History is the only way to reach your goal

General A. E. Snesarev

East Turkestan does not appear next to the restless Tibet-a phenomenon of an order of magnitude weaker and simplest. But not Tibet, but East Turkestan is the key to world politics and as such is included in the American Greater Middle East Project.

1. The victim of the "end of history". A comprehensive study of the history of East Turkestan and its systematic generalization was not successful either in Russia or abroad. In international politics, the role of East Turkestan remained undervalued in the shadow of China. Even when Xinjiang was identified as a factor of global confrontation between the powers (in the form of the Eastern issue), fundamentally little has changed.

N. F. Petrovsky, the Russian Consul General in Kashgar (Klyashtorny and Kolesnikov, 1988, p. 181-187), a former military officer and a "New Chagatai" for the Uyghurs of Xinjiang (Chagatai is the son of Genghis Khan, who ruled Central Asia), attracted the attention of scientists and the Russian public in the 19th century to East Turkestan. N. F. Petrovsky's field of interest is geography, history, economics and politics, i.e. the entire spectrum of geopolitics. By the beginning of the XX century. for the study of East Turkestan, military geographers did the most (in official works). Noteworthy are" Description of Altyshar " by captain Ch. Ch. Valikhanov (1861)," Kashgaria "by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff A. N. Kuropatkin (1879) and" Kashgaria, or East Turkestan " by Captain of the General Staff L. G. Kornilov (1903). All three of them were active scouts; this activity sharpens the attention, intuition and skills of highlighting the essence of any phenomena, any processes. V. V. Grigoriev (Gen. Snesarev puts him on a par with Strabo, Ptolemy, and Pliny the Elder [Snesarev, 2006, p. 51]); his review of the history of East Turkestan for more than 130 years has no analogues and has not been surpassed [Grigoriev, 1869-1873; Litvinsky, 1984, p.4]. but in. V. Grigoriev (military intelligence officer and head of the so-called Orenburg Border Commission) [Khlobustov, 2003, p. 7]managed to summarize the historical data and materials available in his time on the history of Xinjiang. Integrating them without a new methodology was unthinkable. (It will later be proposed by another military intelligence officer and scientist, Gen. A. E. Snesarev, as a trinity of geo-historical politics.)

The advice to look at Xinjiang "without going into history" is strange: allegedly "the topic of Uighur separatism sounds more and more muffled", and "Xinjiang is surrounded by a dense veil of silence" [Russia. Siberia and Central Asia, 2005, pp. 247-249]. To overcome such a veil, Gen. Snesarev advises us to proceed from the principle "history is the only way to the goal" [Snesarev, 1924, p. 240], to understand the deep logic of the historical process, and not the specific features of the historical process.

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circumstances. But Academician V. V. Barthold, based on particulars, considered Chinese Turkestan "a country of the past without a future" (Barthold, 1977, p. 335) (which was ahead of S. Huntington himself with his "end of history").

2. Return to history. We are reading the review of A. E. Snesarev on the "Historical and Geographical Survey of Iran" by V. V. Barthold. "As long as the primary sources remain mostly unused and unpublished, it is hardly possible to draw up a course that would contain not only an overview of external events, but also a scientifically based explanation of historical evolution," A. E. Snesarev quotes V. V. Barthold and... does not agree with him. He explains: "The author... almost avoids any generalizations and even less guesses. The whole work gives the impression of being purely analytical and ... rough." A. E. Snesarev expressed much more outspoken disagreement with V. V. Barthold's approach in an earlier review of Skryne and Ross's "Heart of Asia": "to establish a bare but true historical fact" and to limit oneself to this is absolutely not enough to establish the truth; the result obtained "will most likely resemble some legend", since "the list of historical facts without any mutual connection between them, without any causal relationship, it will be vague, incoherent, and historically illogical." - O. Z.) [Snesarev, 1904, p. 35; Snesarev, 1900, p. 46]. V. V. Barthold just avoided hypothetical (quite verifiable, but, of course, risky) generalizations. A. E. Snesarev reminds V. V. Barthold that he could use the advanced methods of traditional geography and the latest natural sciences (driven forward precisely by the creative boldness of hypotheses; co-authored with others). Snesarev agrees with R. Carneiro [Carneiro, 2000, p. 252]). The disordered nature of modern Central Asian studies [Schoberlein, 1999] is also explained by traditional fearfulness and passive attachment to "pillars" of facts, devoid of "branches" of hypotheses, "leaves" of conclusions, and "fruits" of decisive generalizations.

Simultaneously with the 1st volume of V. V. Grigoriev's work (1869), an official note by the British intelligence officer and diplomat Ney Elias (1844-1897) about East Turkestan appeared in England under the title "Civilization surrounded by deserts". Elayes is the editor of the translation of the Mughal chronicle Tarikhi Rashidi (almost 500 pages of dense English text-perhaps the most voluminous written monument of East Turkestan culture). Translation and commentary of the chronicle were jointly carried out by Elias (Consul General and resident in Mashhad) and a young Oriental professor E. Denison-Ross (1871-1940; later-an employee of the special services in India and England, the first director of the School of Oriental Studies at the University of London [Denison Ross E., n.d.]). The list of chronicles was obtained by the British "Kommersant" R. Shaw. He died under suspicious circumstances, and the manuscript disappeared. Elias used British agents in Kabul and obtained another list of "Tarikhi Rashidi", which was translated into English (the only foreign language). The significance of "Tarikhi Rashidi" as a source for the history of East Turkestan is great - this extensive manuscript covers the events of the XIV - early XVI centuries. when the presence of China in East Turkestan was not observed at all (Morgan, 1971, p.263; Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, 1898).

Studying Xinjiang only as Xinjiang (the period of the Qing Empire and later republics of the XVIII-XX centuries) is unproductive: the two previous millennia of history are lost [see: Milword, 2000, p.121; Zotov, 1991], and the country appears as if suddenly and from nowhere. Such a framework of history gives too narrow an overview and negligible "perspective". The approach to the history of Xinjiang as a decoration of Uyghur nationalism is also unproductive [Aubin, 1998], when the continuity of ancient and modern Uyghurs, the cultures of the oldest Iranian population and the later Turkic population remains a mystery, and it is overlooked that the nomadic empires of the VI - VIII centuries somehow relied on the oases of Kashgaria) [see: Kuznetsov, 1992, p. 103]. East Turkestan acquired a global role in the period of Ancient Rome, then in the world empire of the Tatar-Mongols (it is from here that it began-

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its construction was completed) and in Timur's empire (Teggart, 1939, p. X, 111 - 114, 169 - 170]. The history of East Turkestan (reflected in official Chinese sources) is more than 2 thousand years old, Xinjiang as a part of China-less than 2.5 centuries, counting from 1760. "The fate of Xinjiang" (in the work of D. V. Dubrovskaya of the same name) is considered as a special case of the history of China and Central Asia during this period. But since East Turkestan and Xinjiang are identical only geographically, but not historically, the fate of East Turkestan must be considered throughout its real history; the historical future of it and China can only be predicted on this, and not narrowly"Xinjiang" basis. It is not without reason that in chapter 69 of Tarikhi Rashidi, the author advises "to return to the [continuous] thread of history."

3. The "Big Game" object. In the XIX-XX centuries. East Turkestan is the object of a Big Game between England and Russia for influence in Asia and the world as a whole, a link in the chain of buffers on the northern borders of India. It is no coincidence that India has become the "main factor in the Central Asian issue" [Snesarev, 1906]. During the First World War, the German von Hentig mission penetrated Xinjiang from Afghanistan in order to immediately influence the Russian rear and British India from here (Tikhonov, 2005; Serine and Nightingale, 1973, p. 254-255). During the anti-Japanese war of the 1930s and World War II, Xinjiang also played an important role in Soviet politics: sending military advisers, pilots, and supplying equipment and weapons to China took the shortest route through Xinjiang.

A precedent for Germany's subversive geopolitics in Xinjiang is the suspicious activity of the expeditions of the Nazi orientalist and geopolitician S. Gedin in Mongolia and Xinjiang. Gedin's detachments worked at four points in Xinjiang - the provincial center of Urumqi, on the Bogdo-Ula highlands, in Charklyk at the old entrance to Xinjiang along the Silk Road, in the Prityanipan Kuchar (they mastered the north, center and south of Xinjiang, approaches to it from inner China; in this regard, Xinjiang was visited by the Sorge River) [Roerich, 1999, pp. 221-225; Prudnikova, 2004, p. 71]. An interesting document about the plans of Nazi Germany in Xinjiang was found in the archive of Himmler's personal headquarters. It contained an indication of the mystical "Black Center" in Xinjiang north of the Tien Shan in the form of the Kobdo-Urumqi-Barskel triangle (Barsovo Lake), which is based on the Tien Shan, and is aimed at southern Siberia (and not only: it is crossed by the strategic Chuguchak-Urumqi and Zaisan-Gucheng tracts in the Kazakh direction - object of attention of the Russian General Staff) [Vasilchenko, 2005, pp. 106-107; Sbornik geograficheskikh..., 1888, p. 95]. The version that the document did not interest the German special services is untenable. If geographically this triangle is unattractive (stony desert and impassability), then historically it is the opposite: Genghis Khan's troops marched from the Mongolian Altai to the Dzungarian Gate, and Beshbalyk, the summer capital of the Uyghurs - Genghis Khan's allies - was located halfway between Urumqi and Barsov Lake. The Barkel district controls the entrance to Xinjiang from China. The Russian General Staff carefully studied Kobdo, Dzungaria and its northern Altai district, neighboring Kobdo, as well as the Mongols and Kazakhs opposed to China. The Chinese called the Kazakhs "Muslim tigers", the leaders of the Xinjiang Mongols wanted to replace Lamaism with Islam as a more combat-ready creed.

Xinjiang played a major role in the large-scale geopolitical projects of Nazi Germany, as can be seen from the book "Turkestan", published at the height of World War II. It deals with the Kabul-Kashgar and Lhasa-Kabul geopolitical axes (Olzscha and Cleinow, 1942, p. 134), i.e. Xinjiang and Tibet are included in a single project. Combined with the above-mentioned small geopolitical triangle in the north of Xinjiang, a larger triangle of current instability in the center of Asia is formed with the sides of Kabul-Kobdo, Lhasa-Kobdo and Lhasa-Kabul. At the end of the Korean War, a PLA officer presented a souvenir dagger of an SS officer killed in Xinjiang to a Soviet Chinese military translator in Kashgar (Demidenko, 2003, p. 175), a member of the SS day intelligence group-

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They were active not only in Tibet, but also here. During the Second World War, the United States is playing a Big game in Xinjiang. This can be seen from the later declassified "Amereish Documents", in which the "History of Xinjiang" is placed under the higher heading "Secret" ("Top Secret"), while the "History of Mongolia" - only under the heading "Confidential" ("Secret") [Amerasia Papers, 1970, p. 1409 - 1410].

In the Third World War (waged in "neutral" forms, began in 1975, its latent phase is already over) [see: Jackson, 1987], the importance of Xinjiang increases significantly. China is the main rival of the weakening United States, and the Americans view Xinjiang as the most important geostrategic object, the weakest point of developing China. It is no secret that NATO's penetration of Afghanistan and Central Asia in 2001 was aimed at gaining ground from China's unreliable rear. This process is stalling only because the SCO has emerged in the region as the strongest continental association, and the United States is bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the obvious failure of the United States in the Eastern issue over the past half-century only pushes them to adventure.

Chinese Turkestan is the Achilles ' heel of the PRC primarily due to the difference and incompatibility of the Islamic culture of Iranians and Turks with the Chinese one. In the context of social and political inequality of peoples, this difference turns into a conflict. A line of conflict of civilizations runs through Xinjiang. The PRC is extremely dependent on economic ties with Kazakhstan, on its energy resources, and for this reason, the accelerated development of the Chinese-dominated northern Xinjiang bordering Russia is stimulated, while the Uighur South remains an agricultural, raw materials and traditionally trade appendage of China. In the face of accumulated internal problems and expanding external relations with Central and South Asia, Xinjiang is once again opening up to Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism from the territories of Ferghana, Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan. The Khojas of the Naqshbandiya-khojagan Sufi order became more active in the ranks of Islamic extremists [Regional and global threats..., 2005, p. 22], whose predecessors played a negative role in the history of Central Asia and East Turkestan in the XV-XVIII centuries: in the elimination of Ulugbek, the disorganization of the Mughal Khanate (which paved the way for the Qing Empire to enter East Turkestan). Members of the order have always been distinguished by obedience, perseverance and fanaticism; this is a serious striking force [for more information, see: Zotov, 2005, pp. 481-489].

4. The nail and key of world politics. Russia's border with Xinjiang (less than 50 km in Altai) resembles a kind of nail, which for the time being is not felt. Xinjiang , the most important factor in China's global status (access to Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East), is "the key to all world politics." A hundred years ago, this role was played by India, the "pearl of the British Empire" (Snesarev, 1906, p. 173). The role of the latter is gradually shifting to China, and the role of the "pearl" to Xinjiang, which is more than likely the theater of the Third World War. There is an opinion that "Xinjiang can give an idea of what can be expected for most of Asia" in the near foreseeable future (Menon and Wimbush, 2000, p. 97). But even now Xinjiang appears in idyllic pictures of popular science and popular publications; the images have a soporific effect [Akhmetshin, 2003; Pleskachevskaya, 2006; Myrdal and Kessle, 1972, p. 14].

5. A stone's throw from the "Xinjiang Destiny". "The fate of Xinjiang" is discussed in two recent monographs by D. V. Dubrovskaya and S. V. Moiseev. In them, the new history of East Turkestan (Xinjiang) is considered on the example of the key period - the People's Liberation uprising of 1864 and the existence of the independent state of Yettishar in 1865-1877. D. V. Dubrovskaya recognizes the expansion of China in the Western Region, which was interrupted with the fall of the Han Empire for a millennium and a half (!); the Chinese themselves recognized the inexpediency of secondary subordination of the Eastern In 1878, S. V. Moiseev believes that the state of Yettishar was unstable and that Russia was an independent state.

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interested in Chinese control of Xinjiang. But L. G. Kornilov also pointed out that the Kokand Yakub Bek regime was more favorable for East Turkestan [Kornilov, 1903, p.23; Kuropatkin, 1879]. The danger of the state of Yakub Bek for Russia looks like in St. Petersburg. Moiseyev's theory (as well as that of a number of other authors) is exaggerated and unfounded.

6. Far from being a "mysterious" Eastern question. The very term "mysterious Eastern question" is surprising [Dubrovskaya, 1998; Dubrovskaya, 2006, p. 213; Moiseev, 2006]. It is no longer a mystery for a long time and is revealed in the works of A. E. Snesarev first of all. Snesarev explains the evolution of the Eastern Question from the Middle East to the Middle East as a logical transition from the struggle for the eastern Mediterranean (the western approaches to India - the "pearl of the British Empire") to the struggle for the northern approaches to it in Central Asia - the buffer territories of Iran, Afghanistan, the Pamirs, Kashgaria (south of East Turkestan), Tibet [Snesarev, 2002, pp. 19-27]. And since the British Empire and British India no longer exist, the first and second Eastern questions have been replaced by the next - East Turkestan; the struggle in the twenty-first century is for the geopolitical pearl of China and for the Central Asian approaches to it. The great game of the great Powers in central Asia was not a thing of the past in 1907. The third Eastern question is implemented in the Big Game mode, as well as the second one; the game is most consistent with the nature of modern fifth - generation warfare-para-informational, or gaming [Drozdov, 2007, p. 10; Central Asia..., 2005, p. 144; Obukhov, 2007, p. 478; Terrorism and the UN..., 2004, p. 223-224; War Game, part 1, 1874, p. 6; Beaufre, 1974, p. 223; Beaufre, 1963, p. 120].

7. Explosive East Turkestan. The extremely acute situation in Xinjiang is explained not by simple "ethnic separatism" of the Uighurs, but by much more serious reasons: 1) the poor compatibility of Chinese and Uyghur cultures, 2) the poverty and inequality of the non-Han population, 3) the lack of positive impact of reforms on the situation of autochthonous ethnic groups in Xinjiang ("Han modernization" [Syroezhkin, 2003, pp. 364-365]), 4) the formal and bureaucratic nature of "local national autonomy", 5) the introduction of forced birth control among Muslims since 1984, 6) strict police measures to suppress the slightest dissatisfaction of the non-Chinese majority of the population of Xinjiang, 7) the continuation of the settlement of Xinjiang by Chinese.

It is not surprising that on May 19, 1989, Uighur demonstrators destroyed the provincial Party committee of the Communist Party of China in Urumqi, and since 1990, mass riots, armed demonstrations, sabotage and terrorist attacks under the slogans of "holy war"have not stopped in SU AR. (They began on April 5, 1990, precisely with protests against birth control of Muslims and total control over Muslim communities.) In the same year, the Islamic Party of East Turkestan emerged, leading subsequent mass protests. The network of underground Wahhabi organizations in Xinjiang primarily unites young people aged 18-30 with secondary and higher education. In 1990-1998, at least 700 armed acts and sabotage occurred in Xinjiang, with a total of "several thousand incidents". 16 Uyghur opposition organizations (27 in total) participated in these events.

In 1885, in his report to the General Staff, Consul N. F. Petrovsky reported on the situation in the newly established province of Xinjiang: "Despite the apparent external calm, it cannot be called peaceful and contented with its fate under the rule of the Chinese. The extreme disorder of the government [of the country CJ, unreasonable orders [to the local population C2], large extortions [in the field of economy E], a small number of troops [M] (at that time. - O. Z.), the lack of moral authority [S,] - all this is the reason that the population is tensely [and purposefully S 2] waiting for a coup and at the slightest hint of it [they understand W] will openly oppose the Chinese [in practice P]" [Petrovsky, 1886, pp. 7-8]; Pp = (C1 + C2 + E +

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+ M)(S1 + S2 + W + P). (The" explosive "potential of East Turkestan, cited by the retired officer N. F. Petrovsky, was revealed using the strategic method of A. E. Snesarev; A. E. Snesarev also warned that" the calmness of the Western [Wall] "The apparent" [Snesarev, 1900, p. 14; 1901, p. 26].)

The Uyghur diaspora is represented in the world by about twenty organizations of various types. Most of them are national fellowships (in Canada, such a community is headed by the widow of a well-known Uighur scholar in the past, D. A.). Isiyev), but there are also a number of radical political organizations of Islamist, pan-Turkist persuasion. In 1999 and 2001, the second and third World Kurultai (congresses) of Uyghurs were held in Munich and Brussels. The World Uyghur Congress, created by the congresses, is fighting with political propaganda methods in the West and in other regions, including Central Asia. In 1998-1999, there was the National Council "East Turkestan", which was headed by a retired Uighur general of the Turkish army, Reza Bekin (in the 1970s, Chief of the General staff of the united armed forces of the SENTO military bloc consisting of Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, aimed at the Caucasus and Central Asia). The "disappearance" of R. Bekin's organization should not be misleading: it is quite in the spirit of the times moved to the "network" principle of organization [Syroezhkin, 2003, p. 413; Cyberwar, Netwar..., 2006].

30% of experts consider the Uyghur issue to be solvable only if Xinjiang has broad autonomy, and 22% consider it necessary to immediately stop its Sinicization [Syroezhkin, 2003, p. 293, 400, 406 - 410, 419 - 422, 574; Moiseev, 2005, p. 437]. Otherwise, the preservation of Xinjiang within the PRC is recognized as problematic. But a document of the CPC Central Committee dated March 19, 1996 states that the situation in Xinjiang is "stable", the standard of living is "growing", and the economy is "developing", which is possible only north of the Tien Shan, in the Sinicized areas of Dzungaria, while the situation in Uyghur Kashgaria is the opposite [Bondarenko, 2005, p. 183,449]. 90% of the unemployed in Xinjiang are Uighurs. Uyghur youth do not see any life prospects at the end of high school or even higher education: all modern specialties and positions are "Chinese-speaking", but knowledge of Chinese does not guarantee a piece of bread: there are more Chinese unemployed (including specialists) than all Uyghurs combined. UyghurThe cities of Kashgaria are being settled by Chinese immigrants; the Chinese authorities are beginning to introduce them even to the Uyghur village (which is fraught with an environmental catastrophe due to the alienness of Chinese farming methods to the extreme conditions of the Taklamakan desert).

The discontent of the non-Chinese population is suppressed in two simple ways - a "hard blow" and a "big purge". The Uighurs can neither understand nor accept the restrictions on their birth rate, making up only 0.06% of the Chinese population. Only in the Khotan district (according to the local "Khotan Geziti"), out of 40 thousand local Uyghur women, 30 thousand were forcibly subjected to abortions. Not surprisingly, the Uighurs respond to ethnic cleansing with armed resistance. Despite some success in the crackdown, the Chinese leadership is alarmed by the scale and depth of Uighur resistance. Back in November 1995, it was concluded that the enemy skillfully combines "literary offensive with armed pressure" - that is, offensive propaganda with defense in purely military terms [see: Syroezhkin, 2003, p. 376]. First, the insurgents follow the Clausewitz-Snesarev principle "the defenders won, the attackers were defeated" (Snesarev, 2007, p. 208). Secondly, "literary" (wen) and "armed" (wu) are the two halves of the Chinese character "bin" (harmony). Uighur resistance has reached a level of "harmony" that is dangerous for China. Chinese experts (1995) believe that the Uyghur rebels assign underground work, terrorist attacks and sabotage in 1995-2005, guerrilla actions in 2005-2015, and military operations in 2015-2025. Indeed, special warfare consists of underground warfare, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare.

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military operations (together - unusual maneuver warfare). However, it is incorrect to divide 30 years of struggle into equal segments: it is impossible to rush with military operations, they are permissible only in the very end (in such a war, "handfuls, not armies" are important [Verkhovsky, 1928(1), p. 39,232; Verkhovsky, 1928(2), p. 70, 74, 76, 80 Syroezhkin, 2003, p. 372, 376; Information..., 1899, p. 63]).

The Chinese authorities themselves (unwittingly) create the necessary conditions for "separatism". The Uyghurs ' peacefulness and delicacy, high culture, and commitment to peaceful pursuits mislead not only inexperienced observers, but also the Chinese. In battle, the Uyghurs sometimes surpass the warlike Ferghana with their bravery [Valikhanov, 1986, p. 174]. During its 248 years in Xinjiang (1760 - 2008), China has failed to move beyond relying on the "three whales": repressive violence, bribing parts of the local elite, and progressive Chinese colonization. The 19th century was marked by a series of revolts and the creation of the independent state of Yettishar. In the 20th century, attempts to secede from China doubled (the creation of two East Turkestan republics in the 1930s and 1940s). During the period of the PRC's existence, hopes for social and national-cultural justice were not fulfilled, and the number of uprisings increased. In 1967/68, an illegal People's Revolutionary Party (Dillon, 2004, p.57) (which ruled the Second East Turkestan Republic in the second half of the 1940s) tried to revive in Xinjiang. Since the mid-1980s, the Islamic clericalism of the first WTR (early 1930s) took over. Before perestroika, Uighur patriots in Xinjiang and emigration could have hoped for some support from the USSR, but then they lost it. Unable to find support anywhere else, the Uighur patriots went to cooperate with Al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. (The Islamic Party of East Turkestan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan then merged to form the Islamic Party of Turkestan.)

The rapprochement and consolidation of the three Islamist centers of Central Asia and the Middle East does not bode well either for the SCO members individually, or for the organization and the Asian continent as a whole. The instability of state power in Tajikistan and especially in Kyrgyzstan (with its Ferghana south) facilitates the infiltration of Uighur militants into Xinjiang. (Uyghurs are a fairly large part of the population of the Ferghana Valley within both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.) None of the proposed (indirect) measures to influence the situation in the SCO zone [Russia and China..., 2006, pp. 163-164] can be quite effective in the presence of a deep crisis in Xinjiang - and a sufficiently high probability of its development into a national liberation war like the Afghan one; it will affect all the allies and neighbors of the PRC. In Pakistan's Balochistan (as secretly as in Xinjiang), a guerrilla war is underway. Its targets are regularly communications and Chinese specialists working in this very useful Pakistani region for the PRC [Veselovsky, 2007, p. 189-200].

Since there are at least six hotbeds of tension in the center of Asia (Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan), rather than two: Afghanistan, Northern Pakistan, Ferghana, Balochistan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, the situation is much more dangerous and complex. One of them is exactly (it seems to be not declaring itself) East Turkestan is capable of fundamentally shifting the" center of gravity " of regional and global conflicts. The dynamics of their development in central Asia are unfavorable: in 2007, the Taliban doubled their sphere of control in Afghanistan and covered it with a belt of instability. NATO troops numbering 50 thousand people can not cope with 2.5, a maximum of 5 thousand Taliban (10-20-fold superiority in forces is useless). The dynamics of events in Afghanistan also affect Xinjiang: not a week goes by without terrorist attacks and sabotage of communications. It is no coincidence that in early March 2008, the CSTO Scientific and Expert Council recognized the dynamics of events in Asia as unfavorable for the organization (in other words, threats in the center of the continent are increasing) [see: Krasnaya Zvezda, 13.03.2008, p. 1; 15.04.2008, p.3].

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8. Two "formulas of fate". The twists and turns of the history of East Turkestan do not in themselves explain how natural or accidental the attempts of the peoples of Xinjiang to regain their independence are. If we take the two-thousand-year history of the country as a whole, almost never did the Chinese empires manage to gain a foothold here. The notorious tributary of China's neighbors (including those in Kashgar) was pseudo-tributary. In the middle of the 18th century, the Qing Empire broke the bank in a large and gambling Mongol game. For the second time, the Qing Empire was "lucky" in the fight against the state of Yakub Bek, which was not supported by the European powers.

The history of East Turkestan should be "approached beyond the limits of a particular period in order to give a holistic view of the causes and consequences of events" [Mogilevkin, 1989, p.4]. The history of the Uyghur East Turkestan period (from the middle of the 9th century) can and should be evaluated using the strategic method of A. E. Snesarev using the formula of total geopolitical power (the French namesake of Snesarev, Gen. A. Beaufre, calls it the "equation of the universe"). [Beaufre, 1969, p. 45]. Everything in the universe is triune as "resource-energy-work". In geopolitics, the resource of a particular country generates the energy of the people and the work of the state (triad country-people-state). In Snesarevskaya's geo-historical policy, the country is formed in the past, and the energy of the people in the present allows the state to work for the future. These are material elements F = C + E + M, but the leading role in history and politics is played by spiritual forces, three or four times the strongest: goals-and-values S, theory W and practical technologies P; ψ = S + W + R. The integral of total power looks like: Pp = (C + E + M)(S + W + P). Elements C and S can be divided into C! - territory and C 2-population, S, - values and S2-goals; in this case, the integral takes the form Pp = (C1 + C2 + E + M)(S1 + S2 + W + P). Within each long period of history, the elements of civilization mature in the above sequence, albeit unevenly. With regard to East Turkestan, we can see that there are two alternatives to historical development - one descending and one ascending. Their choice and chronological framework are suggested by Gen. Snesarev [Snesarev, 1903, vol. 1, p. 303].

The first alternative can be traced back to the 9th century, as the evolution of the small and insignificant Uyghur kingdom of Kocho in Turfan: in the 9th - 10th centuries. Uyghurs gain a foothold on the territory of South-eastern Dzungaria From 1, in the X - XI centuries the Uyghur population From 2 settled in the oases of north-eastern Kashgaria, in the XI-XII centuries the Kocho kingdom reaches its economic heyday on the Silk Road, in the XII-XIII centuries. it was strengthened politically later, in the XIII-XIV centuries. Kocho falls into the maelstrom of Genghis Khan and the Genghisids ' geopolitics as their valuable S1 acquisition, in the XIV-XV centuries. The Mughals aim S 2 to create a new empire in the center of Asia, including East Turkestan, in the 15th and 16th centuries. They partially succeed in understanding W and unifying Kashgaria, in the 16th and 17th centuries. The Mughal Khanate is drawn into a period of serious crisis and practically P turns into the theocracy of the Naqshbandi Khojas-vassals of the Dzungarian Khanate; as a result, Pp during the XVII - XVIII centuries, the Qing Empire penetrates into East Turkestan and subdues it; Pp = (C1 + C2 + E + M) (S1 + S2 + W + P). This alternative to the historical evolution of East Turkestan is decadent and pessimistic, and it is moving towards a dead end along a downward trajectory. Such an "end of history" of the country does not even take into account the vicissitudes of its further development in the XIX-XXI centuries.

Much more remarkable is the second alternative, which covers the period of the XIII-XXI centuries. In the first quarter of the 13th century, the kingdom of Kocho became an important factor in Asian geopolitics: it was as a privileged ally that the formation of Genghis Khan's empire began. So, in the XIII - XIV centuries. the territory of East Turkestan From1st became a factor of global geopolitics, in the XIV - XV centuries. here and in the neighborhood the state of a new people was formed From the 2nd-Mughals, in the XV - XVI centuries. the Mughal state was strengthened within the borders of East Turkestan, in the XVI-XVII centuries. it survived the political crisis of clericalization and transformation into a Dzungarian vassal; in the XVII-XVIII centuries. Mughal Khanate

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During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Uyghur people's national unity was crystallized in the course of the national liberation struggle, and in the 20th and 21st centuries, the Uyghur people's national unity was crystallized. There is a transition of the struggle for the return of national independence to the practical direction P; Pp = (C1 + C2 + E + M)(S1 + S2 + W + P). The choice of this alternative is suggested by the gene. Snesarev: "to be guided by the history of more distant centuries and especially the more familiar past - its first half" [Snesarev, 1903, vol. 1, p. 303]; this "first half" fits the period of the XIII - XVI centuries.This is an alternative to the movement of East Turkestan history along an upward trajectory. The first one was defended by Academician V. V. Barthold on limited and non-general material, the second one refutes Barthold and deserves increased (not only and not so much academic) attention. It is in this vein that the so-called fate of Xinjiang can and should be considered. The history of East Turkestan can and should be considered from different points of view (Myrdal and Kessle, 1972, p. 263).

9. Double-edged blade. Superficial "excursions into history" or the "not looking into history" approach are not applicable to East Turkestan [Dillon, 2004, p. 8; Larin, 2003, p. 248; Syroezhkin, 2003, p.83]. It is inappropriate and illegal to question the question of the "autochthonous nature" of the Uyghurs of East Turkestan [Syroezhkin, 2003, p. 38]: they live there for the second thousand years, the Chinese - only the third century; the intentions of the Chinese to oust the Uyghurs from East Turkestan are visible [Syroezhkin, 2003, p.713].

The second formula of historical fatality, given above, is one facet of the blade of the East Turkestan question. The second facet is the geopolitical formula of modernity. Uighurs do not consider their land C1 to be rightfully part of China as an "autonomous" province of Xinjiang. They are against the forcible reduction of their population by the Q Chinese authorities, against the economic E-course of development of Xinjiang and the policy of M pseudo-autonomy. The Uighurs of Xinjiang do not share the CCP's S1 ideology, do not accept the S2 goals of Sinicizing their country, and do not agree to recognize themselves as a "national minority of China" (when they are the majority in Xinjiang), either theoretically or practically. They realize their combined resistance power; Pp = (C1 + C2 + E + M)(S1 + S2 + W + P). At the turn of the twenty-first century, Element 8 of P brought together two formulas and two potentials of East Turkestan's past and present history.

The previous attempt to systematically study the history of East Turkestan took place more than a hundred years ago [Grigoriev, vol. 1, 1869; vol. 2, 1873]. Since then, the situation is similar to the image of three monkeys: the first one sees and hears nothing, the second one hears but does not see, and the third one is silent if it sees and hears [Snesarev, 2002, p. 229-230; Farago, 2004, p. 21].) Sometimes we "hear the ringing" more (like the second monkey) than we observe and see: this is the result of a long silence about Xinjiang - a futile but "unfortunate precaution" [Information..., issue 2, 1898, p. 53; Collection..., issue 47, 1891, p. 165]. But, as J. R. R. Tolkien pointed out, Washington, "measures that seem chimerical often turn out to be successful precisely because the more insignificant the danger seems and the more unprepared the enemy is, the more clear the prospect of success opens up" [cit. by: Lavrenev, 2005, p. 49]. Historical science has to search for" atypical unknowns " of the world disorder, controlled chaos of modern history [Ideology and Special Services, 2005, p. 18; Gallois, 1967, p. 362].

Logical conclusions. 1) Xinjiang (East Turkestan) is historically and culturally alien to China and cannot be organically integrated into it; 2) the proclaimed "rise of the West" does not promise the Uyghur regions of Xinjiang either development or improvement of life; 3) spiritual values for Uyghurs are higher than material ones and promise them "great moral benefits" [see: <url> Strategy in the War..., 2003, p. 3; Jackson, 1957, p. 203] in the further struggle; 4) the PRC is threatened by an internal civilizational war; 5) this war

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It is part of the global rivalry between China and the United States in the framework of World War III; 6) the conflict in Xinjiang is fraught with serious troubles for Russia, the SCO and Eurasia as a whole; 7) the convergence of insurgencies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Iraq, Kurdistan (as well as Tibet) with the uprising in Xinjiang is likely and very dangerous; 8) only a major change for the better in the fate of the Uighurs of Xinjiang can prevent the realization of this scenario.

East Turkestan is palpable on the scales of history, on the scales of regional and global geopolitics-no less significant. These scales weigh the probability, course, and outcome of conflicts and catastrophes where "huge changes occur due to [seemingly] insignificant accidents" (Julius Caesar).

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