The data analysis performed in our previous article (Korotaev, 2006) suggested that the general trend of demographic dynamics in medieval Egypt was rather upward than downward. This was due to the increase in the ceiling of the earth's load-bearing capacity due to the introduction of a significant number of technological innovations in the Egyptian economy during the medieval period, which greatly expanded the ecological niche of this country.

It is quite obvious that the population growth observed in medieval Egypt was rather weak, especially in comparison with what was observed at the same time in other regions of the Old World world system outside the Near and Middle East (see: diagr. 1 and 2).

Chart 1

Population growth in world regions between the beginning of the 1st millennium AD and the 18th century (million people)

Sources: Egypt [Korotaev, 2006]; Europe, India, and China [Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, pp. 177-227; Durand, 1960; McEvedy and Jones, 1978, p. 19 - 39, 170 - 174, 182 - 189].

page 5

Chart 2

Population growth in world regions between the beginning of the 1st millennium AD and the 18th century (maximum population level reached at the beginning of the 1st millennium AD = 100)

-----

Sources: China [Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, pp. 177-227; Durand, 1960]; Egypt [Ayyub, 1997; Atsamba and Kirillina, 1996; Ibrahim, 1998; Nefedov, 1999 (2); 2003; Sami-pasha, 2002-2004, p. 8 - 112; Semenova, 1974; Kharidi, 2005, pp. 243-284; Crecelius, 1998; Raymond, 2001, pp. 191-289; Sanders, 1998; Winter, 1998].

We emphasize that we used the maximum (-7 million people), not the minimum (-6 million people) estimate of the population of Egypt in 1775; however, the contrast between the population growth of Egypt, on the one hand, and the population growth of all major macro-regions of the Old World world system (outside the Near and Middle East On the other hand, it remained extremely clear - during the period under review, the population of Egypt grew by no more than 50% (but it could grow by less than 35%, if the minimum estimate is correct), while in all the main macroregions of the Eurasian part of the World System (outside the Middle and Middle East). In the same period, the population grew five-fold or even more. We believe that this phenomenon can be explained, at least in part, by some mechanisms of the type of political and demographic cycles that were characteristic of medieval Egypt (and, most likely, most other countries of the Islamic Near and Middle East) and markedly differed from the cycles characteristic of the political and demographic dynamics of Europe and India and China (Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005; Turchin, 2003).

The first immediately noticeable feature of medieval Egyptian political and demographic cycles is their short duration. Let us compare, for example, this duration with the duration of political and demographic cycles in the country with the best known long - term demographic dynamics-China [Korotaev. Malkov and Khalturina, 2005, pp. 177-227].

As we can see, the average duration of Chinese political and demographic cycles is almost twice as long as that of medieval Egyptian ones. Note that the medieval European political and demographic cycles were even longer than the Chinese ones (see Turchin, 2003 and page 5).

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Table 1

Medieval Egyptian and Chinese political and demographic cycles

Medieval Egypt

Cycle name

Beginning of the recovery growth phase

Beginning of demographic collapse

Duration of growth phases (years)

The Umayyad Cycle

642 g.

737

95

Abbasid cycle

740 g.

830 g.

90

Tulunid-Ikhshidid cycle

868 g.

968

100

1st Fatimid cycle

970 g.

1065

95

2nd Fatimid ("Jamali") cycle

1073

1143

70

1st Ayyubid "cycle"

1171

1195

24

2nd Ayyubid "cycle"

1218

1243

25

Bahrit cycle

1250

1347

127

1st Ottoman cycle

1525

1601

76

2nd Ottoman cycle

1737

1784

47

Average value

75

Average value, excluding Ayyubid "cycles"

87.5

China

Cycle name

Beginning of the recovery growth phase

Beginning of demographic collapse

Duration of growth phases (years)

East Han Cycle

57 g.

188

131

Early German cycle

650 g.

754 g.

104

Pozdnetansky "cycle" 1

786 g.

870 g.

84

Sung cycle

960 g.

1120

160

Yuan Cycle

1280

1355

75

Minsk cycle

1368

1626

258

Qing Cycle

1680

1852

172

Average value

141

Average value, excluding the Late German "cycle"

151.5

-----

Sources: China [Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, pp. 177-227; Durand, 1960]; Egypt [Ayyub, 1997; Atsamba and Kirillina, 1996; Ibrahim, 1998; Nefedov, 1999 (2); 2003; Sami-pasha, 2002-2004, p. 8 - 112; Semenova, 1974; Kharidi, 2005, pp. 243-284; Crecelius, 1998; Raymond, 2001, pp. 191-289; Sanders, 1998; Winter, 1998].

However, even this characteristic can hardly be considered the most remarkable feature of medieval Egyptian political and demographic cycles. The most significant study of political and demographic cycles in the history of ancient and medieval Asia and North Africa was done by S. A. Nefedov. It should be borne in mind that we have almost no direct data on the long-term demographic dynamics of almost all regions of the world outside of China (and to some extent Western Europe), which made it extremely difficult to identify long-term political and demographic cycles in their history. Researchers mainly have indirect data at their disposal, the dynamics of which are well described by mathematical models of these cycles (we are talking primarily about the dynamics of per capita consumption). As shown by Nefedov, their dynamics always reveal just such a handicap.-

1 It is quite possible that the Late Pacific period should be considered more as a part of the Tanskosun intercycle than as a separate political and demographic cycle (Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, p. 185; Fairbank, 1992, p. 86). The same applies to the Ayyubid "cycles", which, apparently, would be more correct to consider as components of the Fatimid-Bahrit intercycle.

page 7

Figure 3

Duration of medieval Egyptian and Chinese political and demographic cycles (in years)

-----

Sources: China [Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, pp. 177-227; Durand, 1960]; Egypt [Ayyub, 1997; Atsamba and Kirillina, 1996; Ibrahim, 1998; Nefedov, 1999 (2); 2003; Sami-pasha, 2002-2004, p. 8 - 112; Semenova, 1974; Kharidi, 2005, pp. 243-284; Crecelius, 1998; Raymond, 2001, pp. 191-289; Sanders, 1998; Winter, 1998].

the mu that they should have according to these models. Using such indirect data, as well as a system of qualitative indicators, Nefedov was able to identify more than 40 political and demographic cycles in the history of ancient and medieval societies in Eurasia and North Africa, thereby showing that political and demographic cycles are not a specific characteristic of the historical dynamics of traditional societies in China and Western Europe, but represent a universal feature. historical dynamics of all complex agrarian societies.

The main type of quantitative data used by S. A. Nefedov to identify political and demographic cycles was data on the dynamics of real daily wages of unskilled workers. Here he managed to find an extremely interesting picture, which is quite consistent with mathematical models of political and demographic cycles (see fig. 6 and 7):

page 8

Figure 4

Average duration of medieval Egyptian and Chinese political and demographic cycles (in years)

-----

Sources: China [Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, pp. 177-227; Durand, 1960]; Egypt [Ayyub, 1997; Atsamba and Kirillina, 1996; Ibrahim, 1998; Nefedov, 1999 (2); 2003; Sami-pasha, 2002-2004, p. 8 - 112; Semenova, 1974; Kharidi, 2005, pp. 243-284; Crecelius, 1998; Raymond, 2001, pp. 191-289; Sanders, 1998; Winter, 1998].

Chart 5

Demographic dynamics of Italy, 1000-1750 (million people)

-----

Source: [McEvedy and Jones, 1978, p. 106-109].

As can be seen, at the beginning of political and demographic cycles, when the population is well resourced and there is a certain shortage of labor, the real wages of unskilled workers tend to be relatively high. However, as the population grows, the availability of resources decreases, the supply of labor more and more outstrips demand, and per capita consumption decreases more and more, which ultimately triggers the mechanisms of demographic collapse. Thus, real daily wages were quite appropriately used by Nefedov as an indirect indicator of relative overpopulation (the lower the level of real wages, the higher the level of relative overpopulation). Against this background, the results of comparing the real wage levels, which were witnessed on the eve of the political and demographic collapses in medieval Egypt, on the one hand, and beyond its borders (both in time and space), on the other, are particularly interesting (see Table 1). 2 and page 8):

page 9

Figure 6

Dynamics of the level of consumption in Babylonia in the VI-V centuries BC. Numbers denote the amount of barley (in liters) that an unskilled worker could buy with his daily salary (Nefedov, 2003, Fig. 4).

Figure 7

Dynamics of consumption in North India in the XVI-XVII centuries. The numbers represent the amount of wheat (in liters) that an unskilled worker could buy with his daily wage (Nefedov, 2003, Fig. 12).

As you can easily see, on the eve of the medieval Egyptian political and demographic collapses, the real wages of unskilled workers were on average more than twice as high as those recorded in other countries and in other epochs. And the only exception here belongs to the class of exceptions that only confirm the rule - we are talking about medieval Iraq, which makes us assume that here we are faced with some characteristic feature of medieval Middle Eastern political and demographic dynamics.

The contrast is equally striking for the beginning of political and demographic cycles (see figure 9).:

This contrast is particularly striking if we compare the medieval Egyptian real wages on the eve of political and demographic collapses with the real wages recorded in the initial phases of other political and demographic cycles (see figure 10):

As we can see, on the eve of political and demographic collapses, the real wages of unskilled Egyptian workers were not very different from what was observed outside medieval Egypt in the initial, most prosperous phases of political and demographic cycles, when the maximum (within the cycle) level of consumption (and real wages) was observed.

page 10

Table 2

Real wages of unskilled workers at the beginning and end of medieval Egyptian and other political-demographic cycles

Medieval Egyptian political and demographic cycles

Cycle name

Real daily wage of an unskilled worker (in liters of wheat)

At the beginning of the political and demographic cycle

Years

On the eve of a political and demographic collapse

Years

Abbasid

15

- 743 g.

4.3

beginning of the IX century

Tulunido-Ikhshidid district

40

- 868 g.

4

954-62 years.

1st Fatimid Monastery

14

970s.

4.9

1053 years.

2nd Fatimid Monastery (Jamali)

22

- 1097

8

the first half of the XII century.

1st Ayyubid "cycle"

18

- 1172

12.5

1180s.

2nd Ayyubid "cycle"

30

1203-18.

16

- 1232

Bahritsky

29

1293-96

5.1

1341-43.

Average value

24

7.8

Average value, excluding Ayyubid "cycles"

24

5.25

Other political and demographic cycles

Cycle name and country

Real daily wage of an unskilled worker

Unit of measurement of real wages/day

At the beginning of the political and demographic cycle

Years

On the eve of a political and demographic collapse

Years

Qing, China

3.2

1730-50 years.

1.7

1800-20 years.

liter of rice

Mughal, India

4.6

1595.

2.5

1670-90 years.

liter of wheat

New Babylonian, Babylonia

7.7

605-562 BC

2.0

522-486 BC

liter of barley

1st Ptolemaic, Egypt

5.3

- 270 BC.

1.7

- 210 BC.

liter of wheat

2nd Ptolemaic, Egypt

7.2

- 140 BC.

2.6

- 60 BC.

liter of wheat

Roman, Egypt

6.0

- 1 AD.

1.7

second half of the second century

liter of wheat

Late Abbasid period, Iraq

12.2

- 1132-66.

5.7

- 1243.

liter of wheat

Average

6.6

2.6

liter of grain

Average, excluding the late Abbasid Iraqi cycle

5.7

2.0

liter of grain

-----

Sources: (Nefedov, 1999-2003).

If we, together with Nefedov, consider medieval real wages as an indicator of under-population, under-filling of an ecological niche, then the results obtained can be interpreted as evidence that medieval Egypt suffered from under-population rather than overpopulation, that the medieval Egyptian population fluctuated significantly below the ceiling of the earth's bearing capacity, without reaching this ceiling even on the eve of the war. political and demographic collapses. By the way, this circumstance at least partially explains the obvious contradiction between the data of agricultural and technological history, which indicate a very significant increase in the ceiling of the earth's bearing capacity between the II and XVIII centuries, and the relatively insignificant increase in the Egyptian population observed during the same time period. The point is that when we compare the Egyptian population for 165 and 1775.,

page 11

Figure 8

Real wages of unskilled workers on the eve of political and demographic collapses (in liters of standard grain)

-----

Sources: [Nefedov, 1999-2003].

We compare overpopulated Roman Egypt with underpopulated Late Ottoman Egypt; we compare a population that has filled an ecological niche and reached the ceiling of the earth's load-bearing capacity with a population that is noticeably lower than this ceiling. Indeed, there are very strong doubts that the Egyptian population (which was considerably thinned out as a result of the demographic collapse of the XVII century) in the 60 years preceding the demographic collapse of 1784-1798 and relatively free from

page 12

Figure 9

Real wages of unskilled workers at the beginning of political and demographic cycles (in liters of standard grain)

-----

Sources: [Nefedov, 1999-2003].

However, due to catastrophic epidemics and crop failures, there was enough time to fill the ecological niche before saturation [Ibrahim, 1998; Sami Pasha, 2002, pp. 32-112; Haredi, 2005, pp. 243 - 284; Crecelius, 1998; Hathaway, 1998].

In general, the relatively high level of real wages witnessed at the end of the medieval Egyptian political and demographic cycles and their short duration seem to be closely interrelated phenomena: during the short medieval Egyptian political and demographic cycles, the population of this country simply, as a rule, did not have enough time to fully fill the ecological niche and reach the ceiling This would lead to a drop in real wages to really low values) before the population is catastrophically reduced as a result of another political and demographic collapse.

Thus, the analyzed data suggest that political and demographic collapses in medieval Egypt occurred at a level significantly lower than the ceiling of the earth's load-bearing capacity. Therefore, models of political and demographic cycles that link political and demographic collapses with the filling of an ecological niche and describe well the long-term political and demographic dynamics of the population.-

page 13

Chart 10

Comparison of medieval Egyptian real wages on the eve of political and demographic collapses with real wages recorded at the initial stages of other political and demographic cycles (in liters of standard grain per day)

Sources: [Nefedov, 1999-2003].

However, the study of the Chinese dynamics of traditional China (Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, p. 221-227; Nefedov, 1999 (6); Chu and Lee, 1994; Nefedov, 2004; Turchin, 2003, p.121-127; Usher, 1989, etc.) is not entirely applicable to medieval Egypt.

Apparently, it is no coincidence that among the mathematical models proposed so far, medieval Egyptian dynamics is best described by the model [Turchin, 2003, p. 131-137], which was developed as an attempt to formulate a mathematically relevant part of the sociological theory of a thinker who spent the most fruitful years of his life directly in the medieval world. Egypt. We are talking about the sociological theory of ' Abd ar-Rahman ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) (Ibn Khaldun, 2004; Ibn Khaldun, 1958). The prospects for using his theory to model the dynamics of medieval Egyptian political and demographic cycles will be discussed in detail in our next article.

page 14

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