Dmitry Uzlaner

The Dialogue of Science and Religion from the Perspective of Contemporary Theories of Democracy

Dmitry Uzlaner - Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Society, Associate Professor of Chair of State-Confessional Relations, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia). uzlanerda@gmail.com

This article deals with the dialogue between science and religion through the lens of contemporary theories of democracy. Can religion, along with science, make valuable contributions to the public debate? Should scientific community respect this contribution, and if yes, then why? The article analyzes the two general considerations in favor of religious contributions. One is normative, connected with contemporary theories of democracy. Another one is epistemological, which, in turn, exists in two versions: weak or "modern", represented by Jurgen Habermas and implying the necessity of "translation" of religious contribution into the language of universal secular rationality; and "strong" or postmodern, implying epistemological equalization of religion and science. Then the article considers concrete historical details of Russian culture (most importantly, its internal binary oppositions), which stipulate the social projection of the dialogue between science and religion in the Russian context.

Keywords: religion and science, Jurgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, public religion, postsecular society, deliberative democracy.

This article focuses on the problem of dialogue between science and religion. However, we are not interested in the standard angle of this problem: for example, academic or near-academic discussions on particular issues, whether it is the status of theology in higher education or the dispute between creationists and evolutionists. Instead, we are interested in:-

Uzlaner D. Dialog nauki i religii: vzglyad s pozitsii sovremennykh teorii demokratii [Dialogue of Science and Religion: a view from the positions of modern theories of democracy]. 2015. N 1 (33). pp. 136-163.

Uzlaner, D. (2015) "The Dialogue of Science and Religion: A Theory of Democracy Perspective", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 33 (1): 136 - 163.

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The main projection of this dialogue is the interaction of science and religion (and their respective communities) in the public space. Is there a place for religion in the public space? Can religion, along with science, make a meaningful contribution to public discussions? Should the scientific community respect this contribution, and if so, why?

By public space, we will mean a set of institutions and practices located between the sphere of state power and the sphere of privacy, that is, what makes it possible to discuss issues of common importance for all members of a given society.1 Public discussions are those critical and rational discussions that relate to generally significant issues and take place in the public space. In contemporary works devoted not only to general problems of democracy, but also to the question of the place of religion in a democratic society, public discussions are increasingly coming to the fore as an important addition to "aggregating" or "voice-centered" models of democracy. The latter can provide "a mechanism for determining winners and losers, but no mechanism for reaching consensus, or shaping public opinion,or even for formulating a decent compromise." 2 Public discussions, according to the theorists of "deliberative democracy", are precisely the mechanism for reaching consensus, without which stable democracy is impossible. Moreover, these discussions are sometimes just as important as the procedures and decisions that result from them. In particular, they turn out to be "the main tool that allows organized groups of citizens to limit power and make powerful actors accountable" 3.

The contribution of science and the scientific community to public discussions is obvious and does not require any special explanation.4 However, the presence of religion and its representative communities in the public space, as well as their status as legitimate ones.-

1. For more information about the idea of the formation and development of public space, see Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society [1962]. Cambridge: Polity.

2. Kimlika U. Sovremennaya politicheskaya filosofiya: Vvedenie [Modern Political Philosophy: Introduction]. Moscow: Publishing House of the National Research University-Higher School of Economics, 2010, p. 371.

3. Young, I.M. (2000) Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4. See, for example, Kitcher, F. (2001) Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford University Press; Kitcher, F. (2011) Science in a Democratic Society. Prometheus Books.

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public debates are not so obvious. So, in particular, within the framework of the once popular theories of secularization, a thesis was formulated about the inevitable privatization of religion, 5 which combined descriptive and normative dimensions, that is, it was not only about stating what is actually happening, but also about presenting this process as not always desirable, but almost always inevitable outcome socio-political development. It was argued that religion is losing its social significance (whatever the reasons for this) and is increasingly becoming a private matter of a person who, in the space of his privacy, has the right to believe/disbelieve in what he sees fit, without burdening others.

Despite the fact that this thesis has been increasingly revised in recent years - in particular, by theorists of desecularization and post-secular society, who emphasize the importance of religions as important "interpretive communities" 6-it is still popular among some "public opinion leaders", not to mention the academic community, which jealously protects its status as the only provider reasonable expert judgments. An example is one of the leading intellectuals of our time, 7 Richard Dawkins, who, as one of the leaders of the so-called "new atheists", comes out with the sharpest criticism of"public religions". From his point of view, the mere fact of having a cassock, beard, and cross does not automatically give a person the right to participate in public discussions, and certainly does not impose any obligations on other participants in the discussion to take these judgments seriously. 8 Dawkins ' position is not without foundation: in contrast to science, which claims to know the world "as it is" and supports its arguments in public discussions with the authority of this knowledge, religion, as a whole, is not without reason.

5. Berger, P. L., Berger, B. and Kellner, H. (1974) The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness, p. 138 - 142. N.Y.: Vintage Books; Parsons, T. (1966) "Religion in a Modern Pluralistic Society", Review of Religious Research 7 (3): 134.

6. Habermas Yu. Against "Militant atheism" / / Russian Journal [http://www.russ.ru/pole/Protiv-voinstvuyuschego-ateizma, accessed from 17.01.2015].

7. По версии рейтинга журнала Prospect Magazine, составлявшегося на основе десяти тысяч голосов, поданных из ста стран мира. См.: World Thinkers 2013 // Prospect Magazine [http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/world-thinkers-2013/#. UnBGXECGhjo, доступ от 30.10.2013].

8. Dawkins R. Dolly and ryasogolovye // Dawkins R. Chaplain of the devil: reflections on hope, lies, science and love. Moscow: AST: Corpus, 2013.

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It is a matter of individual and highly subjective faith, and it is not able to support its argument with an equally weighty epistemological authority.

Thus, the right of religion to be present in the public space and to participate fully in public discussions needs additional justification. The arguments in favor of this participation will be presented below, which, we hope, will show the social significance of the dialogue between science and religion and its desirability for the stable existence of modern constitutional democratic states, which we would like to include Russia at least on formal grounds. In a sense, this article is a response to the new militant atheists who believe that religion has no place in the public sphere, that it cannot make any contribution to public discussions, and that religion, being a purely subjective and individual matter, should remain within the private sphere.

Religion is a full participant in public discussions

Abstract, "ideal-typical" considerations will be presented below, which allow us to speak both about the inevitability of the presence of religions and their representative communities in the public space, and about the need to take their contribution to public discussions very seriously, regardless of how subjective and shaky the epistemological grounds supporting this contribution are from the point of view of the scientific community metaphysical doctrines.

There are two such considerations. We will call the first one normative and consider it related to the formal side of the dialogue between science and religion; the second one is epistemological and related to the content side.

The essence of the normative consideration is to point out that a constitutional democratic society is based primarily on the consent of all its members, and not on the truth, as the advocates of scientific or religious truth may wish. The very fact that something is true (for example, from the point of view of science) has no binding consequences for society as a whole. Even if this truth is embodied in political, legal, economic, or any other social form.-

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but in meaningful ways, its recognition requires reaching at least a minimal public consensus. As Charles Taylor rightly points out, modern societies since the seventeenth century have made the transition from cosmic-religious concepts of the political order to "bottom-up" concepts, that is, to the idea that society exists for the protection and mutual benefit of its members, equal to each other. These concepts contain a very powerful normative dimension, it implies equal participation of all members of society in joint discussions concerning common issues. As Taylor points out, the laws and institutions of such a society should flow from consent, from the conviction that society and its future belong to all members of this society without exception.9
The principle of consent is complicated by the inevitable pluralism of modern society, which always has communities based on different and often incommensurable "comprehensive doctrines", to use the terminology of John Rawls. 10 These can be doctrines, some of which have knowledge as their fundamental basis, and others have faith. In the logic of the considered normative consideration, the question of the truth of these doctrines is not of fundamental importance, since the presence of people who share unjustified (for example, from the point of view of science) ideas about the world and man does not deprive these people of civil equality and the right to defend the point of view that they for whatever reasons believe for yourself, it is sufficiently justified. In this situation, the problem of "public use of reason" comes to the fore as an inclusive and non-coercive process of exchanging rational and reasoned arguments.

In connection with these new realities, the very understanding of secularism is also being transformed. As Charles Taylor points out, secularism

9. См. Taylor, Ch. (2011) "What Does Secularism Mean", in Taylor, Ch. Dilemmas and Connections: Selected Essays, p. 309. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. For a translation of Taylor's article into Russian, see this issue of our publication.

10. See Rawls J. Theory of justice. Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk State University Press, 1995; Rawls, J. (1997) "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited", University of Chicago Law Review 64: 765-807; Rawls, J. (1985)" Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3): 223-251.

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Today , it is no longer so much a question of the relationship between church and state, of the proper degree of influence of religion on the state (and vice versa), of protecting society from the excessive influence of religion, as it is a question of how to respond to the challenges of ever-expanding pluralism. Historically, the question of secularism in its modern sense was first raised in the context of the bloody religious wars of the XVI-XVII centuries: opposing religious factions were involved in a fierce conflict that threatened the integrity of society and raised the question of workable mechanisms for ensuring civil peace. Secularism in its origins is a problem of finding such norms and agreements that would not depend in any way on the irreconcilability of confessional differences. 11
This search led, according to Taylor, to two possible types of secularism as an attempt to respond to the challenge of pluralism that once divided a whole society. The first type is secularism of a common ground, the essence of which is to find a common denominator that would unite all the opposing sides. In the Christian West, this foundation is based on the most general Christian principles shared by all the opposing factions. However, as social diversity increased, including non-Christian communities and worldviews, common-ground secularism began to work worse.

The second type was the secularism of independent political ethics, which is an attempt to fundamentally abstract from any confessional factionalism and create independent norms and principles based on the premise "as if there were no God", in the words of Hugo Grotius12. For example, as the basis of such independent principles, we can consider the position that a person is a rational social being who, like everything else in this world, strives for self - preservation and prosperity side by side with other similar beings. However, with the appearance of atheists and agnostics in society as a socially significant force, for whom the words of Hugo Grotius ceased to be just a methodological device and became the foundation of their worldview and life, the strategy of " independent-

11. Taylor, Ch. (1998) "Modes of Secularism", in R. Bhargava (ed.) Secularism and Its Critics, p. 32. Oxford University Press.

12. Grotius G. O pravo mira i voiny [On the Right of peace and war]. Moscow: Ladomir Publ., 1994. Prolegomena XI. pp. 46-47.

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my political ethics" has become the position of only one of the factions. This faction has by default gained an advantage, which it has tried to strengthen by seeking to exercise "strict supervision of the boundary between religious and independent political ethics", while doing everything possible to "further transform religion into something that has no significance for public life".13 Like general secularism, this type of secularism can hardly be considered as a political phenomenon. It should be called fair and viable in the conditions of modern post-secular societies.

Thus, both strategies of secularism, "one of which involves referring to different communities and finding a point of convergence between them on some fundamental points, and the second-the need to abstract from any fundamental lofty beliefs in the name of the goals of political morality" 14, faced quite serious difficulties in the transition to a pluralistic society based on consent. This led to a request for a third type of secularism, which Taylor, following John Rawls, calls "overlapping consensus" secularism.

The secularism of the" overlapping consensus " consists in the recognition by all parties of a set of the most common political and ethical principles and values. At the same time, these principles are justified only politically as mechanisms for achieving civil peace in a pluralistic society based on consent. The more fundamental metaphysical justification of these principles-whether based on Christian ideas of justice and fraternity or on liberal ideas of natural rights and freedoms-is a secondary matter and can be based on a variety of considerations, including purely pragmatic ones, which tell one or the other side that it does not have enough resources to win the election. a possible civil war. As for the political and ethical principles that should form the basis of the "overlapping consensus" of different factions, they should be related to the achievement of three main goals: (1) protecting the rights of people to have and / or realize their rights.

13. Taylor, Ch. Modes of Secularism, p. 36.

14. Ibid., p. 34.

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in practice, any chosen worldview; (2) the same treatment of all people, whatever their choice; (3) creating conditions for all people to be heard 15. In this case, it does not matter whether a particular worldview is more or less true. The very fact that there is a group that considers its worldview to be justified and wants to take part in public discussions on generally significant issues is crucial. If the voice of this group is ignored (for whatever reason), then a part of society (whether it is a minority or a majority) may get the impression that its voice is systematically not heard and that its contribution to solving common problems is impossible. In this sense, contrary to the "new atheists", the very logic of a modern constitutional democratic state implies the registration of religion and its communities in the public space and their right to fully participate in public discussions on an equal basis with scientists and other "interpretive communities".

If the normative consideration was mainly formal, then the second - epistemological-consideration concerns the content dimension of the question. Is religion really incapable of contributing to public debate, and is Richard Dawkins right in his arrogant attitude towards"rowanheads"?

It should be noted at once that in studies devoted to desecularization and the phenomenon of" public religions", the question is very often raised not so much in terms of the normative structure of modern societies, but in terms of the meaningful contribution that different religious communities are able to make to the public sphere. Thus, Jose Casanova's well-known study "Public Religions in the modern World" 16 is devoted to the study of the contribution that religions that are quite successful in developing public space can make to the" derailed " modernization, helping the latter not to lose the value of freedom and human rights. In particular, Casanova shows exactly how public religions have helped

15. Taylor, Ch. (2011) "What Does Secularism Mean", p. 309. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

16. Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.

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to design a public space (Poland), as well as to promote public discussions about liberal values (USA). According to Casanova, who welcomes the phenomenon of "public religions", their spread can play a positive role, in particular, to correct some of the dangerous excesses of modernity, since "religion has often served and continues to serve as a bulwark against the "dialectic of enlightenment", as a defender of human rights and humanistic values against secular spheres and their absolute claims." on internal functional autonomy"17. Even Jurgen Habermas, for all his distrust of religion and generally extremely rationalistic attitudes, is willing to accept at least the possibility that the world's religions contain some "cognitive content" 18 that can be useful for society as a whole and, in particular, bring a fresh stream to the "decayed everywhere". normative consciousness " in the context of "derailing modernization" 19.

However, the mere recognition of the contribution that religious citizens can make to public debate does not yet answer the question of what the status of this contribution is and how other citizens should be treated. Habermas emphasizes this point: "The democratic procedure owes its legitimation-generating power to two components: on the one hand, the equal political participation of citizens, which ensures that the addressees of laws can at the same time understand themselves as their authors; on the other, the epistemic dimension of forms of discursively guided discussion that justify the mood for rationally acceptable results.""20. What is this "epistemic dimension" of the discussion? This is primarily a question of the status, in particular, of religious metaphysics and the resulting argumentation and rhetoric in public discussions.

Thus, if within the framework of the normative consideration we are talking about the fundamental political equalization of science and re-education, then we should consider the following issues:-

17. Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World, p. 39.

18. Habermas Yu. Religion and publicity / / Habermas Yu. Between naturalism and religion. Philosophical Articles, Moscow: Vse mir Publ., 2011, p. 134.

19. Habermas Yu. The boundary between faith and knowledge. On the history of influence and the actual significance of Kant's philosophy of Religion. Between naturalism and religion. Philosophical articles, Moscow: Vse mir Publ., 2011, p. 200

20. Habermas Yu. Religion and publicity, p. 115.

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In the context of the epistemological consideration, we are talking about a new attempt to organize them: should science and the argumentation and rhetoric that follows from it stand above religious argumentation and rhetoric in public discussions?

There are at least two possible answers, one of which can be called modern, and the second-conditionally "postmodern" (the authors considered in this article would hardly agree with this classification, given the ambiguous attitude to postmodernism). The modern strategy is to preserve the priority epistemological status of science, that is, the status of a publicly accessible universal language in which any public discussion should take place. Religion, as a metaphysical doctrine of less status from an epistemological point of view, must go through a mandatory procedure for translating its statements into the public language of secular-scientific rationality, in which case it can count on careful attention to its cognitive contents. The "postmodern" strategy, in turn, consists in a fundamental epistemological equalization of any metaphysical doctrines, at least in their projection on socio-political discussions. In this sense, the scientific and religious worldviews are only different, but equally possible languages of description and-most importantly-equally understandable and accessible to any citizen, regardless of whether he is a believer or an atheist/agnostic.

As an example of a modern strategy, we can consider the position of Jurgen Habermas. There are several stages in the evolution of Habermas ' views on religion.21 At the first stage (early 1970s), he thinks about religion in the framework of the Marxist materialist philosophy of history. At the second stage (represented, in particular, by the work "Theory of Communicative Action", 1981), he thinks of religion in terms of the "linguistics of the sacred" and the evolutionary sociology of religion by Emil Durkheim. Finally, at the present stage, the beginning of which was marked by the work "Post-Metaphysical Thinking" (1988), he comes to an understanding of the debts that ra has to pay.-

21. См. Harrington, A. (2007) "Habermas and the 'Post-Secular Society'", European Journal of Social Theory 10 (4): 543 - 560.

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national analysis has advantages over religious sources of knowledge.

In each of his subsequent works, Habermas moves toward an increasingly sympathetic understanding of religious traditions. After 9/11, Habermas spoke openly about a post-secular society, meaning " a via media between an overconfident project of modernizing secularization, on the one hand, and fundamentalist religious orthodoxies, on the other."22. He began writing that religious and secular citizens had "epistemological responsibilities" to each other, and that they should be involved in "complementary learning processes."23
Then there is the question of the limit of the presence of religion in the public space, that is, of such a presence as does not violate, on the one hand, the principle of secularism of the state (in the sense of equality and equidistance of worldviews), and on the other-the boundary between faith and knowledge, between perspectives centered on God and perspectives centered on God. on man 24. That is, this is just the problem of the two aspects we have identified - normative and epistemological.

As for the epistemological aspect that interests us in this case, despite the changes that Habermas ' views on religion are undergoing, his basic approach remains the same: religious worldviews have a lower epistemological status compared to secular/scientific worldviews and therefore need to be "processed" by philosophy. The fact is that, according to Habermas, religion is always rooted in a special particular experience, it concerns belonging to a special particular community, which by definition is not able to claim the universality that only philosophy can give. Therefore, Habermas emphasizes: "Religious discourse carried out within communities of believers takes place in the context of a special tradition with substantive norms and elaborated dogma. It appeals to a general ritual praxis

22. Harrington, A. (2007) "Habermas and the 'Post-Secular Society'", European Journal of Social Theory 10 (4). p. 543 - 544.

23. Habermas Yu. Religion and publicity. Cognitive prerequisites for the "public use of reason" of religious and secular citizens. Between naturalism and religion, p. 138.

24. Habermas Yu. The border between faith and knowledge. p. 229.

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it is based on the individual's particular religious experience. " 25 This is the difference between religious discourse and philosophical discourse, which is ideally designed to appeal to arguments that have universal significance and are understandable regardless of their roots in a particular tradition or event (for example, Revelation).26. This boundary, according to Habermas, is insurmountable: "Philosophy is reasonably fueled by religious heritage as long as the orthodox source of revelation remains a cognitively unacceptable assumption for it. Perspectives centered either on God or on man are incommensurable."27.

Habermas strictly contrasts the world of faith and the world of reason. The world of reason, in his opinion, has priority because it works with arguments that are equally accessible to all people.28 This is the difference between reason and faith, because the latter is accessible only to those who are involved in a certain type of experience, who belong to a certain community, who recognize a certain type of authority (Revelation), which means that faith, by definition, cannot be accessible to everyone.

As Eduardo Mendieta points out, commenting on Habermas, " without secularization and transformation, which are carried out by translating religious concepts into secular ones, the religious itself will remain mute and will even be in danger of becoming dead and historically impotent. Without philosophy, what is alive in religion can disappear or be inaccessible to us, children of the Enlightenment. " 29 In this sense, Habermas declares his loyalty to the principle of "methodological atheism", that is, to the principle that " philosophy cannot appropriate what is said in religious discourse precisely in the sense of religious experience. This experience can only be added to the fund of philosophical resources that are recognized as their own basis for the experience of philosophy, if philosophy identifies this experience, i.e.-

25. Habermas, J. (2002) "Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in This World", in Habermas, J. Religion and Rationality. Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, p. 73. Polity Press.

26. Habermas, J. (2002) "A Conversation About God and the World", in Habermas, J. Religion and rationality, p. 162.

27. Habermas Yu. The border between faith and knowledge. p. 229.

28. Ibid., p. 114.

29. Mendieta, E. (2002) "Introduction", Habermas, J. Religion and Rationality, p. 28.

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using descriptions that are no longer borrowed from the language of a particular religious tradition, but are taken from the universe of argumentative discourse, separated from the event of revelation."30
As an example of such "feeding" of secular discourse with religious content, Habermas considers Immanuel Kant as one of the founders of post-metaphysical thinking. Actually denying the very possibility of religious experience ("the sensuous experience of the supersensible is impossible") and identifying religion with ethics, Kant considers the question of religion in his Critique of Practical Reason, which deals with questions of morality and duty. Kant's ethical ideas are quite well known, so we will not dwell on them, but turn to a specific aspect of his ethical doctrine. The problem with his ethics of duty is that " the moral law is itself... it doesn't promise happiness." Moreover, the ethics of duty require a person to put out of brackets all their natural inclinations - "which alone can make a person happy." This means that there is a natural need to compensate for the lack of connection between the happiness that the moral individual deserves and his real empirical happiness.31
But why be moral at all? Habermas 32 asks, as it were. Here Kant has to go beyond the moral legislation of strict ethics of duty to the space of religious ideas about the Kingdom of God, in which everyone will get what they deserve. Further, Kant has to resort to the thesis of the supreme good as a duty that a person must strive for; in fact, he is talking about the Kingdom of God on earth, which one must believe in, since this should help "strengthen the moral mood in self-confidence and protect it from defeatism" 33.

Thus, using Kant's example, we can see that "without the historical background that positive religion conveys with its stimulating richness of images, practical reason would lack the epistemological impulse to postulate-

30. Habermas, J. (2002) "Transcedence from Within, Transcendence in This World", p. 74 - 75.

31. Habermas Yu. The border between faith and knowledge. p. 203.

32. Ibid., p. 208.

33. Ibid., p. 209.

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there, by means of which practical reason tries to reach the need for a horizon of rational reasoning already articulated by religion. " 34 According to Habermas, Kant's philosophy is an example of a successful translation of religious content into the language of rational ethics. It recognizes the legitimacy and even usefulness of the contents of religious traditions; the only question is that these contents must be filtered out and already assimilated in a filtered form by the mind that appropriates them.

Thus, for Habermas, the presence of religion in public space is permissible only after appropriate processing by the secular mind, which carries out a kind of" saving assimilation " of religious contents, which otherwise would be forever locked up in the particularistic, subjective and highly opaque universe of religious traditions. Habermas is ready to recognize the normative equality of science and religion and their respective communities, but only to immediately relativize this equality, pointing out the undoubted epistemological priority of science and knowledge.

Proponents of the" postmodern "strategy, who advocate equating religious and secular discourses in public discussions, criticize the modern approach for its "secular bias". The essence of this bias was perfectly expressed by Charles Taylor: "The idea that the neutrality of the state is a response to diversity is perceived by "secular" people in the West quite problematic. These people retain their bizarre obsession with religion as something strange and possibly even threatening. Such sentiments are fueled not only by the past and present conflicts of liberal states with religion, but also by a special epistemological division: religiously oriented thought in some strange way turns out to be less rational than purely "secular" thinking. This attitude has political justifications (religion as a threat), but also epistemological justifications (religion as something flawed from the point of view of reason)."35
Let us further cite some considerations that allow us to question this " secular bias-

34. Habermas Yu. The border between faith and knowledge. p. 211.

35. Taylor, Ch. "What Does Secularism Means?" p. 321.

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tosh". In particular, we will point out the ambiguous nuances that are present in the considered position of Habermas.

First, Jurgen Habermas talks about universally valid secular arguments. However, are such universally valid arguments possible when dealing with fundamental questions concerning modern society? Won't these arguments also be reduced to some incommensurable traditions, the foundations of which cannot claim the universal significance to which Habermas appeals? Can not the main arguments concerning the key moral and practical issues of modern society - be it justice, migration, family and intimate issues, etc. - be reduced to different but equivalent intellectual traditions (both religious and secular)36? For example: the liberal tradition, the public interest tradition, the utilitarian tradition, etc.Each of these traditions is subject to its own logic, which is quite understandable, but it can hardly be called universally significant, since it is possible to deny the very premises on which this tradition is based. And why in this case only religious traditions fall under the requirement of reduction and translation?

Secondly, aren't religious ideas more accessible and understandable to the "crowd of people"? (In fact, most philosophers in all ages have understood this perfectly.) Is the argument that man is created in the image and likeness of God much less accessible to a person of Judeo-Christian culture than an argument in the spirit of utilitarianism, Kantianism, or any other scientific secular doctrine? In a sense, it is more appropriate to speak here not about greater rationality as criteria for epistemological ranking, but about the inclusion of a particular metaphysical doctrine in the general cultural space of a particular society. As McIntyre wrote, modern public discussions of justice are mixed with arguments and fragments of at least five intellectual traditions, each of which is familiar to the inhabitant of modern society at least at the most primitive level.37
36. For more information on intellectual traditions, see Maclntyre, A. (1988) Who's Justice? What Rationality? Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

37. For more information, see: A. McIntyre. Posle dobrodeteli: issledovaniya teorii morali [After Virtue: Studies in the theory of morality], Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2000; Maclntyre, A. Who Is Justice? What Rationality?

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Habermas ' thesis about the particularity of religious doctrines and their ambiguity for those who do not belong to the relevant religious communities can be refuted by analyzing real public discussions. For example, we were able to find only one example, when in a public discussion one of the participants asked for a translation from a religious language into a public one. We are talking about the well-known Russian atheist and polemicist Alexander Nevzorov, who during the debate refuses not only to understand the meaning of religious rhetoric, but also to recognize the very right of representatives of religious communities to be present in public space (the essence of his thesis: "We don't have to understand what you're talking about.") However, the biography of Nevzorov, who at one time, according to his website, "was a novice in a monastery" and "sang the bass part in a church choir" 38 suggests that such monolingualism is more a conscious gesture of a person who perfectly understands what is being said, than an example of a situation that confirms the imperative of translating particular contents. translation of religious traditions into the common language of secular concepts.

Third, Habermas ' approach is overly rationalistic: it takes into account only the cognitive content of statements and constructs public discussion as an exchange of rational arguments. At the same time, he ignores the emotional, imaginative, poetic, and metaphorical components of any discussion, which in the presence of these elements can often be much more significant than the exchange of logically constructed rational arguments.39
Fourthly, there is also the problem of "untranslatability", when judgments derived from one tradition cannot be translated into another.

38. See the main page of A. Nevzorov's personal website: http://nevzorov.tv/[accessed on 03.11.2013].

39. American scientist and public figure Craig Calhoun recalls his participation in the round table, which was attended by Jurgen Habermas: "As Cornel West rightly noted, religion is not only rational arguments, it is also music, preaching, in a word - emotional perception. He looked very funny at the conference with his style of a Black preacher ("Sister Judith and my brother Jurgen, I'm talking to you!"). It seemed to me that Habermas was very impressed. He told me later: "You have been telling me for several years that I sometimes miss something in religion, considering it a set of rational statements. So, after listening to Cornel West, I understood what you meant" "(See: Calhoun K. Postsekulyarnost pri demokratiki / / Russian Journal. 15.06.2011 [http://www.russ.ru/layout/set/print/pole/Postsekulyamost-pri-demokratii, доступ от 03.11.2013]).

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adequately translated into the language of another tradition. For example, is there any cognitive potential in the concepts of "sin" or "godlike"? And how not to lose it in the process of translating it into a generally significant, from Habermas ' point of view, secular language?

Fifth, Habermas proceeds from a kind of" ideal communication", when only rational arguments are taken into account, and evaluated exclusively in terms of their universal significance. However, any society and, consequently, any public discussion is burdened with history, its past, which has a significant impact on how a particular, even the most rational argument is perceived in this particular historical situation. For example, some completely rational and generally understandable arguments or even entire discourses within a certain society may not be perceived at all due to the unpleasant associations with which they are associated. The same discourse of "human rights" in modern Russian society may simply not be perceived by some groups - and not because of any epistemological flaws, but because of the historical burden of this discourse for these groups. Or, for example, in Europe it is difficult to imagine a rational discussion about the effectiveness of Hitler's policies in the 1930s.

The above considerations allow us to assume a certain degree of correctness in the position of the so-called "postmodernists"who defend the equality of religious discourse and the discourse of scientific and rational thinking.

Thus, the epistemological consideration can be formulated in two versions:: weak and strong. According to the weak version, religious content is a potential reservoir of valuable content, ideas, and arguments that can be used in the public space. However, their epistemological inferiority, which is determined, in particular, by their particularism, requires a constant translation procedure

40. Naturally, this is not a question of revoking the so-called "Rawls clause", the essence of which is that any religious or scientific justification should be left out of brackets in the normative acts of a modern secular state. That is, the discussions that precede a decision can be anything, as well as the reasons for making this decision can be anything, but after this decision is made, it must be clothed in legal form in the most neutral formulas that exclude references to any comprehensive metaphysical doctrines.

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These contents are translated from the private language of specific religious "interpretive communities" into a universally valid universal secular language. In its stronger version, this consideration leads to the relativization of scientific secular discourse, its transformation into one of the possible languages rooted in a particular intellectual tradition. This intellectual tradition is neither better nor worse than other intellectual traditions, one of which is the tradition of Christian reflection. If this thesis hardly stands up to criticism in natural science disputes, then as soon as this dispute is brought into the public sphere and begins to touch on key moral and practical issues, the equality of traditions makes itself felt.

Searching for a ternary model

The above two considerations can be supplemented by another one that directly concerns the peculiarities of Russian culture. As many researchers note 41, Russian culture and, accordingly, Russian history have one characteristic feature-binarity. We are talking about a constant oscillation between two extreme poles that do not have any neutral third element between them that can balance these extremes. In particular, Y. Lotman and B. Uspensky point out that "a specific feature of Russian culture... This is its fundamental polarity, which is expressed in the dual nature of its structure. The main cultural values (ideological, political, religious) in the system of the Russian Middle Ages are located in a bipolar value field, separated by a sharp line and devoid of a neutral axiological zone. " 42 This is the difference between Russian culture and Western culture, which is mostly "ternary" and presupposes the presence of a third element, as if balancing two extreme poles, each of which tends to take precedence over the other.

Tracing the theological roots of this gap, researchers point to the absence in the Russian tradition of the concept of purgatory, located between heaven and hell. The Catholic idea of purgatory does not know such a sharp division into the righteous and sinners and suggests a chance for the not entirely righteous

41. See the works of Mikhail Epstein, Boris Uspensky, and Yuri Lotman.

42. Cited by. Epshtein, M. Religion after Atheism, Moscow: AST-PRESS, 2013, p. 165

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and not entirely sinful people to be saved. In the legal sphere, binarity is manifested in the dichotomy of justice/mercy, which in Western culture is balanced by a third, intermediate reality of the law, which is located as if in the middle between mercy and justice: "In the antithesis of mercy and justice, the Russian idea based on binarity opposes the Latin rules imbued with the spirit of the law: Fiat justitia-per eat mundus and Dura lex, sed lex "43.

The same binarity can also be traced in terms of secularization patterns. David Martin, who made the theory of secularization more sensitive to the specifics of specific societies, in his fundamental work "General Theory of Secularization"44 drew attention to two basic scenarios for the religious development of a modernizing society: a "vicious" and a "beneficial" spiral. The "vicious" spiral characterizes modernization, which takes the form of an anti-religious struggle and leads to a split of society into two irreconcilable camps, which is usually characteristic of societies with a religious monopoly. In this case, secularization leads to the decline of religiosity (France). The "beneficial" spiral - when modernization is not associated with any anti-religious actions, and religion retains its place in modern society on the condition of compromise (USA) - is usually associated with religious pluralism.45 What is meant here by" depravity "and" benevolence "is not an ethical assessment of processes, but simply a statement: either we are dealing with"a spiral of internal hostility or disgust and mutual antagonistic determination of each other, or else we are dealing with a spiral of internal compromise and mutual adjustment." 46
Russian secularization, if we follow Martin's logic, has taken the path of a"vicious spiral". There was nothing third between religion and secular modernity, so during the violent secularization of the Soviet era, religion was not a separate entity.

43. " May justice be done and the world perish!", " The law is harsh, but it is the law." Lotman Yu. Culture and explosion / / Lotman Yu. Semiosphere. Saint-Petersburg: Iskusstvo-SPB, 2000, p. 144.

44. Martin, D. (1978) A General Theory of Secularization. Harper and Row.

45. Ibid., pp. 16 - 17.

46. Ibid., p. 16 - 17.

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rejected along with all other institutions of the "old order".

Another manifestation of the binary nature of Russian culture is the absence of the phenomenon of "religious Enlightenment"in it47. Enlightenment is usually interpreted as a purely secular phenomenon, as "the cornerstone of modern secular culture"48. However, in addition to the radical French Enlightenment, there was also a religious Enlightenment, which was built precisely in the logic of the ternary model, that is, in the logic of searching for a "middle ground" between the extremes of dogmatic faith and secular reason. Representatives of the religious Enlightenment were motivated by the desire to find a "reasonable faith" that would find a healthy middle ground between the traditional forms of intolerant, dogmatic, fanatical faith and the extreme exaltation of reason, which is fraught with immoral skepticism and the transformation of religion into a "natural religion" at best, derived from philosophical speculations about what God is and what it can consist of. god-pleasing human activity.

As David Sorkin points out, religious educators tried to "combine natural religion with the religion of revelation... They saw natural religion as a necessary but insufficient foundation of faith. Natural religion alone was not sufficient to provide instruction in matters of morality and true faith. Only reason paired with Revelation was an adequate response to the task at hand. " 49 In their quest for "reasonable faith," religious enlighteners tried to interpret Scripture using the principle of "adaptation": God, when communicating his will to people, always "adapted" to the specific temporal, spatial, and mental characteristics of his interlocutors, which requires the interpreter of the Bible to constantly take into account this specific historical context.50
If in the European tradition the interpretation of the Enlightenment as a purely secular project is still somehow softened by the understanding of-

47. См. Sorkin, D. (2008) The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews and Catholics from London to Vienna. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. For a review of the book, see our journal (No. 1, 2013, pp. 261-269).

48. Ibid., p. 2.

49. Ibid., p. 13.

50. Ibid., p. 13.

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in addition to the" radical Enlightenment", there was also an influential tradition of the" moderate Enlightenment " (represented by John Locke and Isaac Newton in England, as well as many other thinkers in Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and other countries), then in the Russian consciousness-due to the peculiarities of Russian cultural history, as well as in many other ways due to the specific nature of the Soviet tradition of the history of ideas, the Enlightenment is almost uniquely identified with its radical variety and is still canonized in the form it took in France in the XVIII century. As a result, the confrontation between believers and atheists in Russia takes the most radical forms: enlightenment ideas of freedom, reason, religious tolerance, and progress are conceived as essentially incompatible with the religious tradition that historically dominates our culture. The "middle ground", which religious enlighteners were searching for, remains an unthinkable alternative in Russian culture. And although Sorkin himself concludes his research with sad reflections that the project of "religious enlightenment" has generally failed, yet traces of this alternative Enlightenment can still be traced in Western "ternary" culture.

The binary nature of Russian culture, which promotes a rush from one extreme to the other, makes the transition to the" ternary " model of culture one of its most urgent imperatives. As Mikhail Epstein points out, the beginnings of such a transition were traced in Russian culture as early as the 19th century. However, according to Epstein, this attempt was never crowned with success: in the middle of the XIX century, it led to a new polarization, when two new extremes converged-Gogol's super-religion and Belinsky's quasi-religion.51 Epstein sees the current post-atheistic situation as an opportunity to develop a third element that can balance the traditional polarity of Russian culture.52 In other words, today there is another opportunity, to put it in the words of Lotman, "to switch from a binary system to a ternary one"53. At the same time, Epstein points out two possible scenarios for the realization of this ternarity: (1) the apocalyptic synthesis of the religious and secular presented by ida-

51. Epshtein M. Religion after atheism, pp. 160-161.

52. Ibid., pp. 218-222.

53. Lotman Yu. Culture and explosion. P. 147.

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the "Third Testament" of Vladimir Solovyov, the "Third Testament" of Dmitry Merezhkovsky, the" holy flesh "of Vasily Rozanov, and (2) the search for a middle ground through the creation of a "neutral zone" in the form of political and legal institutions that would not remove the existing contradictions, as the first alternative does, but rather provide conditions for their safe communication It is able to keep both poles from sliding into a "vicious spiral" when the principle "Who is not with us is against us" operates 54.

The second, moderate scenario suggests not so much the search for a "Russian idea" or a new "Russian ideology", but rather the construction of neutral grounds that can provide safe and mutually beneficial forms of communication between extreme extreme positions (for example, between secular science and religion) and prevent further unwinding of the" vicious spiral " of Russian history with its desire to throw itself out of control. extreme to extreme, meaning destroying your opponent to the ground. These neutral grounds could well be ideologically based on the considerations concerning the structure of a modern constitutional democratic society discussed in the previous section.

"Burdened" by the past, or obstacles to dialogue

The above considerations - normative and epistemological - are purely abstract, abstracted from Russian realities. They can be called considerations based on the ideal-typical model of a constitutional democratic state. Our reference to the binary structure of Russian culture and the utopian dream of moving to a ternary model can also be criticized. The fact is that any society is "burdened" (to use the term used by communitarians to criticize utopian liberal projects) with history and culture. This "encumbrance" can negate any considerations that may arise.-

54. Lotman Yu. Culture and explosion. P. 145.

55. For more information, see Kimlik U. Sovremennaya politicheskaya filosofiya: vvedenie [Modern Political Philosophy: Introduction], Moscow: Publishing House of the State University - Higher School of Economics, 2010, pp. 287-297.

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There is no need to discuss the benefits of dialogue within the framework of a modern constitutional democratic state. Next, we will briefly outline the obstacles that, in our opinion, stand in the way of the dialogue described above (while we will not touch on general points, such as the authoritarianism characteristic of the Russian political system, and we will limit ourselves to those obstacles that directly relate to the issue of interest to us). In what aspects does the" burden " of Russian society hinder the dialogue between science and religion that we have recognized as necessary in their social projection? Let us consider this "burden" both on the part of the religious camp (on the example of the Russian Orthodox Church) and on the part of the secular-scientific camp.

First, in the social and political imaginary of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russia's largest religious association, there seems to be a lack of understanding of civil society and public space as an authority that can influence something. The State does not separate itself from society, and the latter is not recognized as an independent authority. As Alexey Sitnikov states, the categories of Orthodox social teaching were based mainly on ideas borrowed from Byzantine thought, in which there could be no differences between the state and society established in Europe in the XVIII-XIX centuries. The ideal of a sacral, uncompetitive and strictly hierarchical model of state governance was traditionally inherent in Russian Orthodoxy and was approved by it as a divinely established one.56 As a result, the main focus is on the relationship between the church and the state-bypassing civil society and public space: "The leadership of the church, wanting to make it an influential organization, seeks to develop not so much parishes and other associations created by ordinary believers, but rather contacts with government representatives, seeks their support and believes that the influence of the church is directly proportional to its with the state, that it can be a significant organization only because of the power"57.

56. Sitnikov A. Pravoslavie, instituty vlasti i grazhdanskogo obshchestva v Rossii [Orthodoxy, institutions of power and civil society in Russia].

57. Ibid., p. 210.

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The very problem of John Rawls ' "political justice", on which we mainly relied in the first section of the article, according to Sitnikov's conclusions, remains alien to Orthodoxy. It still sees itself in the situation of a monolithic, vertically integrated state, which should ideally be guided by Christian ideas about the common good. In particular, the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (in the section dealing with freedom of conscience) states that " in the modern world, religion is transformed from a "common cause "into a" private matter " of a person. In itself, this process indicates the disintegration of the system of spiritual values, the loss of aspiration for salvation in most of the society that asserts the principle of freedom of conscience. If the state initially emerged as an instrument for establishing the divine law in society, then freedom of conscience finally turns the state into an exclusively earthly institution that does not bind itself to religious obligations."58 Here we can see the same lack of a middle ground between the state as an "instrument for establishing the divine law in society" and the private life of a person. A whole layer of civil society and public space is being overlooked.

In such a situation, public discussion becomes just a smokescreen behind which opaque private transactions of the leaders of secular and spiritual authorities are hidden. On the part of the church, this leads to a feeling of awkwardness and general unwillingness to publicly argue their position, on the part of the secular-scientific - to a constantly heated sense of threat and the resulting sense of inability to hear even the arguments that are still being presented. Hence the growing popularity of" secular bias " and the thesis that religion is a private matter and that it has no place in public space.

Secondly, this general lack of differentiation between the state and society and the leveling of the importance of public discussion is superimposed on the lack of a developed tradition of socio-political reflection. It turns out that there is a place for statements, "the microphone is turned on", and there is nothing to say. As the study notes-

58. Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church // the Russian Orthodox Church. Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate. 12.09.2005 [http:// www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/141422.html, accessed on 03.11.2013].

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Researcher K. Kostyuk: "The social and ethical thought of the church remains so superficial that real powerful challenges, issues related to democracy or the economy, do not cause any movements in the bosom of the church. The presence of Christian leaven is still felt in medical and biological issues related to euthanasia or the use of human embryos, but it does not manifest itself in complex socio-ethical problems affecting democratic values, political structure,and the beginning of self-understanding of society. " 59
The lack of a tradition of socio-political reflection, which does not amount to reproducing Byzantine rhetorical moves, leads to the fact that the church can only be considered with great reservations in the context of the thesis of the "deprivation of religion". The fact is that the very presence of religion in public space and in public discussions does not yet indicate the phenomenon of "public religion". Perhaps, in this case, we should talk about the socialization of the private - for example, the family and intimate sphere, which was traditionally considered the quintessence of privacy; or, conversely, about the privatization of the public, which is increasingly disappearing into the shadows, becoming the result of private transactions of individuals with authority. In other words, Russian Orthodoxy, even when it enters the public space, does not yet become a "public religion"; it still restricts itself to the private sphere, but only makes this privacy public.

Third, the secular camp is characterized by the same lack of distinction between the state and the public (at least when it comes to religion), as evidenced by the often repeated "mantra" about religion as a private matter of man. They identify either the sphere of state power and coercion, or the sphere of privacy and cultural and leisure preferences. Protesting against the rapprochement between church and state, "secularists" push religion into the space of private life, bypassing the public space, where, according to the logic of the above considerations, it belongs.

Fourth, the mentioned binary nature of Russian culture is one of the most serious obstacles to a possible dialogue. If there is no difference between science and religion,

59. Kostyuk K. Istoriya sotsial'no-eticheskoi mysli v Russkoy pravoslavnoi tserkvi [History of social and Ethical Thought in the Russian Orthodox Church]. Moscow: Aleteya, 2013, p. 398.

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If there is no middle ground, then no rational communication is possible, which will inevitably be replaced by a violent confrontation between two parties that speak different languages and rely on different metaphysical doctrines.

Fifth, the "crisis of trust" recorded by sociologists also does not allow us to hope for the successful development of the dialogue. The arguments put forward are almost immediately rejected - as having no meaning and serving rather to deceive the opponent; the dispute is over "gray arguments" that are read as if between the lines. Participants in the dialogue do not perceive each other as independent actors whose words can be trusted; they are thought of as repeaters of someone's private, corporate interests, behind which there is a desire to discriminate against the opponent, to deprive him of important financial and symbolic resources.

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