance of rent - oriented rather than productive behavior among economic agents. By definition, the development of raw materials is associated with rent extraction, since access to raw materials is limited by the licensing system, and it is impossible to increase the number of competing producers that would lead to the disappearance of the rental component from gross profit. In an environment where the extractive sector dominates the economy, the psychological desire to get out of-

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the attraction of rent itself suppresses incentives for entrepreneurial activity in non-primary industries. Instead of normal market competition for the price and quality of goods, the country's leading companies compete for the best conditions of access to raw materials provided by the state. The system of market signals is thus distorted, there is an objective basis for corruption and the adoption of inefficient management decisions focused on group interests by both the state bureaucracy and corporate management. This is especially true in developing countries, where democratic institutions are weak and the public sector plays a very significant role in the economy due to the immaturity of national private entrepreneurship.

The trend towards the formation of oligarchic business groups, combined with the already noted weak integration of the commodity sector with the rest of the economy, contributes to an even greater deepening of income inequality. In large, and especially multinational countries with uneven distribution of mineral deposits across the territory, progressive social inequality can lead to regional differentiation, which is fraught with centrifugal trends. In addition, social discontent caused by inequality can provoke populist tendencies in economic policy, leading to accelerated inflation and destabilization of capital formation processes.

Favorable external market conditions can create an "illusion of trouble-free behavior"for the authorities of a resource-rich country. As a result, overdue but obviously unpopular reforms are postponed or even canceled altogether. On the contrary, with a sharp deterioration in the global price environment, it is more likely that the authorities will resort to excessive fiscal and monetary expansion to maintain economic growth. To the instability introduced from outside by fluctuations in commodity prices, instability may be added generated by an internal factor-cyclical fluctuations in economic policy from financial expansion to anti-inflationary tightening.

As a result, we can say that in the long run, commodity dependence causes factors that reduce the efficiency of the economy and thereby slow down the pace of its development. Numerous studies show that in recent decades, economic growth rates in countries with limited mineral resources have been noticeably higher than in resource-producing countries. Among specialists dealing with economic development problems, it has even become customary to talk about the" resource curse " that prevails over countries that are generously endowed with nature.

Are these problems solvable in principle? The data show that in the group of developing countries rich in natural resources, only three States managed to achieve the following goals in the 1960s and 1990s: increase the savings rate to a level comparable to the indicators of developed countries (at least 25% of GDP), and ensure economic growth rates of more than 4% per year, and these are also "Asian tigers", only the"second generation". We are talking about Malaysia (the main raw export products are natural rubber, tropical timber, palm oil and oil), Indonesia (an oil exporter) and Thailand (an exporter of rice and other agricultural products).

In these countries, the large scale of raw material exports was combined with a purposeful state policy to industrialize the economy and increase the share of manufacturing products in exports. At the same time, the symptoms of the "Dutch disease" were felt, but they were stopped by the state-established system of investment incentives in non-primary industries and objective macroeconomic counter-trends. High rates of economic growth are accompanied by-

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They were accompanied by relatively high inflation and current account deficits, which counterbalanced the tendency to strengthen the national currency and, moreover, led to periodic devaluations. The fiscal revenues that the state received from raw materials exports were not accumulated for the future and were not invested in foreign securities, but were used to compensate for budget revenues that "fell out" due to the provision of tax incentives in non-primary industries, and to finance expenses related to the modernization of the economy. In particular, in Indonesia, which was in the 1970s. As a result of rising global oil prices, up to 40% of budget expenditures were spent on public investment in infrastructure projects. A significant share of the budget was also spent on improvements in education and health care systems, which were supposed to help accumulate "human" capital for the growing economy.

The "recipe for development" formulated above, proposed to Russia on the basis of the experience of the "Asian tigers", should therefore be clarified: macroeconomic policy should include measures to sterilize foreign exchange earnings from commodity exports, and industrial policy should include special investment mechanisms for economic diversification, balancing the increased return on investment in raw materials industries. It seems that this is the direction of the "strategic turn" taken in Russian economic policy since 2004, as described by Yu. G. Alexandrov (pp. 318-331). In the macroeconomic area, the formation of a Stabilization Fund, which accumulates a significant share of rental income, has been added to the traditional methods of ensuring budget balance. At the same time, a number of innovations were made that allow us to talk about the formation of a system in Russia "development institutes". The state consolidated control over large corporations in the fuel and energy sector. The formation of state-owned holdings in the aircraft and shipbuilding industries has begun. A budget Investment Fund has been formed. The Development Bank, the Russian Venture Company, and the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation were established. Various types of special economic zones are being created in the country, including technical and innovative ones. National projects in the social sphere are being implemented.

The new exchange rate is still being developed, and adjustments may be made to it. In particular, in my opinion, a positive role could be played by restoring the system of tax incentives for investors at the national level, with their possible differentiation depending on the scale of investments, on their territorial location, on the prospects for reinvesting profits, etc. Russia also needs a more active protectionist foreign trade policy, which encourages import substitution mainly through the use of non-tariff instruments (quotas, licenses, technical barriers, etc.). At the same time, it is necessary to diversify methods of sterilizing excess foreign currency liquidity that enters the country due to the influx of export revenues and foreign investment. The expansion of the Stabilization Fund, which was recently divided into the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund, actually means removing a significant part of national savings from productive use. The same sterilization function could be effectively performed by the Central Bank through operations with government debt obligations. At the same time, the development of The development of a domestic public debt market will mean that the economy will have clearer guidelines for interest rate changes than it currently has.

Be that as it may, the ongoing adjustment of economic policy means that the Russian authorities are moving away from their dominant positions for almost a decade and a half.-

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It has been argued for several decades that only macroeconomic stability and institutional changes will be sufficient to ensure that market mechanisms themselves will ensure the structural adjustment of the economy. The Russian policy of economic development is gradually beginning to be based on principles similar to those that were successfully implemented by the Asian tigers in their time. Predicting whether Russia will become a "tiger", of course, is impossible. But, in any case, there are more reasons for optimism about this recently.

(Ending in the next issue.)

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