... our embassy has succeeded beyond expectations and perhaps even beyond desire.

From the letter of the Orenburg Governor-General N. A. Kryzhanovsky

to the Minister of War D. A. Milyutin.

On July 29, 1878, the people of Kabul witnessed an unprecedented event: a small group of Firinjis, Christian Europeans who had previously been strictly forbidden to enter the country by order of the Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali Khan, was encamped on the outskirts of the city. Apparently, this time an exception was made: the detachment was guarded by Afghan soldiers, and preparations were underway in the city for the solemn reception of foreigners. Who were these newcomers, why did the emir give his permission to receive them in the capital? The roots of this should be sought at least a year before the events described, or even earlier.

In April 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey. Great Britain, without formally participating in the war, took active measures to ensure that no changes in the balance of power in the Balkans affected its position in world politics and did not interfere with its relations with its colonies in Asia, primarily with India. The victory of Russian weapons and the expected capture of Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, in early 1878 prompted London to take decisive diplomatic steps. The Russian army was stopped at the nearest approaches to the Turkish capital. On February 19 (March 3, 1878), a peace treaty was signed in the small town of San Stefano, according to which Ardagan, Kare, Batum, Bayazet and part of Bessarabia were withdrawn to Russia. Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro gained full independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina gained autonomy, and Bulgaria became a de facto independent principality. Such a solution to the Eastern question could not satisfy Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. The demarches of these two countries led Europe to an acute political crisis. The tension grew. In March 1878, Queen Victoria signed a decree calling up reservists, and British warships were sent to the Dardanelles. The head of the Cabinet of Ministers, Boris Disraeli, called for the occupation of Cyprus, considering it as the key to Asia. In the context of the European crisis and growing tension, the tsarist government decided to organize a march of troops of the Turkestan Military District towards India on the southern borders of the Russian Empire - the "Indian Campaign". It was planned as a demonstration, as a diversionary maneuver and a means of pressure "to prevent possible plans of the British government regarding us in Central Asia and to threaten its own interests in the East Indies" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 80].

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The plan of the campaign was outlined in the" Report to the General Staff in the Highest name on the measures taken on our Central Asian borders in case of a break with England " of April 8, 1878.:

"1. In view of the limited military resources of the Turkestan Military District, immediately strengthen the troops of this district by forming as many reserve units as possible according to the reserve of lower ranks available on site and in the Western Siberian District, as well as the available super-kit in the troops of both these districts. The formation of reserve units will make it possible to withdraw most of the Turkestan field troops from the region. The reinforcement of the regular staff of the permanent local troops of the Turkestan district, which Adjutant-General von Kaufmann requested , was postponed in the form of significant annual expenses that would have been required for this.

2. Leaving within the Turkestan region the number of troops necessary for the protection of the internal peace of the population, advance at a convenient time a detachment of the greatest possible strength to the Amu Darya, Shirabad or other point, as it will be more profitable to better ensure the security of our borders from possible external attacks and at the same time prepare the ground for further there will be a need.

3. On the part of the Caucasian Military District, strengthen the troops of the Transcaspian Military Department and advance a detachment of adequate strength to the land of Teke and further towards Merv in order to familiarize ourselves with this still unexplored area and strengthen our influence there, as well as to protect the space between the Caspian Sea and the Amu Darya from the invasion of Turkmen gangs.

4. A detachment of Turkestan troops may be sent from the Amu Darya division to join the Caucasian troops in Merv or Teke, if local resources and circumstances permit. In general, it would be desirable for the two main detachments, which are being sent out from Turkestan and the Caucasus, to try to open communication between them by flying detachments or in some other way.

5. In order to prevent misunderstandings about the movement of our troops among the population of the areas where the troops will have to march for the first time (in the Khanate of Bukhara and Turkmenistan), oblige the authorities of the Turkestan and Caucasian military districts to take all measures to establish friendly relations between the troops and the population, encouraging the latter to provide even possible assistance

6. Special attention should be paid to ensuring that the military movements undertaken do not make an unfavorable impression on Afghanistan, whose hostile attitude towards us would be extremely unprofitable and, on the contrary, an alliance with which would be very desirable. In these circumstances, the Turkestan Governor-General should be allowed to enter into communication with the ruler of Afghanistan in advance by sending him confidants or even an official embassy, which should explain that the advance of our detachments is by no means hostile to Afghanistan, but, on the contrary, may even be useful to him as a support for its independence. the British, and under certain circumstances even as support against them.

7. In general, it would be useful to send special emissaries to the lands lying along the routes to India and in the vicinity of this country to get acquainted with the situation of these lands and with the attitude of the inhabitants and their governments towards England, to establish our relations with them and prepare their favorable mood in case of a break with England." the game"..., 2005, pp. 82-84].

In Tashkent, Samarkand and other major cities of Russian Turkestan, active preparations for the campaign began: orders were made to form reserve companies, food supplies were concentrated in Samarkand, artillery and engineering parks, hospital units and quartermaster transport were also sent there. All troops assigned to the campaign received their first uniforms, greatcoats, two pairs of spare boots, portable tents, a bedding bag and trench tools. Three field hospitals were formed to treat the sick and wounded. Provisions (crackers and cereals), tea and sugar for two months and grain fodder for one month were prepared and concentrated in the Jam tract on the border of the Turkestan General Government and the Bukhara Emirate. For better control of the troops, a telegraph line was built from Samarkand to the Jam tract. Number

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horses on the postal route from Tashkent to Samarkand were increased by three triplets at each station; in addition, a post office was established in the Sary-Kul tract. A diplomatic official was sent to the Emir of Bukhara, Syed Muzaffar Khan, to explain the situation. He had to assure the Emir that he had nothing to fear, since the proposed movement of troops was not directed against him or his state.

The troops moved from Tashkent to the Bukhara border on June 1, and the last echelons concentrated near the Jam tract on July 5. The detachment was a fighting force of 12,500 men with three sets of ammunition and three sets of charges for each gun.

The Turkestan Governor-General has always maintained friendly relations with the Afghan Emir Sher Ali Khan. The messengers who brought the letters of Adjutant-General K. P. von Kaufmann to Kabul were mainly local Muslim merchants, since the emir did not allow Christians, whether Russian, English or representatives of any other nationality, to enter the borders of his state. In the first half of May, the Emir's reply was received to a letter sent as early as September 1877 with the usual greeting for maintaining good relations between Russia and Afghanistan, but this very kind response did not contain any hint of the Emir's attitude towards the British, despite the fact that another letter sent in January to Sher Ali Khan contained a question about this relationship. Sher Ali Khan received the January letter, but did not reply until September. Such slowness in correspondence was a common practice of the Afghan emir: he answered a message only when he received a new one. Therefore, "in order to find out the attitude of Afghanistan towards us, Major-General Stoletov was sent to Kabul upon his arrival in Tashkent, and he was instructed to put a categorical question to the Emir of Kabul about what it would be convenient for him to establish relations with us, and to expose all the benefits of good friendship and alliance to us" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 253].

Nikolai Grigoryevich Stoletov (1834-1912) completed a course at Moscow University, but he was destined for a military career: in 1854, he entered the military service as a volunteer and went to Sevastopol as a fireworks display during the Eastern, or Crimean, War of 1853-1856. For his part in the famous case at Inkerman, he received the insignia of the Military Order of St. George and the rank of ensign. After that, he studied at the General Staff Academy. He had to apply the acquired knowledge and experience first in the Caucasus, and then (since 1867) in Central Asia. It is possible that the choice of a place of service was influenced by his knowledge of the Tatar language, which he learned while still a high school student.

The first significant milestone of his military career was the conquest of the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and the foundation of the city of Krasnovodsk. On November 5-7, 1869, a detachment consisting of one infantry battalion, fifty Cossacks and six guns, under the command of Colonel Stoletov, landed in the Krasnovodsk Bay. The waterless desert, the hostile population surrounding the detachment, the difficulties with the delivery of food - the head of the detachment saw and experienced a lot. Apparently, the command was satisfied with his actions, and already as a connoisseur of Central Asia, he led a scientific expedition to study the old channel of the Amu Darya. As a result of this expedition, he published several works, and the Imperial Russian Geographical Society elected him as its full member.

At the same time, he had the idea of going to India. In 1870. he wrote and presented to his superiors "A report on the state of the British military forces in India and the mood of the natives" [OPIGIM, No. 10, l. 1-10]. This project of a military expedition to India showed a great awareness of the author in the history of the conquest of India by the British and in what this conquest led to, i.e. in the current state of the country.

Meanwhile, in the mid-70s of the XIX century, the Eastern question came to the fore in the contradictions between Russia and Great Britain. The Russian army began preparing for war with Turkey. The formation, training and command of the Bulgarian militia was

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assigned to Major General N. G. Stoletov. By the beginning of the defense of Shipka, five militia squads were formed, and Nikolai Grigoryevich himself led the defense of Shipka at the first, most difficult and bloody stage. Then there was service in the detachment of General M. D. Skobelev, when he happened to accept the surrender of the Turks after the battle of Sheynovo. In the camp of the Russian troops in Rumelia, he received a telegram with instructions to urgently leave for Tashkent at the disposal of Adjutant-General K. P. von Kaufmann, Governor-General and commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district: he was appointed head of the Russian diplomatic mission to Kabul. In addition to him, the mission consisted of Colonel (since August 1878 - Major General) N. O. Razgon, doctor I. L. Yavorsky, translator from Persian Second Lieutenant Nazirov, topographer N. A. Bendersky, translator from Turkish Shikhalibekov Zaman-Bek, translator from English titular adviser Malevinsky, 21 Cossacks at the Russian Academy of Sciences. one constable and a paramedic.

Upon arrival in Tashkent, the Governor-General, K. P. von Kaufmann, announced to N. G. Stoletov the highest will: he was going on a mission to Kabul to " consolidate our friendly relations with him (the Emir of Afghanistan-T. Z.), clarify to the Emir all the benefits that are happening for him, and to conclude, if possible, with It is the name of the union in case of an armed conflict between us and England. ...Your Excellency's mission to the Emir of Afghanistan is primarily aimed at maintaining the Emir's distrust of the British actions and encouraging him to continue resisting their attempts to establish themselves in Afghanistan... in peacetime, this support may consist in our presenting to the London Cabinet the need to preserve the independence of the Afghan ruler, and in the event of an armed conflict between us and England, we can actually provide support. Consequently, the Emir should not regard the concentration of our troops on the Amu Darya as a demonstration hostile to Afghanistan, but as a force friendly to it, on which he can safely rely if he wishes to take advantage of the current extremely favorable circumstances for him and put a limit to further British encroachments on interference in internal affairs. Afghanistan" ["Big Game"..., 2005, pp. 103-104].

General Stoletov was asked to explain to the emir the difference between Russian and British policy in Central Asia, to emphasize that one should "be afraid of English generosity and all the apparent benefits of an alliance with them in the present. The British everywhere in Turkey, India, China, and Afghanistan have the same goal: to enslave the country politically and industrially. In their pursuit of such a goal, they naturally undermine the existing order everywhere. This usually begins with lords who pass from independent to vassals, pensioners, etc. It is quite different for us, for example, in Central Asia, when we have protected our borders from the predation of semi-savage rulers and their subjects, and for this purpose we had to let them feel our strength as much as necessary; everywhere we maintain the legitimate authority and the order established for centuries. The power of the khans, who have entered into friendly relations with us, is not only not undermined, but is becoming stronger. So we did with Bukhara, Kashgar, Khiva" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 104]. General N. G. Stoletov had to convince the emir in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and Great Britain to become an ally of the former, then, if successful, "the restoration of the old eastern border of Afghanistan and the subordination of the previously vassal Baluchistan to it is the most modest reward that the emir can count on with a somewhat favorable outcome of a clash with England."

Since there was very little information about the situation in this part of Asia, the mission was assigned to find out the real state of affairs in the country, how strong the position of the Emir was, and who was opposing him. Besides:

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"1. To collect detailed information about the country's resources, regarding food and transportation facilities, in the event of our troops entering there, what, how, where and at what price can be purchased there; 2. To remove the route from the Amu River to Kabul, as well as those side roads and points where you would have to be; 3. How much can be examined, as well as determine the number and quality of the Afghan troops, regular and militia; 4. To collect information about the location and number of British troops, it is desirable to arrange this matter so that this information is constantly updated according to changes in the English deployment; 5. To enter into relations with as many influential persons as possible independent of the Emir of Eastern Afghanistan and Hindustan itself, learn from them about the mood of the minds of the population in those countries and try to act through these personalities in a sense hostile to English rule, and if possible, then find people who would be able to serve as emissaries to spread a party hostile to the British..."If the Emir decides "to incline to our side, then you are fully entitled not only to assist him in a sense hostile to England by your advice and instructions, but also to assume the management or command of that part of the country's resources and forces which, by agreement with the Emir, you will find most important in a defensive or offensive sense against England. England" ["Big Game"..., 2005, pp. 105-106].

Having received the order and money, the mission members began to purchase the necessary equipment: the path was long, and most importantly-unknown. Lieutenant Ya. V. Vitkevich, who had once been on a mission in Kabul, burned all his papers before committing suicide. There was some information about the roads of Bukhara and Afghanistan, but how reliable were they?

On May 28, the mission set out from Tashkent, and on June 2, from Samarkand, the last major city of the Russian Empire. Then there was the territory of the Bukhara Emirate and a meeting with the Emir of Bukhara in Karshi, his summer residence. Syed Muzaffar, who had been warned in advance of the Russians passing through his territory, received them with Oriental hospitality and consideration. Prominent people of Bukhara were sent to meet them and accompanied them to Karshi. The road was comfortable, passed through a populated area, there was plenty of water, and at the end of each trip they were expected to have a delicious dinner and a comfortable overnight stay. At first, the caravan traveled at an average speed of 50 versts per day, but, according to Eastern concepts, it was considered indecent for important persons to hurry. "In general, here the measure of a person's dignity is taken to be his greater or lesser heaviness, clumsiness, and importance" [Yavorsky, vol. 1, 1882, p. 43].

The temperature in the shade reached +43°. While crossing the mountains from Guzar to Shirabad, pack horses were damaged, so they had to be replaced with new ones, and later some of the packs were transferred to oxen. Here, for the first time, Dr. I. L. Yavorsky had to apply his knowledge: the governor of Shirabad was ill, and the Russian doctor was invited to his bedside. The first ailments were also noted among the mission members: two Cossacks started to have an upset stomach, but thanks to the measures taken, everything ended well ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 117].

In Shirabad, a border town in Bukhara, the head of the mission was approached by a messenger from the governor of Charvilayet, a neighboring Afghan province, asking him to delay crossing the Amu Darya until he received permission from Kabul, which may not come until ten days later. Major-General Stoletov replied that due to the instructions given to him, he could not wait, and wrote a letter about this to Shir-dil Khan, the head of Charvilayet. Lieutenant Nazirov was sent with this letter on June 17, and the next day, despite all the persuasions of the Afghans, Major General Stoletov insisted on his own and crossed to the Afghan coast with the rest of the mission members. On the 19th, it was announced that Sher Ali Khan had received permission to accept the embassy. ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 127]. Thus began the mission's journey through Afghanistan.

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The gathering of the mission and the movement of the caravan first to the southern borders of the empire, and then through the territory of Bukhara, could not go unnoticed by English informants. The first known report from Punjab about Russian envoys to Kabul is dated back to May 13, 1: ".. .The Russians decided to go to war with the British government and sent envoys to the Emir of Afghanistan to ask permission for the Russian army to pass to India and return from there through his territory, if necessary " [NAI, Secret, July 1878, N 101]. On June 5, three days after the departure of the mission from Samarkand, Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, was informed from Punjab of a Russian agent in Kabul, who informed the Emir that a Russian envoy, a European equal in rank to the Governor-General of Tashkent, would soon visit Kabul. Governor-General Kaufman also wrote to the Emir about this, adding that he should be received as an ambassador of the Emperor [NAI, Secret, December 1878, N 1]. On June 12, a new message came with the content of the emir's reply to the Russian authorities in Turkestan: sending a European envoy to Kabul may not be to the taste of the Afghans, a rude, uncivilized nation, and because of their fanaticism, they may harm the envoy [NAI, Secret, January 1879, N 353].

Information from various sources began to flow into Calcutta, often based on hearsay and full of speculation and exaggeration. A telegram dated June 29 stated that the Russians intended to establish military settlements at Shirabad and at the crossings at Kelif and Kerki on the Amu Darya [NAI, Secret, December 1878, N 3].A month later, another report came that a high-ranking Russian envoy was expected to arrive in Kabul within days, accompanied by 100 Cossacks and 200 Uzbek horsemen, and that the Emir was preparing to receive him with great honor. The British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lord Loftus, asked N. K. Geers, the head of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, directly whether any Russian was sent by the government or the Governor-General of Turkestan on a diplomatic mission to Kabul. " Mr. Geers replied that no such mission was sent and there are no intentions to send neither the Imperial government nor General Kaufmann has such a problem" [NAI, Secret Supplement, January 1879, N 23]. Only later, in September, when General Stoletov had already returned from Afghanistan, did the Chancellor A. M. Gorchakov confirm the fact of sending the mission, which "was a courtesy visit and was temporary in nature, and he also noted that the Sovereign Emperor would never waive his right to send such missions to any of the foreign sovereigns or neighboring princes..." [NAI, Secret Supplement, January 1879, No. 3].

Meanwhile, the mission continued to move through Afghanistan. Along the way, the topographer N. A. Bendersky, who received the nickname "naturalist", had to plot the route of the embassy, which hardly pleased the honorary escort who accompanied them, so " ... he carefully hid the bussol and the book from the Afghans, and made notes in the sleeve of his coat or port sake, showing the appearance that he was preparing for himself cigarettes." Despite such tricks, he was caught several times at the scene of the "crime": "Once, when he opened the bussoli dial and intended to mark the angle at which the path deviates from this direction, Mosin Khan (the official assigned to accompany the mission - T. Z.), apparently mistaking the bussoli for a watch, asked: "Chend-vakht-is there?"(i.e., what time is it). A topographer caught off guard by the question... I told him the time at random. But probably the difference between the present time and what the surveyor said was very large, since Mosin Khan expressed doubts about the accuracy of the surveyor's watch. The "Naturalist" did not contradict Mosin Khan's suggestion, declaring that he had not checked the watch for a long time, and therefore did not guarantee its accuracy-which, apparently, completely satisfied his annoying companion" [Yavorsky, vol.1, 1882, pp. 151-152].

1 British intelligence, both in Europe and in Asia, was well established: the first report that has come down to us about the upcoming campaign to India is dated April 30, 1878. It was a letter from the British Ambassador to Turkey, Layard, to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, containing inaccurate information about the number of troops being assembled for the campaign, and about the intended commander.

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The first major Afghan city on the route of the Russian caravan was Mazar-I-Sha-rif, where the mission arrived on June 23. The embassy was met by four battalions of infantry with eight guns. The troops saluted, and the artillery fired a salute. At the head of the troops were Feiz Mahomet Khan, the chief of the troops of Afghan Turkestan, and Khosh-dil Khan, the son of the governor of Shir-dil Khan, his father's assistant in civil administration. Both of them apologized that the governor himself could not meet the embassy due to illness. On June 26, he died, and the embassy was delayed in Mazar-I-Sharif for several days while waiting for a new person to be appointed by Sher Ali Khan to accompany the mission. Major General Stoletov found out that the emir wants to solemnly receive the embassy in order to show that he puts the Russians above the British, who several times sought the Emir's permission to send an official embassy, but were constantly refused ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 127].

On 6 July, the mission left Mazar-I-Sharif for Kabul. Two infantry battalions, a cavalry regiment and eight guns were assigned to honor Major General Stoletov. The health of the mission members, which had been affected by fevers while driving on the plain and parking in Mazar-I-Sharif, began to improve as the mission entered the mountains.

During the entire trip, the Afghan authorities showed the most considerate attention and warm hospitality. None of the mission members needed anything, pilaf and lamb shish kebab were prepared for them at each stop. To facilitate the mission's pack horses, additional horses were provided, and at each station the Russian caravan was met by foremen with 150-200 riders from honorary residents. As they approached Kabul, Shah Mahomed Khan, the Emir's vizier, rode out on three elephants to meet the mission. Major General Stoletov and some members of the embassy moved to elephants.

A solemn meeting of the Embassy in Kabul was scheduled for July 29. Exhausted by the journey, the mission members were getting out their parade uniforms, putting their ammunition in order, and cleaning their horses when a messenger arrived from Tashkent with a secret package for Major General Stoletov. After opening it, Nikolai Grigoryevich learned about the completion of the Berlin Congress, about the signing of a treatise that changed the situation in Europe. The terms of peace were largely revised in favor of Turkey, but this removed the threat of war. The "Indian campaign" was canceled, the troops of the Turkestan Military District returned to their permanent quarters, and the main reason for sending a military-diplomatic mission to Afghanistan no longer existed. 2 The situation in which the mission members found themselves was unenviable: it was no longer possible to turn back or cancel the solemn meeting.

On July 29, members of the Russian Embassy rode elephants to Kabul. At the entrance, they were surrounded by a regiment of Afghan Guards cavalry led by the Emir's brother. He asked the head of the mission to transfer to a huge elephant specially sent for him with gilded tusks and a golden saddle. Then the ceremonial procession passed through the outskirts of Kabul, where all the streets, bazaars, roofs of houses, and hills surrounding the city were covered with solid masses of people. Loud shouts greeted the embassy from all directions. Then on to the field in front of Bala Hisar (the fortress where the Emir lived and where rooms were prepared for the mission members and the con-

2 We do not have the text of the Governor-General's dispatch at our disposal, so we can only rely on the opinion of Lieutenant-General M. A. Terentyev, author of the three-volume work "History of the Conquest of Central Asia", written in hot pursuit of the events using documents from the archives of Tashkent and personal conversations with members of the mission who still lived there: "In view of the peaceful outcome of the congress, Kaufman advised Stoletov to refrain from making any decisive promises in negotiations with the Afghan government and generally not to go as far as previously assumed in case of war with England" [Terentyev, vol.2, 1906, p. 447].

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eight infantry battalions, two cavalry regiments, and two batteries were formed up. A salute was made while following the embassy. All this took place to the accompaniment of three military bands. At the entrance to Bala Hisar, troops were lined up on all the approaches to it, saluting to the sound of marching music.

The mission was located quite spacious and very comfortable by local standards. The designated area was a closed square courtyard with two square buildings facing inwards. Each of them had many rooms. "But there were few that could be called comfortable in the European sense of the word. There was very little furniture: a few chairs of simple workmanship, a few simple chairs and tables covered with tablecloths, the product of English factories; native beds with rope bindings instead of springs and cotton mattresses instead of hair-that was all the interior of the palace. Not a single mirror was seen anywhere. The rooms are very small, rarely more than 4 - 5 fathoms in length and 2-3 in width. The floors of the rooms are covered with Persian carpets, then simple rugs, then patterned thick and soft Kyrgyz koshmas... The walls of the rooms are quite well plastered... In the thickness of the walls there are niches where tea sets, candlesticks, etc. were placed. cabinet items " [Yavorsky, vol. 1, 1882, p. 319]. Both buildings were at least as good as Emir Sher Ali's, but the mission members themselves were different."we thought to see marble, gilding, bright colors of plaster, lapis lazuli, magnificent fountains, magical gardens, etc., but instead we met clay and little glass, not a single tree, not a trickle of water!" [Yavorsky, vol. 1, 1882, p. 321].

On July 29, the mission rested. The Emir sent several times to inquire about the health of members of the embassy. On July 30, the Emir gave the first audience to the head of the mission, which lasted for two hours, partly one - on-one, partly in the presence of the vizier. Here is how Major General Stoletov described the ruler of Afghanistan: "The Emir is 54-55 years old, medium height, dark brown hair, with gray eyes, an open, kind expression, he was of medium stature, he was dressed perfectly with all the details in a white Hussar dolman with the same trousers. The clothes fit him well, and he seems quite used to them. On his head is a silver-plated helmet with feathers, this is the uniform of the mounted Afghan regiment, something like our Horse Guards. He was wearing a striped ribbon over his shoulder. His appearance and manner are casual, casual, and well-mannered. He is very much like a cavalry regiment commander, of venerable years, and a drill driver, with complete simplicity and a special kind of attractiveness in his address. It seems to me that this is the type of Asian who has received neither a scientific education nor upbringing, but is naturally richly gifted and understands the importance and power of European science and life. I haven't seen Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt or Renjit Singh, the ruler of Seik, but I think Sher Ali Khan has something in common with them" (Big Game..., 2005, p.138).

At this first audience, Sher Ali was presented with a letter from the Governor-General of Turkestan, Adjutant-General K. P. von Kaufmann.:

"Let it be known to you that at present the relations between the British government and ours regarding your state require deep consideration. Since I cannot personally convey my opinion to you, I have transferred my powers to a trusted person-Major General Stoletov. This man is a close friend of mine, and he proved himself very well during the last Russo-Turkish war, for which he earned the favor of the Sovereign Emperor. He enjoys the respect of the Sovereign Emperor. He will tell you everything I have to tell you. I hope that you will pay full attention to his words and believe him as you do me; and after the necessary consideration, you will give him an answer. Meanwhile, let it be known to you that your alliance and friendship with the Russian government will be beneficial to us, but even more so to you. Advantages of ten-

3 This letter is preserved in the Indian National Archives; it appears to have been seized along with other papers of Sher Ali Khan during the second Anglo-Afghan War.

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Any possible alliance with the Russian government will be obvious" [NAI, Secret Supplement, November 1879, N 141].

Major General Stoletov was treated to tea and cigars during the audience. The conversation was quite lively and relaxed, the interlocutors moved from one subject to another. The essence of the conversation, described by Nikolai Grigoryevich in a letter to the Governor-General K. P. von Kaufmann, was as follows: "The Emir highly appreciates the attention of our Sovereign Emperor, hopes for him as a powerful neighbor, says that both he and the entire Afghan people hate the British, that the Hindustan rajas and ruling families are currently living in Afghanistan. driven to extreme irritation against their conquerors. He wonders why we didn't pay attention earlier to this area, where, in his opinion, it is easiest to hurt the British, who then would not have been able to harm us so much after the success of the last war. He wants to know that if he had to, how many troops we can have in this theater. Are all our troops Russian? He had heard from the British that we had a lot of Cossacks and that the Cossacks were a different tribe (after showing my team, I convinced the Emir that this information was incorrect). He likes our burdanki, the simplicity of rifle techniques and regulations. In this respect, he is a very competent person, and all the drill regulations have been translated from English into Afghan under his supervision and according to his editorial board. He knows quite well what is being done in Europe and how the British have hurt us after our brilliant victories.4 He is sure that I will lay the foundation for a strong friendship between Afghanistan and Russia, I will tell him something useful in the military field, which will be accepted by him at the same time" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p.138].

After the audience, the Emir was introduced to all the members of the mission and the team of Cossacks. The Emir talked with Colonel N. O. Razgonov, Dr. I. L. Yavorsky and translator Malevinsky for about an hour.

На следующий день эмиру были поднесены подарки. Трость, инкрустированная бирюзой, в футляре местной работы; серебряный пояс, также инкрустированный бирюзой; несколько кусков парчи довольно низкого качества; несколько халатов из парчи, бархата и простого сукна (такие уездные начальники Туркестанского генерал-губернаторства дарили сельским аксакалам) - все это было закуплено в Ташкенте и распаковано только в Кабуле и совершенно не соответствовало уровню эмира, выглядело просто убого. Тогда Н. Г. Столетов взял три лучшие лошади, подаренные эмиром Бухарским, велел оседлать их бухарскими же седлами с парчовыми попонами и уздечками, отделанными бирюзой, а также ружья и два револьвера (пехотное ружье Бердана, кавалерийский штуцер Бердана, охотничье ружье Ланкастера, форменный револьвер Смит-Вессона и самый маленький с никелевой оправой его же), к этому были присоединены чайный и десертный серебряные сервизы [Яворский, т. 1, 1882, с. 327 - 328]. В таком виде подарки выглядели вполне пристойно.

После поднесения подарков генерал-майор Столетов беседовал с эмиром часа два о прежних границах Афганистана, о захвате англичанами Кветты. Шер Али-хан говорил о возможном открытии со стороны англичан против него враждебных действий и заявил, что в этом случае рассчитывает на помощь со стороны русских войском. Далее разговор зашел об унизительности и опасности денежных субсидий для независимого владетеля, притом сам эмир ни жадности к деньгам, ни какой-либо надежды получить их от России не показал, но на помощь войсками надежда у него сквозила на каждом шагу ["Большая игра"..., 2005, с. 139].

Появление русского посольства в столице Афганистана не могло остаться незамеченным и не отмеченным английскими шпионами. Донесения на эту тему стекались в Калькутту из разных источников. Один из основных вопросов, который интересовал вице-короля, была личность са-

4 This refers to events in Europe after the signing of the San Stefano Peace Treaty.

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my ambassador. Some reports claimed that this was the Governor-General himself, K. P. von Kaufmann, but this information was soon refuted, and we were talking about a Persian-speaking European officer equal in status to Konstantin Petrovich. One of the informants called him "Deputy Governor-General; it may be General Abramov, Governor of Samarkand" [NAI, Secret, December 1878, N 12]. Although Alexander Konstantinovich Abramov commanded the Ferghana detachment in the "Indian Campaign", and had nothing to do with the mission to Afghanistan, the British continued to consider him the head of the embassy in the future, and his name in this capacity was mentioned in an official note dated August 26, 1878 by the Charge d'affaires of Great Britain Plunket to the Russian government [RGVIA, L. 119-121].

Relations between the Emir of Sher Ali and the Viceroy of India, the British representative in this part of the world, have always been strained. The situation worsened after the Peshawar Conference of 1877, when all the demands of the British, including the admission of their observer officers to the borders of Afghanistan, were resolutely refused by the Afghans and put forward their demands to stop interfering in the internal affairs of their state. The countries were on the verge of declaring war, and only the Russo-Turkish campaign delayed its start. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, who was appointed to this position in order to pacify the rebellious emir, was waiting for an excuse to strain relations and start a war with the Afghans. The arrival of the Russian embassy gave him this opportunity. In Calcutta, preparations began for the British embassy to the Emir's court, headed by General Neville Chamberlain.

The daily life of the embassy was very boring: only the head of the mission was allowed to go outside the premises reserved for the mission if he was going to meet with the emir or some high dignitary. Everyone else was sitting in their rooms without the opportunity to go out for a walk, not only in the city, but also just outside their yard. The honor guard that had met them on the outskirts of Kabul and escorted them to Bala Hisar remained with them, either as a guard or as a convoy. "Meanwhile, the Russian envoy is under strict surveillance and no one is allowed to visit him in Kabul. It is said that the townspeople were forbidden to enter the garden where it is located, and there is a sentry at the gate. The Messenger is not allowed to pay for anything. Women are forbidden to show themselves in the bazaar while there are Russians in the city," said one dispatch to Calcutta [NAI, Secret Supplement, January 1879, N496].

Fever attacks were becoming more frequent among the mission members and the Cossacks accompanying them. There was not a single member of the embassy or the guards who did not suffer from this debilitating disease, including Dr. I. L. Yavorsky himself. The supply of quinine was still sufficient, but each new attack weakened the people, and added to the stomach ailments. On the morning of July 31, the mission was woken up by a thud and an entire building shaking. People ran out into the courtyard, but there were no more aftershocks, the building survived, and everyone returned to their places [Yavorsky, vol.1, 1882, p. 326].

On August 3, Dr. I. L. Yavorsky was invited to visit the ailing Prince-Heir Abdullah Jan. The patient's condition was so severe that Ivan Lavrovich could not help him, and he died.

On the same day, Emir Sher Ali received a notice from Calcutta that the Anglo-Indian Government was sending an embassy to him, headed by General Chamberlain. Before giving an answer, the emir consulted with General Stoletov, who suggested that he should not receive the British in Kabul. Sher Ali Khan refused to accept the embassy, the reason for this was mourning for the heir to the throne. The British continued to insist.

After staying in Kabul for about two weeks, Major-General Stoletov, accompanied by Dr. Yavorsky, 10 Cossacks and several horsemen, left for Tashkent on August 11 to report personally to Governor-General K. P. von Kaufmann. He was carrying with him a draft of a friendly convention between Russia and Afghanistan, drawn up with the help of the Emir. Paragraph one of this document read: "Russian Imperial Government-

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The Government considers the State of Shir Ali Khan, the Emir of Afghanistan, to be an independent State and wishes to have friendly relations with it, as with other independent States, out of old friendship." It went on to say that Russia is committed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. "Only if the state of the Emir... from any internal or external enemy exposed to danger, then at the request of the Emir... The Russian imperial government can interfere in internal affairs even by providing appropriate assistance." The Russian government has pledged to recognize whoever the emir finds worthy as the heir to the throne of Kabul. If a State invades the territory of Afghanistan by armed force, and the Emir appeals to the Imperial Government for armed assistance, the Imperial Government, if it is not possible to peacefully reject the clash, will provide him with this assistance. The Emir of Afghanistan is given the opportunity to send his chosen people to Russia to study various specialties, including military ones. Individuals sent from Afghanistan to Russia will benefit from the cooperation of the relevant military and civilian authorities. If the emir needs people of various specialties, including military ones, the imperial government will provide him with all possible assistance. Both sides pledged to take all measures in their power to promote and facilitate mutual trade relations.

The project ended with expressions of friendly feelings for each other:

"A friend of the State of Shir-Ali Khan, Emir of Afghanistan, should be considered a friend of the Imperial Russian Government, and an enemy of the State of Shir-Ali Khan, Emir of Afghanistan, should be considered an enemy of the Imperial Russian Government, and vice versa. Therefore, on the basis of all the above, from now on forever the Russian Imperial Government considers it necessary to provide assistance, assistance and support to the Emir of the Afghan state by all means, both explicit and implicit, both external and internal, recognized by both states as useful and expedient" [Bolshaya Igr..., 2005,p.159].

This document was signed only by General Stoletov, although, except for two points with mutual obligations (development of trade and recognition of the enemy of one state as the enemy of another), the entire burden of its implementation fell on Russia.5

The signing of such documents required the highest approval, especially since in personal conversations with General Stoletov, Sher Ali Khan asked for the protectorate of Russia and, in case of need, for armed assistance.6 Upon arrival in Tashkent, it turned out that Major General N. G. Stoletov was on his way to Moscow and then to Livadia to personally report all the circumstances of the case to Alexander P. At first, he believed that he would still return to Afghanistan, but the situation in Europe had changed, and, in the opinion of the Russian cabinet, this was no longer necessary. 7 The remaining members of the mission, headed by Colonel N. O. Razgonov, remained in Kabul for two or three weeks, as Major General Stoletov had promised them [Yavorsky, vol. 1, 1882, p. 346]. The reason for this was that the emir wanted to send a large embassy to Russia, which took time to prepare, and Niko-

5 Note that the Instructions to General Stoletov "in the event of a clash between us and England" (emphasis added) did not consider the possibility of a conflict between Afghanistan and England, nor did they regulate the obligations of the Russian side in this situation. After the signing of the Berlin Treaty and further negotiations between the Russian and British diplomatic departments, the conclusion of any treaty with Afghanistan became impossible for Russia.

6 According to Dr. I. L. Yavorsky, General N. G. Stoletov promised the Emir to send a 30,000-strong army if necessary [Yavorsky, vol. 2, 1883, p. 83].

'After returning from Livadia, N. G. Stoletov was seconded to the General Staff, and from June 5, 1879 to May 5, 1880, he was on leave abroad. He was sent to India on a secret mission. See Russo-Indian Relations in the 19th Century, 1997, pp. 245-247.

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lai Grigorievich had to go fast, light. [Yavorsky, v. 2, 1883, p. 79]. Neither the Russian nor Afghan authorities ever intended to turn this mission into a permanent representation of Russia in Kabul, but the departure of its head gave the British reason to interpret these events in this way and continue to insist on the emir's reception of his embassy.

As early as the beginning of July, both London and Calcutta knew what the purpose of the "Indian Campaign"was. "There is no doubt that in view of the possibility of war with England, the Russian government and the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan are preparing a military expedition to our Indian border without, as I believe, much hope of success, more in order to serve as a threat and with the hope of creating internal difficulties for the government of India..." [NAI, Secret, November 1878, N 130],-wrote the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lord Loftus, to the Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Salisbury. The purpose of sending the mission, according to intelligence reports, was to promise a large sum of money for allowing troops to pass through Afghanistan to India or for concluding a defensive and offensive alliance [NAI, Secret Supplementary, December 1878, N 668]. Neither option inspired much fear in the British; on the contrary, the appearance of the Russian mission in Kabul gave them a long-awaited excuse to insist on accepting their mission.

On September 21, the Chamberlain mission, numbering more than 1,000 people, set out from Peshawar. The emir strictly ordered the border authorities not to let the British pass, and if they move by force, stop them with weapons. At the Khyber Pass, the English caravan was stopped. The Afghan officer was given an ultimatum to hand over Sher Ali Khan.

In Tashkent, the formation of the mission took place in an atmosphere of strict secrecy. Only Major-General Stoletov, a man of great personal bravery, a talented soldier, but not a diplomat, was notified of the goals and objectives of the embassy. All the other members of the embassy remained completely unaware of the purpose of the trip. Before entering Kabul, Nikolai Grigoryevich was put in a very difficult position: the "Indian campaign" was canceled, and thus the very subject of negotiations with the emir disappeared. The interviews with Sher Ali Khan took place one - on-one, their contents were not disclosed to anyone, and secrecy continued to be observed.

Before his sudden departure, Stoletov left Colonel N. O. Razgonov with the most general, rather "brief verbal instruction: on all issues of a political nature, recommend that the Afghan authorities try to gain time by negotiations before receiving a response from Tashkent" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 148]. Upon receiving the letter with the directives of the Governor-General von Kaufmann, N. O. Razgon for some reason considered it best to follow only his common sense, thus ignoring the order of his direct superior. He wrote to the Governor-General: "In a letter dated 17/23 Sept. Your Excellency was pleased to say that the Emir should have received an English embassy if war could be avoided, especially since, according to the British, they were sending an embassy to strengthen friendship, and that the Emir did not yet know what they would ask of him. We should not just enter into any obligations with the British. This is exactly what I intended to recommend to the Emir when, after G. M. Stoletov's departure, I became aware of the British embassy being sent to Afghanistan. But as I became more familiar with the state of affairs, I became convinced of the need to reject the arrival of the British mission in Kabul " ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 180]. This is what he advised the Emir.

The situation of N. O. Razgonova was unenviable. The emir, the vizier, and other dignitaries told him bluntly that history was repeating itself: Witkiewicz's trip had caused a clash with England and incalculable sacrifices on our part; you had arrived, we had received you as welcome guests, and the British were knocking at our door again...

8 Subsequently, the Emir, in an interview with Colonel N. O. Razgonov, did not confirm this intention.

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At the end of the ultimatum, without receiving a response from the emir, the British invaded Afghanistan in three columns through the mountain passes.

Further instructions for the mission from Tashkent arrived late and were of the most general nature: "It is necessary to disabuse the Emir of our immediate assistance, and to advise extreme caution in dealing with the British in order to avoid a dangerous encounter. It is desirable to maintain the established good relations between us and the Emir, without giving, however, a pretext for England to establish itself in Afghanistan" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p.163].

The mission members continued to live in their assigned quarters in Bala Hisara. The Cossacks and members of the mission, who had only light clothing (they went to Kabul for two or three months), suffered from the cold; in the rooms where they lived, there were no stoves or fireplaces, and firewood was expensive. Candles for the mission were served under glass caps, as the draughts in the rooms constantly extinguished them. The Emir's fur coats and felted boots were greeted with a joyful " Hurrah!". The isolation of the mission from the city was now considered a blessing: typhoid fever was rampant in Kabul. One Cossack still fell ill, but further spread of the disease was avoided, which can not be said about the fever. First one, then the other, was knocked down by a severe attack. With the outbreak of hostilities, refugees from the western regions of the country flooded into Kabul. This caused first an increase in prices for all goods, then their disappearance and, finally, famine. The attitude of the people of Kabul towards the mission worsened day by day. Cossacks who passed through crowded streets, when they went to check and clean their horses, were insulted by the crowd, they were thrown with sticks. Topographer Bendersky, who went out on the roof of his house to get some fresh air, was almost shot.

The British continued to move inland. The emir and vizier constantly demanded an answer from General Razgonov: where is Stoletov, where is the promised help? Nikolai Osipovich was ready to take command of any part of the Afghan army, to fight on the side of Afghanistan, but he had no answers to the questions of the Afghans. He feared for the fate of the mission in the event of a further British offensive and asked the emir to release them. The vizier replied: "General Stoletov promised us a lot and disappeared like a fish in water! While you are here, there is still hope for your help "[Terentyev, vol. 2,1906, p. 471], i.e. the embassy was already considered by the Afghans as hostages.

At the end of November, the emir announced to General Razgonov that he would soon leave Kabul, and the Russians were to go with him. On December 1, the Emir set out from Kabul with a large group of dignitaries and troops. That same night, the mission left the city under the escort of the Afghan Guard and joined the Emir. Sher Ali Khan was on his way to St. Petersburg to visit the Russian Emperor to request the convening of an international congress to discuss the current situation in relations between Great Britain and Afghanistan. The Emir traveled without haste, as befitted an eastern monarch. Only at the end of the month did the caravan reach Tashkent, where Dr. I. L. Yavorsky joined the Russian embassy. The emir had a strong cough and a sore throat, so he asked to call a doctor from Tashkent who was already familiar to him. On January 5, the Emir and his entourage arrived in Mazar-I-Sharif, and on January 19, Sher Ali finally let the Russian embassy go home. Leaving Dr. Yavorsky and Zaman Bek's interpreter at the Emir's headquarters, the mission, accompanied by several dignitaries and a detachment of Afghan cavalry, headed for Tashkent.

The attitude of the Russians towards the fate of Sher Ali Khan was different depending on how closely they were familiar with the emir himself and with the situation inside Afghanistan. N. G. Stoletov, N. O. Razgon and other members of the mission personally interviewed the Emir, became sympathetic to him, "fell ill" with Afghanistan, and they don't have any

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there was a question whether to help him in this situation. After the first negotiations with the Emir, N. G. Stoletov wrote to K. P. von Kaufmann:

"At present, in the Turkestan district, it is necessary to have considerable detachments of troops (no less than Your Excellency intends to gather) ready in case of emergency, since it seems to me that new relations impose new obligations on us, and, moreover, who can guarantee that the British, having won a victory in the west without war, and having now considerable forces in readiness, they will not want to undertake anything in the East" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 140].

Both Stoletov and Rasgon were ready to fight on the side of the emir, but both were bad diplomats and, finding themselves in a difficult situation at the court of the emir, not having all the information from Russia, they were forced to either keep silent or act at their own risk, giving the emir unsecured promises.

The Governor-General of Turkestan, K. P. von Kaufmann, who considered the situation of Afghanistan in the complex of problems of the entire Central and Central Asia, considered it not only possible, but also necessary to conclude an agreement with the Emir of Iran.. get a protectorate over Afghanistan. But in taking such a step, one cannot help but think of the possibility of a contrary turn of events, i.e., that the British will start a war with Afghanistan; we must then help it. In view of this possibility, it is necessary to strengthen the troops of the Turkestan district..." Kaufman foresaw that in case of refusal, Russia closed the Central Asian theater of operations for a decisive strike against England, since this was possible only if an alliance with Sher Ali Khan was made. "We can hardly be dangerous to England except on condition of a peaceful route from the Amu River to the borders of India," he wrote to the capital.

Perfectly aware of the limited capabilities of the region, which he can have as commander of the Turkestan military district, K. P. von Kaufmann asked to send two infantry divisions with artillery and four regiments of Cossacks to Turkestan ["Big Game"..., 2005, p.155]. This was not Kaufman's first request for an increase in the number of troops in the district ["Big Game"..., 2005, p.83], but, as before, he received a negative answer. After the end of the Eastern War, the treasury was empty, the human losses were huge, so this demand could not but cause the Minister of War a feeling of irritation and annoyance at the annoying petitioner. Despite his repeated requests for permission to travel to the capital, the emperor's permission was never granted.

Most of all, K. P. von Kaufmann was concerned about the resonance that might cause a refusal to help Sher Ali Khan. In his opinion, Russia's prestige in Asia should always remain at its best:

"I am afraid of one thing in all this: if the result of everything that is now being done here is the subjugation of Afghanistan to the influence of England, then we will lose the charm that we acquired in Central Asia, we will lose the boundless faith in us of the peoples and governments surrounding us here. And such respect and trust are acquired slowly and steadily, always by steady, always honest work and politics; but once this trust and respect are shaken, it is not easy to correct it, but it will never reach the height at which it stood, " he wrote in St. Petersburg ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 177].

The Minister of War, Adjutant-General D. A. Milyutin, and the Chancellor, Prince A.M. Gorchakov, had all the information about the international situation and internal problems of Russia and considered the fate of the Afghan Emir in this context. Their main task at that time was to prevent a new war:

"The Sovereign Emperor will not change his firm intention to support the European peace to the last extreme and not allow us to give a reason for a decisive break with England. A clash between us and this Power in Asia would be a signal of a general war.

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and a persistent war under circumstances and circumstances that are extremely unprofitable for us. Supporting the Emir of Afghanistan in the struggle against England would be appropriate only if a break with England became inevitable. This was meant at the beginning of this year, when we were preparing for war. Now there can be no question of any active measures on our part, and if the Emir, having decided to go to war with England, is counting on our material support, then I believe that it was not we, not our embassy in Kabul, who led him into such a delusion " ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 217].

This did not mean that the Russian government did not take any steps to defend the independence of Afghanistan. The Russian Ambassador to the UK, Count Shuvalov, held talks with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, and received assurances from the British side that the sovereignty of Afghanistan will be preserved. Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, in a secret telegram to the Governor-General K. P. Kaufman, ordered to collect needle guns and ammunition for them at points where it would be convenient to send them to Afghanistan, if circumstances so required ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 172].

Later, when Sher Ali Khan left his capital and headed for Tashkent, N. O. Razgon and K. P. von Kaufmann were sure that the government should take advantage of this and, by giving the Emir a decent reception, strengthen our position and prestige in this part of Asia. The attitude of Chancellor A.M. Gorchakov was quite clearly expressed by him in a letter dated January 11, 1879 to K. P. von Kaufmann:

"There is no doubt that the warm and friendly reception extended by the Emir to our embassy in Kabul, and the assurances repeatedly expressed of friendship and boundless devotion to his imperial government, impose on us in some way a moral obligation to repay him with good for good - to give him the same hospitality and the same honor when he enters our borders, what services they provided to our embassy. By doing so, we will give him the moral support that he expects from us, as you say in your letter, and which, in the eyes of the emir himself and other Central Asian rulers, will serve as the best proof that the Russian government does not abandon to the mercy of fate people who are loyal to it and seek its protection and patronage... Prudence demands first, before assuming any obligations to the Emir of Afghanistan, waiting for an explanation of many circumstances that hitherto seem not quite clear, it is necessary to highlight the state of affairs in Afghanistan that preceded the departure of the Emir from his possessions."

He goes on to say that Emir Sher Ali was not well liked or liked by his people; before the war, there was a party that sought to overthrow him from the throne, and the loyalty of his son, Yaqub Khan, who was left behind in Kabul, is extremely doubtful. Under these circumstances, it can be assumed that the position of the Emir himself was extremely precarious and that he decided to leave his state in anticipation of his imminent overthrow. Then "... we would have a nominal ruler of Afghanistan on our hands, devoid of any significance in his country, who could become a hindrance for us rather than a tool for achieving any political goals" ["Big Game"..., 2005, p.240].

Such a development could only complicate the already difficult relations between Russia and the United Kingdom. The Russian government's attitude to the Afghan issue was shaped by the balance of power not so much in Asia as in Europe. Therefore, the first reaction was to try to dissuade the emir from his intention to go to Russia. Later, however, it was decided to give the Emir a decent reception in Tashkent ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 237].

On January 16, Dr. Yavorsky was summoned to see Sher Ali Khan: the emir's existing illnesses were supplemented by pain in his leg. The first examination of the leg did not make it possible to make a diagnosis. Soon it became clear to I. L. Yavorsky that Sher Ali Khan had a blood clot on his back.-

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gangrene developed. The only option was to have the leg amputated, but permission was not granted, and Emir Sher Ali Khan died on February 8. [9]

Thus ended the Russian military-diplomatic mission to the court of the Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali Khan. In the report of the Governor-General K. P. von Kaufmann to the Minister of War on awarding the members of the mission, it was said about their "useful service activities ... and the tireless work, hardships and dangers experienced by them in carrying out the assignment assigned to them", it was noted that "during the journey, a route survey was made and a detailed description of the entire area covered during too 1300 versts, and various information was collected and a beautiful numismatic collection of very ancient coins, including 110 different copies." Having really assessed everything that fell to the share of all the embassy officials, it was decided to count the time spent as part of the mission as a military campaign, i.e. twice as much ["Big Game"..., 2005, p. 276]. A few years later, the diaries of Dr. I. L. Yavorsky were published-a truthful and colorful description of everything he experienced, the first reader's acquaintance with Afghanistan in Russian.

The establishment of friendly, good-neighborly relations between the two countries, which the mission was supposed to promote, did not happen, because, willingly or unwittingly, it became a pretext for the British to open hostilities. During the second Anglo-Afghan war, the emir, without receiving the expected help, lost his throne, and then his life, and all the hardships that no war can do without fell to the lot of his subjects, along with defeats and victories.

list of literature

The "Big Game" in Central Asia: the "Indian Campaign" of the Russian Army. Collection of archival documents, Moscow, 2005.

Department of Written Sources of the State Historical Museum (OPI GIM). F. 307.

Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 1396. O. 2. D. 2195.

Russian-Indian relations in the 19th century Collection of archival documents and materials, Moscow, 1997.

Terentyev M. A. Istoriya obedianiya Srednoi Azii [History of the Conquest of Central Asia], vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1906.

Yavorsky I. L. Journey of the Russian Embassy in Afghanistan and the Bukhara Khanate in 1878-1879"". Vol. 1-2. St. Petersburg, 1882-1883.

National Archives of India (NAI). Foreign Department.

9 I. L. Yavorsky and Zaman Beg left Mazar-I-Sharif a few days after the emir's death and went to Bukhara, as the Emir of Bukhara, Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, was unwell and asked the Governor-General, K. P. von Kaufmann, to send Ivan Lavrovich, whom he knew personally, to him. The doctor and interpreter returned to Tashkent on March 25, 1879.

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