Yu. G. ALEKSANDROV. CAN RUSSIA BECOME A "EURO-ASIAN TIGER", MOSCOW, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007, 480 p.*

A. I. SALITSKY (IMEMO RAS). The title of Yu. G. Alexandrov's monograph contains an implicit question, which, in my opinion, can be partially resolved with a slightly different formulation. For example, such a question: "Is it possible to reproduce in Russia the economic dynamics close to what was observed in the past and is currently observed in successful Asian countries?". To answer the question posed in this way, it is important to identify common features in the socio-economic development of Asian states and their economic strategies. It is worth noting that the word "tiger" is usually associated with a relatively small number of countries and territories of East Asia, otherwise called "new industrial". These are relatively small formations, which, alas, have lost the growth rates that actually served as an example for others in the new century. At the same time, two Asian giants came to the fore in the group of leaders. Their experience is even more relevant, including for Russia.

This, I emphasize, is not a question of opposition. As if taking into account the experience of "new industrialism", China and India simply suggested that economists think about the existence of more complete and therefore more universal models of the development of large states. For this reason, I fundamentally disagree with Yu. G. Alexandrov that " China, for all its success, is still not the best role model because of its uniqueness."

Speaking about Russia as a "tiger", in my opinion, one cannot ignore modern China. I will add that the thesis about the uniqueness of today's China and the lack of demand for its experience is not shared by many foreign scientists from both the West and the East. For example, they coined the term "Beijing Consensus"in 2004, 1 implying a major change in milestones in the global economy and the actual demise of the" Washington Consensus", which for a long time destroyed national economies. Chinese philosophers do not share the thesis about the uniqueness of China, because there is a significant difference between " individual "("special") and"unique". Chinese economists who have written mountains of volumes on foreign economic experience, which were actively used by reformers in this country, will also disagree with this thesis. It is no accident that nostalgia for their own dynamic past is colored by the works of many Japanese and South Korean sinologist economists who see its features in modern China. German Orientalists, in turn, note the similarity of the current Chinese model with the concept of the "social market"

* Continued. For the beginning, see: East (Oriens). 2008. N 5, pp. 156-177.

1 Ramo J. C. The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power. L.: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.

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Ludwig Erhard. Finally, the Chinese experience is valuable because it is a "success here and now", and the success of a country with an average per capita income by world standards, close to the Russian indicator.

I would like to emphasize that identity does not exclude, but rather presupposes, the creative use of other people's experience. In a certain sense, China is just the least unique country, since its huge mass and variety of internal conditions do not allow it to be too specific. There would be no success without a proper understanding of common truths and patterns. The experience of a country with a huge variety of economic conditions, which has solved the problem of combining the market and socialism, cannot but have universal significance.

Moreover, a retrospective look at the economic history of the tigers in the light of the current success of the elephant and especially the dragon allows us to identify several typical features of what can already be considered an Asian economic community - and not in the negative sense similar to the "Asian mode of production". These traits are fairly well known. The relatively low availability of land resources, the particular severity of the employment problem, the initial lack of capital, technological backwardness and other factors were the soil that almost everywhere in Asia fed and continues to feed certain modernization strategies. Importantly, these strategies continue to focus on industrialization, which combines import substitution and export orientation.

A characteristic feature of the structure of the economy of modern Asia is the presence of a number of countries in which the share of industry in GDP significantly exceeds the share of the service sector (this phenomenon was extremely rarely observed in developed Western countries and Japan). These are primarily China (where 49% of GDP is produced in industry versus 39% in the service sector), oil-exporting countries, some second-wave NIS (Indonesia, Malaysia), as well as Vietnam and Turkmenistan.

It is noteworthy that in 2001 - 2007, the growth rate of industrial production outpaced the increase in the volume of services produced in China, India and Malaysia. The same trend was observed in Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This pattern has also spread to Thailand, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Taking into account the increase in oil prices, the share of industry (extractive)has also increased in the GDP of oil-exporting countries. In Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, industrial growth was only slightly slower than in the tertiary sector. All this confirms the fact that the industrialization of Asia continues.

Industrialization does not contradict the active development of the Asian population of the achievements of the "post-industrial" world in the service sector. The natural advantages and objective needs of Asian countries for industrial development, combined with new opportunities for communication and information services, promise to provide original examples of successful economic construction and creative solutions to national problems.

It should be noted that the global trend towards servisization of the economy is in a certain sense more profitable for developing countries than for developed countries. Many service industries are expanding mainly extensively, since it is impossible to mechanize and automate them. Since labor productivity here is lower than in industry, an increase in the number of people employed in the service sector for developed countries means a general decline in the skills of workers and often stagnation of incomes. This is also fully true for Russia. On the contrary, for the population of developing countries, employment in the service sector is a significant step forward

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compared to working in low-productivity agriculture or the informal sector.

However, agriculture is also not forgotten in Asia. In the second half of the 20th century, agricultural production in Asia increased 4.8 times, while the population grew 2.6 times. This made it possible to achieve self-sufficiency in food, to increase participation in international trade in agricultural products. In the coming century, the growth rate of agricultural production is even more significantly outstripping the rate of population growth. In Russia, on the contrary, the industry crisis has not been overcome.

If we include modern China in the Asian development model, we will find that planning, strong state regulation, purposeful cultivation of competitive enterprises on the world market, and selective use of foreign capital are still widespread in this part of the world. This model provides for an increased rate of accumulation and a significant scale of infrastructure construction, without which it is impossible to create a full-fledged domestic market.

Gradually increasing, the average rate of accumulation in Asian countries already in the 1970s reached the indicators of developed countries. Subsequently, its growth continued, although it was sometimes interrupted by crises. This trend was primarily related to the development of the industrialization process, including its infrastructure component. The credit sector was very active, and state-owned banks, including development banks, played an exceptionally high role.

The dynamic growth of the share of Asian countries in global GDP, combined with the increasing accumulation rate in the new century, has allowed this part of the world to become the main investment platform of our time: in gross terms, more than half of all global capital investments are realized here. The preservation of an elevated accumulation rate in the main body of the Asian economy can be considered as an important prerequisite for further strengthening of Asia's position in the world economy. It should be emphasized that the process of accumulation is increasingly provided by our own financial resources and technologies.

Successful Asian countries are characterized by caution when interacting with TNCs in developed countries. There are relatively few own TNCs in Asia. It is possible that such an organization of the economy is better from the point of view of the development of the internal market and economic dynamics. There is a well-founded point of view: one of the reasons for the slowdown in economic growth in developed countries since the 70s of the last century was precisely the processes of global monopolization and transnationalization. Multi-branch national concerns, which made a great contribution to scientific and technological progress in the post-war period, gave way to relatively narrowly specialized TNCs. Extensive capture of foreign markets, the withdrawal of "non-core" assets from companies (outsourcing), and cost reduction by moving production abroad pushed intensive methods of fighting for the market, including the development of fundamentally new products, into corporate strategies.

In modern China, the situation in this sense is particularly contrasting. There, state-owned (or joint-stock) intersectoral concerns, closely linked to research organizations, remain the main engines of the national economy. It is possible that this organizational form will also be more fruitful in the innovative perspective.

Since the 1980s, the direct involvement of the state in the economy has been declining, and the methods of regulating the economy have also changed. This phenomenon is called liberalization. It also did not bypass Asia. Generally speaking, economic liberalization in developing Asia reflected the increased capacity of national producers of goods and services, as well as the successful solution of initial problems by the State.

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tasks of modernization and industrialization. This, of course, meant not the state's withdrawal from the economy, but only the concentration of its efforts on new tasks and the rejection of exhausted methods of influencing the economy. In most Asian countries, liberalization was metered out, which largely explains why this part of the world continues to maintain high economic growth rates - in contrast to Latin America, Africa and" transition " states.

Liberalization has a positive effect if the economy and public administration are sufficiently mature, including in terms of infrastructure. Unprepared or premature liberalization can lead to crises and major failures. The situation will get worse if the state disguises its lack of ability or desire to regulate economic development by new means with rhetoric about the inevitability of liberalization and the justification of its negative social consequences.

The establishment and development of the export sector behind the protectionist barrier and the very slow liberalization of the foreign economic and currency spheres were another important regularity in the economic development of both the "tigers" and large Asian countries. China and India still manage to combine the strengthening of their foreign economic positions with the purposeful formation of the sectoral structure of the economy, foreign and own capital investments abroad. At the same time, it is fundamentally important that both the "tigers" and China and India were well aware that the mere opening of markets can only preserve the existing comparative advantages, but the future specialization in the global economy requires a targeted policy.

The world economic achievements of the largest Asian countries are the result of a clear subordination of strategy, policy and practice, their historical continuity and close alignment with domestic and foreign policy objectives. The policy of China and India in the field of foreign trade and the use of foreign investment in the 80 - 90s of the last century can be properly qualified as a combination of selective opening of the national economy with strict state control and protectionist measures.

This policy has paid off. In 1997 - 1998, as a result of the "overheating" of farms, aggravated by excessive borrowing and speculative movement of short-term capital, four East Asian countries faced a currency and financial crisis. The ways out of the crisis were largely similar: tightening currency regulation and control over the banking system, restoring credit and investment mechanisms available to the real sector, and expanding export production. The international liquidity ratios of the crisis-hit countries improved significantly by the middle of this decade.

Now we can say that most Asian countries have overcome the problems associated with the lack of currency, which for a long time held back their economic development. The currency and credit monopoly of Western countries has been virtually eliminated. Thus, there are additional opportunities for developing the goals of the economic strategy and foreign economic policy. The forced opening of national farms does not seem to be an imperative, but at the same time, further strengthening of positions on the world market is almost explosive.

In the new century, Asian countries have significantly increased their participation in international trade. Thanks to high rates of industrialization, the structure of their exports has significantly improved: now they are mainly manufactured products, and the share of high-tech goods is growing very rapidly.

At the same time, in the first half of this decade, economic growth rates were higher in Asian countries with a relatively low degree of unemployment.-

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indoor economy. The role of foreign direct investment in the economic development of most countries in this part of the world has also slightly decreased. Asian countries, including the largest ones, are increasingly exporting capital, including in the form of direct investment.

At the present stage, the market quality of the economy and high international competitiveness in Asian countries have been achieved to some extent, and the rate of accumulation is also quite high. Another issue is on the agenda - enhancing the role of the state in developing and increasing the capacity of the domestic market. The latter is hardly possible without strengthening the redistributive role of the state. The fact is that in the current conditions, the main constraint on economic growth is no longer so much a capital deficit as a lack of demand. You can increase it by making your income more evenly distributed.

Therefore, increased state redistribution is becoming an important factor in maintaining high economic growth rates in Asia. In the first years of the new century, the growth of the share of government revenues and expenditures in GDP was typical for the countries with the highest economic dynamics: China, Kazakhstan, India, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Thailand. On the contrary, countries with low GDP growth rates (Taiwan, Singapore, Sri Lanka) experienced a reduction in the share of budget revenues and expenditures. The share of government spending in GDP in developing Asia as a whole has grown from 17% in 1990 to 20% in 2000 and continues to grow rapidly. In China, for example, between 2004 and 2006, the annual growth rate of government revenues exceeded 20%, and in 2007 it was 32.4%.

With the economic development of large and especially large countries, the problem of modernization largely becomes internal: the source of positive experience is no longer foreign examples, but the achievements of advanced regions within the country. Accordingly, the dissemination of these achievements throughout the entire economic system, overcoming regional gaps and imbalances becomes another important direction of state policy and ideology.

The last thing to mention is regional economic cooperation in Asia. For a long time, it developed much more slowly than in other parts of the world. At the turn of the century, there was a tendency to increase regionalization. At the same time, Asian states are moving from a continuous liberalization of foreign economic policy within the WTO to a selective one, focusing on strengthening intraregional ties and bilateral preferential agreements on trade and services. As a result, the share of vertical trade and economic ties (with developed countries) decreases and the share of horizontal ones (between developing countries) increases, and "global" institutions, including the WTO and the IMF, which are often viewed with excessive reverence by Russian economists, are being pushed to the periphery of external economic liberalization.

A significant contribution to economic regionalization in Asia is made by the ASEAN countries, as well as China. The agreement on the establishment of the CAFTA (China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone) seems promising from the point of view of consolidating the efforts of developing countries in economic development and jointly protecting their interests in the world market. Regional cooperation is also being strengthened in other parts of Asia, rapidly expanding into new areas, including monetary and financial. As a result, Asian states have significantly strengthened their collective and individual positions in the global economy and increased their ability to withstand crises.

The variety of ways of socio-economic evolution of Asian countries and their successful overcoming of various dogmatic constructions indicate the need to implement individual development strategies. Such strategies can be a combination of human-developed theories and models

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economic growth or adherence to a single doctrine. It is important that the strategy ensures growth and a more even distribution of its results among different groups and strata of society. The problems of backwardness, dependency, and poverty are no longer insurmountable given the current dynamics.

The state in Asian countries retains the role of an organizer of socio-economic development, a defender of the domestic market, a business incubator, an infrastructure builder, and a regulator of relations between national and foreign capital, monopolies, and the market. The reduction of the public sector is not a landslide here. On the contrary, in recent years, major government programs have been initiated in Asia to mitigate regional and social disparities.

Something similar has been observed in Russia only recently. Intuitively catching powerful dynamic impulses from the East, our country, however, is still far from consistently building and implementing its own modernization strategy. Without taking into account the experience of Asia and, of course, China, such a strategy is unlikely to be complete.

Unfortunately, the factors of high economic dynamics in Asian countries have not yet been replicated in Russia. GDP growth is based on faster and clearly hypertrophied growth in the service sector, including the non-competitive financial sector by international standards. The fate of the domestic manufacturing industry is a legitimate concern, compounded by much higher tariff increases than in Asia. Investments in infrastructure, agriculture and forestry are very low. The income gap is growing. The real sector lacks affordable credit. Regional economic cooperation within the CIS is weakening.

Some increase in the accumulation rate in 2006 - 2007 may stop, including due to the thesis launched by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation about "overheating of the economy". External borrowings of the financial sector, which do not facilitate lending conditions for the real sector of the economy, are also considered excessive. At the same time, Russia, unlike successful Asian countries, has not managed to achieve stabilization of domestic prices. There are many reasons for this, but the result is important: the suppression of the price competitiveness of the economy, the import "avalanche", which aggravates the hypertrophy of the service sector. The transition to the modernization scenario remains questionable.

V. A. MELYANTSEV (ISAA at MOSCOW State University). Recently, hundreds of books and thousands of articles devoted to Russian reforms and transformations have been published. It would seem that almost everything is said... However, the book of the famous Orientalist-economist Yu. G. Alexandrov, who adheres, I would say, mainly to rational-liberal views, which is full of a number of interesting thoughts and statistical calculations, under an intriguing title, encourages discussion about the results and prospects of socio-economic modernization of the Russian Federation.

Although the structure and layout of individual sections of the book may not be completely perfect, and the general and intermediate conclusions could be more clearly formulated, the work, along with a critical analysis of the Russian metamorphoses of the last two decades, contains, which is valuable (and not so often found in the specialized literature), a number of optimistic and at the same time realistic assessments of what is happening. It is emphasized that, despite the mass of existing problems and difficulties, there is still a more or less effective market adaptation of the economy. And under certain conditions, the relatively rapid deployment of export-oriented Russian large companies is possible, both in the fuel and energy sector and in a number of other industrial sectors.

Let us also ask ourselves the question that is explicitly stated in the title of the book: from what we are now seeing, is the Russian economy becoming more and more like the "Eurasian tiger"?

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1) Yes, indeed, the Russian economy (GDP) is growing relatively fast (in any case, undoubtedly faster than developed countries)1. However, given that the informal sector accounts for a significant share of it (estimated at at least 20-30% of GDP), 2 we - let's face it - do not know exactly how fast it is actually growing.

Many (if not most) economists and other fellow citizens have a feeling / suspicion that in reality deflators (i.e., price indices that are used to translate the dynamics of macroaggregates expressed in current prices into so-called constant prices) are underestimated, and, consequently, in official Russian reference books, the average annual dynamics of Russian GDP can be very low. In my opinion, it should be overstated by at least one or two percentage points. In other words, the average annual growth rate of Russian GDP, even in the conditions of recovery growth (according to our estimates, in 1999-2007 it was no more than 5-6% per year3), was generally lower than in the Asian NIS during their accelerated growth, as well as in the PRC and India of the last two decades 4.

2) At the same time, we emphasize that due to the rapid rise in the price of hydrocarbons and raw materials exported by Russia and the increase in the index of barter conditions of its foreign trade 5, as well as the expansion of the export quota in GDP, the average annual growth rate of real disposable income of the Russian Federation, according to World Bank calculations, in 2000 - 2006 outstripped the GDP growth rate by at least 4 percentage points. Let us emphasize that none of the "Asian tigers" that I know of has had such a "boost" to their economic growth over any long period of time.

3) My analysis of the dynamics of aggregate factor productivity (taking into account the increased number of working immigrants, a significant increase in the degree of capacity utilization compared to the end of the 1990s7) showed that the economic growth of the Russian Federation in the last 8-10 years was determined not so much by intensive factors (in particular, the increase in the number of labor productivity - as it follows from the materials of official statistics), how many extensive determinants 8, which, according to our calculations and estimates, provided at least three quarters of the increase in the Russian labor market?

1 См.: IMF. World Economic Outlook, April 2008. Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 242, 246.

2 According to experts ' estimates, in 2003 the informal economy of the Russian Federation could have been equivalent to about 46% of its gross national income (Economy Characteristics // www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/EconomyCharacteristics.aspx.).

3 See: ECO, 2007, No. 6, p. 20.

4 See: V. A. Melyantsev. "East Asian model" of economic growth: the most important components, advantages and disadvantages. Moscow: ISAA, Gumanitarii, 1998, p. 49; on. Two Asian giants: the main contours of economic development / / Vostok (Oriens). 2007. N 4, p. 124.

5 Export price index divided by the import price index.

6 In 2000-2006, in China and India, where the barter terms of trade index was declining, the average annual growth rate of real disposable income was, on the contrary, lower than GDP growth by 1.3 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively (See: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2008. Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 195).

7 See: The World Bank. Russian Economic Report. N 15, p. 19; N 16, p. 2. Washington, D.C. November 2007-June 2008; B. A. Zamaraev. National economy of Russia at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. Moscow, 2006, p.).

8 What the author of the book under discussion also writes about (see p. 61, 145-147). Analyzing the effectiveness of Russia's post-reform economy is not an easy task. Considerable problems are associated with adequate accounting for structural shifts in the gross product, correct calculation of the dynamics of used fixed production assets and actual time worked (see: S. Drobyshevsky et al. Factors of Economic growth in the regions of the Russian Federation, Moscow: IEPP, 2005; V. A. Bessonov, K. B. Voskoboynikov. Dynamics of Fixed assets and investments in the Russian Transition Economy, Moscow, IEPP, 2006).

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GDP 9. This indicator is close to the indicator for the PRC, whose growth efficiency leaves much to be desired (which is emphasized even in official publications), but it is clearly worse than in India and the main group of "Asian tigers" over the past two to three decades (according to our calculations, in 1980-2005 in South Korea, Taiwan and In India, at least two-fifths of GDP growth was determined by an increase in aggregate productivity)10.

4) To a large extent, the relatively low contribution of intensive components of economic growth in the Russian Federation is due to the fact that the country's fixed capital has been little updated for a long time and is generally very technologically outdated. According to experts, if in 1990 the average age of equipment in the Russian Federation was five years older than in the United States, now it is almost fifteen years 11. Due to the underdevelopment of roads, the country is estimated to suffer losses equivalent to 3 - 5% of its GDP every year12.

5) Despite the high rate of domestic saving13 and the increased inflow of foreign investment into the Russian economy14, the rate of gross domestic investment in the Russian Federation remains low. Although after the default, this indicator increased from 14-15% of GDP in 1999 to 17-18% in 2005 and 21% in 2007, it is still significantly lower than, for example, in Thailand (in 2006, 29% of GDP), South Korea (30%), India (33%) and China (41%; all calculations are in national prices)15. Calculations in international prices based on purchasing power parities of currencies show that Russia's lag behind the "Asian tigers" and vanguard countries in this most important factor of economic growth is even deeper. According to recent surveys conducted by the World Bank, the capital investment rate, measured in PPP, in 2005 in the Russian Federation did not exceed 11-12% (!), amounting to 19-20% in developed countries, 22-23% in India, 30% in the Republic of Korea, and 39% in the PRC 16. It is worth recalling that the "tiger" growth of Japan and Asian NIS during the period of their accelerated development was largely, and perhaps primarily, due to the high rate of capital investment (which reached an average of about one-third of GDP) 17.

6) In contrast to the Asian NIS and modern China, in which, during the period of accelerated development, from a quarter to a third of GDP growth was provided by

9 Calculations and estimates by: V. A. Melyantsev. Rossiya za tri veka: ekonomicheskiy rost v mirovom kontekste [Russia for Three Centuries: Economic Growth in the Global Context]. 2003. N 5. Table 2; same name. Russia, large countries of the East and West: a comparative assessment of indices of international competitiveness, productivity and quality of life / / Lomonosov Readings. Oriental studies. Moscow: ISAA at MSU, 2005, p. 212; The World Bank. World Development Report, 2008, p. 340 - 341; The World Bank. Russian Economic Report. N 16. Washington, D.C., June 2008, p. 2,4.

10 See: V. A. Melyantsev V. A. "East Asian model" of economic growth: the most important components, advantages and disadvantages. Moscow: ISAA, Gumanitarii, 1998, p. 49; on. Two Asian giants: the main contours of economic development / / Vostok (Oriens). 2007, N 4, p. 124.

11 See: A. Balatsky, A. Gusev. Iron Logic-3 (Russia will need about a quarter of a century to close the technological gap with the United States) / / NG-Nauka, April 23, 2008.

12 For information on the quality of Russian roads, see: A. Kolesnichenko. Russia's Deadly Roads // Business Week. May 29,2008.

13 The rate of domestic savings in the Russian Federation in 2005 - 2007 was almost three-fifths higher than the rate of capital investment (see: The World Bank. Russian Economic Report. N 16. Washington, D. C., June 2008, p. 2, 5; World Development Report, 2008, p. 341).

14 According to the World Bank, gross FDI inflows to the Russian economy increased from $ 7 billion in 2003 to $ 14 billion in 2006 and $ 28 billion in 2007 (see: The World Bank. Russian Economic Report. N 16. Washington, D. C., June 2008. p. 7).

15 A. R. Belousov. Evolyutsiya sistemy vosproizvodstva rossiiskoi ekonomiki: ot krizisa k razvitiyu [Evolution of the reproduction system of the Russian economy: from crisis to Development]. Moscow, Maks-Press, 2006, p.358; World Development Report, 2008, p. 340 - 341; The World Bank. Russian Economic Report. N 16. Washington, D.C., June 2008, p. 5).

16 World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2008, p. 8 - 10.

17 According to our three-factor model, two-fifths of higher GDP growth rates in developing countries were determined by a higher rate of investment in physical and "human" capital (V. A. Melyantsev. Developing Countries: Growth, differentiation, economic challenge / / Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Ser. 13. Vostokovedenie. 2006, No. 2, p. 23).

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As a result of the shift of employment from agriculture to industry and services, 18 the Russian Federation has long since exhausted this important resource of modernization. It also, like a number of developed countries, has an aging population, thus losing the "demographic dividend".

7) In contrast to many developing countries, modern Russia is characterized by a relatively high average number of years of education for the adult population (according to our calculations and estimates, in 2007 - 13.6 years; in India-6.7 years; in China-8.4 years; in developed countries-17 years) and a fairly high indicator of school enrollment in the United States. higher education (68% compared to 12% in India, 19% in China; and 82% in the United States) 19. At the same time, the quality of education in many universities, unfortunately, leaves much to be desired. Only one-seventh of university teachers are engaged in scientific work (this is half as much as at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s)20. Many of them are very "advanced" in age. And the average life expectancy from birth, despite the increase in the standard of living over the past 10 years, does not change much: she (65-66 years old) It is already lower than in India (66-67 years) and significantly lower than in China (73 years) - countries with much lower per capita incomes.

Thus, the quality of not only physical, but also "human" capital in many components, unfortunately, continues to degrade. Meanwhile, it should be emphasized that in the Russian Federation, the total expenditure on higher education, science and information technologies in GDP (in 2006-2007, 5.7% of GDP) It is already lower than in China and India (over 7%) and two to three times less than in Asian NIS (on average, 11-12% of GDP in South Korea and Taiwan) and developed countries (13-15% of GDP).21. It should be emphasized that in the" Asian tigers", building up "human capital" has always been a top priority.

8) At present, the Russian Federation is taking certain, but in general, extremely insufficient measures to strengthen funding for science, which has been on a "starvation ration" for twenty years. This factor, as well as the uncompetitive organization of Russian science, has led to the fact that, while still having about one-tenth of the global number of researchers, Russia produces less than 1% of the world's scientific output, compared to 36% in the United States, 16% in Germany, and about 6% in China. By increasing raw materials, primarily hydrocarbon, exports (about which much is written in detail in the book), Russia, alas, remains a dwarf in the export of technological goods and services. The share of high-tech goods in the export of finished products of the Russian Federation (no more than 8% in 2005) is three to four times lower than the "Asian tigers" (in 2005 in Thailand 27%, in South Korea and China 31 - 32%)22.

9) It seems that, despite the fact that the economic and political stability of the Russian Federation has undoubtedly strengthened over the past eight years, the quality of state institutions, according to very numerous estimates, remains extremely low-even in comparison with China and India, not to mention the group of "Asian tigers" (see graph).

A high level of corruption (Russia, as you know, ranks 143rd in the world), growing double-digit inflation (especially for food, self-sufficiency, etc.).-

18 See: V. A. Melyantsev. How it happened: the emergence and spread of an intensive mode of production in today's developed, developing countries and Russia / / Bulletin of the Moscow University. Ser. 13. Vostokovedenie. 2004, No. 3, p. 15.

19 Compiled and calculated by: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2007, p. 78 - 80; UNDP. Human Development Report, 2007/2008. N. Y., 2007, p. 269 - 272.

20 F. E. Sheregi, M. N. Strikhanov. Nauka v Rossii: sotsiologicheskii analiz [Science in Russia: a Sociological Analysis], Moscow, 2006, p. 227.

21 Calculated by: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2007, p. 304 - 306, 308 - 310; UNDP. Human Development Report, 2007/2008. N.Y., 2007, p. 265 - 267.

22 The World Bank. World Development Report, 2008, p. 342-343; see also: S. Tsirel. Do pears grow on an apple tree: domestic innovations twenty years later // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 27, 2008

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Chart

Note: The institute quality indicator changes from -2.5 to 2.5.

Calculated by:D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, M. Mastruzzi. Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996 - 2006. WPS N 4280. World Bank, Washington, D. C., 2007.

These characteristics clearly contrast with the majority of successful Asian NIS (which is no more than half of them in the Russian Federation), and a high level of inequality (the Gini coefficient is over 0.4)23. This reduces the level of trust (and social capital) in society, increases transaction costs, prevents adequate accumulation of physical and "human" capital and increases the degree of its effective use.24
10) At the same time, noting the obvious differences between the "Asian tigers" and the Russian Federation, I, like the author of the book, do not believe that Russia is fatally doomed to eternal lag. The main thing that we can agree with Yu. G. Alexandrov is that, despite many difficulties, Russia undoubtedly has prospects and considerable chances for successful development - provided that a correct, consistent and active policy is implemented. The period of economic stabilization and recovery has ended. It is obvious that the previous and current presidents of the Russian Federation are focused on activating urgent structural reforms, including the most important one - administrative (designed to help improve management efficiency and reduce corruption), as well as on implementing priority, primarily innovative, national projects. The associated increase in capital investment, of course, can lead to a certain surge in already high inflation (presumably by one or two percentage points per year) .25 But in the future, as the author of the book under discussion also writes, increasing supply and increasing market competition, including by increasing the number of small and medium-sized enterprises and thus overcoming monopolism, is quite capable of bringing down high inflation and thereby improving the investment climate and improving the efficiency of the national economy.

(The ending follows)

23 For an explanation of why abnormally high (and abnormally low) inequality indicators slow down economic growth, see: V. A. Melyantsev. Asiatic economic breakthrough: scales, efficiency, consequences / / Valery Shirokov: I would like to talk to you / Ed. by S. V. Soplenkov, A.M. Petrov. Moscow: Akad. humanities Research, 2006, pp. 59-160, 169.

24 See: V. Shlapentoch. Trust in Public Institutions in Russia // Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2006. Vol. 39, N 2, p. 157, 159, 161, 169.

25 See about this: V. M. Polterovich. Reducing inflation should not be the main goal of the Russian government's economic policy // Ekonomicheskaya politika sovremennoi Rossii [Economic Policy of Modern Russia], Moscow, 2006, No. 2 (33).

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