The collapse of the Golden Horde led to a radical change in the political situation and balance of power in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Muscovite State joined the struggle for supremacy in Eastern Europe. The owners of the Golden Horde, which was formed in the second half of the 15th century, also claimed the heritage of the Golden Horde. The Crimean Khanate (see Iskhakov, 2004; Nekrasov, 1999; Khoroshkevich, 2001). They were supported not only by the descent of the Crimean Khans from Genghis Khan himself, but also by the powerful military force that was in the hands of the Girei. The huge role played by the armed forces in the history of the Crimean Khanate is beyond doubt. It cannot be said that the problem of studying the peculiarities of the formation and development of the armed forces of the Crimean Khanate was not of interest to domestic and foreign researchers. In recent years, several papers have been published on this issue (see [Dmitriev, 2003; Ishchenko, 1989, et al.]). However, the study of this problem, as well as the history of the Crimean Khanate in general, is at the very beginning after a long period of oblivion. To date, we do not have a more or less clear idea of what the Tatar army of the late XV-XVII centuries was like. The popular idea of the Crimean army as a "thousand-numbered" army of poorly armed horsemen, capable only of looting and beating unarmed Ukrainian and Russian villagers, is in clear contradiction with the important role played by the Crimean Khanate in the history of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe of the late Middle Ages-early Modern times, while the Crimean Khanate played a significant role in the history of when the real weight of the state in the system of political relations was determined primarily by the size of its military potential.

Starting with the analysis of the peculiarities of the development of the military affairs of the Crimean Khanate, we proceeded from the definition of the structure of the state's military power formulated by the American researcher S. Huntington. He wrote that the latter " ... has four dimensions: quantitative-the number of people, weapons, equipment and resources; technological-the effectiveness and degree of perfection of weapons and equipment; organizational - the coherence, discipline, training and morale of troops, as well as the effectiveness of command and control; and public - the ability and desire of society to effectively use the military equipment." military force (emphasis added - V. P.)... " [Huntington, 2003, p. 126].

We will start with an attempt to determine the quantitative parameters of the military potential of the Crimean Khanate. It is difficult not to agree with the opinion of A. L. Khoroshkevich, who noted that "... the absolute population figures of the Crimean Khanate are being restored with great difficulty " [Khoroshkevich, 2001, p. 92]. Especially this remark is just-

This paper was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Natural Sciences (grant N 07 - 01 - 55102 a / C) and Bel.State University (intra-university grant 2007).

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It was not until the initial period of the history of the Crimean Khanate, when censuses of the population of the Crimea were apparently not carried out by Khan officials. It is only much later that some information about the population of the khanate appears, but the range of opinions regarding how many inhabitants lived in the Crimea is still very significant. D. M. Iskhakov, for example, believed that the population of the Crimean Khanate during the first Girei ranged from 300 to 600 thousand people [Iskhakov, 2004, pp. 34-36]. A number of other researchers, using fragmentary data on population censuses conducted under the last khans, and the results of audits of the late XVIII century, believe that in the early 80s of the XVIII century under the rule of the Crimean Khan there were from 250-300 thousand to about 430 thousand or a little more people [Aibabin, Herzen, Khrapunov, 1993, p. 217; Andreev, 1997, p. 168; Roslavtseva, 2008, p. 32]. These figures are more accurate and can be used as a basis for further calculations. There is no doubt that during the three centuries of the Crimean Khanate's existence, its population should have grown, and given that by this time the way of managing the Crimean Tatars had changed significantly compared to the initial period of the Khanate's history, it can be assumed that for most of the XVI century, the Crimean Khans could not have been much more than 250 thousand people.

Let's try to check whether this assumption is true. As a basis for calculations, we will take the data reported by contemporaries on the number of Tatar armies in individual campaigns and the estimated productivity of pastures in both the Crimea itself and the Northern Black Sea region, as well as the well-known norms for conscription of men into the Khan's army.

Almost a common place in historical writings with the light hand of some contemporaries was the attribution to the Crimean khans of the ability, if necessary, to put an army of almost 100 thousand, or even 200 thousand horsemen in the field (see [Boplan, 2004, p. 227; Gorsey, 1990, p. 56; Madaryaga I. de, 2007, p. 364, 172; Fletcher, 1991, p. 90; Yavornitsky, 1991, p. 320]). The numbers are more than impressive, but how real are they? Let's assume that the Crimean khans could actually field so many soldiers and these figures can be used to calculate the population of the Crimean Khanate. The norms by which Kettlebells recruited their troops are known. Ottoman writer of the second half of the 17th century. Huseyn Hezarfenn noted that when the Crimean khan was going on a campaign, "... then /every / seven people put out one and allocate a pair of horses... " [Hezarfenn, 1990, p.269]. Most modern experts agree that for nomads in the case of total mobilization, the ratio of the number of soldiers deployed to the total population was approximately 1 to 5 (see [Kradin, 2002, p.71-72; Pletneva, 1990, p. 79, 114]). Consequently, the total population of the Crimean Khanate in the XVI - first half of the XVII century was at least 500 thousand, or even 1 million people, which is clearly not true. We will correct these data by calculating the biological productivity of the steppe [Kradin, 2002, pp. 78-79]. Calculations show that while maintaining a purely nomadic way of life, the Crimean steppe itself could feed no more than 25-30 thousand nomads.

It is noteworthy that if we apply to the obtained figure the norms of conscription of soldiers given above, then the data obtained almost completely coincide with the information reported by the Venetian traveler and diplomat I. Barbaro. He wrote that the Tatars who lived in the steppe on the "island of Kafa", if necessary, can put up from 3 to 4 thousand horsemen [Barbaro and Contarini, 1971, p. 155]. On the insufficiency of the Crimean Khan's own resources at the beginning of the XVI century. The materials of diplomatic correspondence between Crimea and Moscow also indirectly testify. So, in the summer of 1501, in the midst of a confrontation between Mengli Giray and his main opponent, the khan of the Great Horde Shig-Akhmet, the Crimean khan demanded from his ally, the Moscow sovereign Ivan III, that he send a 10,000-strong army to help him.

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And since Shig-Akhmet had an army of approximately 20,000 men, Mengli-Giray himself had much less strength and did not seek to fight Shig-Akhmet alone [Khoroshkevich, 2001, p. 155]. (Cf. the message of the Moscow ambassador to the Crimea I. Mamonov that in the summer of 1501"...the tsars 'armies are now being slaughtered in half a hundred thousand ..." [Monuments..., 1884, p. 368]). These data are either overstated or, more likely, reflect the approximate maximum forces that Mengli-Giray could put up in the event of a total mobilization of everything and everything]). Therefore, it is clear why in the events of 1501-1502. Mengli-Giray took a wait-and - see attitude, not joining the battle with the army of Shig-Ahmet and why Ivan III in the fight against the Great Horde made a bet on the Crimean khan-he was less strong, and therefore not as dangerous an opponent as the children of Ahmet.

About half a century passed, and the Lithuanian writer and publicist Wenceslav Mikolaevich (better known as Michalon Litvin) wrote that the Crimean khan, with the total mobilization of all men who can hold weapons in their hands, can put up an army of 30 thousand horsemen. At the same time, he emphasized that the population of the Crimean Khanate has significantly increased in comparison with previous times [Litvin, 1994, p.65-66]. Indeed, after Mengli-Giray defeated Shig-Akhmet in a stubborn struggle in the early 16th century, most of the uluses that had previously been subordinate to his opponent migrated to the winner (Zaitsev, 2004, p. 100-105; Khoroshkevich, 2001, p. 92k-93, 153 - 158, 162 - 163]. Along with the primacy, most of the lands and pastures previously controlled by the Khans of the Great Horde also passed to the Crimea. Applying formulas for calculating the bio-productivity of pastures to the new possessions of the Crimean khans, we find that by the end of Mengli-Giray's reign, the number of his subjects could have approached 200 thousand people, i.e. (taking into account the errors that are inevitable in such calculations) generally fits into the above-mentioned conscription norms.

In the future, the population of the Crimea inevitably had to grow, especially since under the successors of Mengli-Giray, the transition of the Tatars to a semi-sedentary, and then sedentary lifestyle was outlined. Tradition attributes special merits to the sixth Crimean Khan Sahib-Giray I, son of Mengli-Giray (Smirnov, 2005, p. 312). Accordingly, the number of Tatar troops grew. Thus, in the course of repelling the raid of the Crimean army led by Khan Devlet-Giray I in 1555, Moscow warriors captured the khan's camp with a wagon train (kosh) and 60 thousand horses [Nikonovskaya Chronicle, 2000, p. 257]. It is known that each Tatar warrior, when going on a campaign, led at least two spare horses (Boplan, 2004, p. 231). Based on the text of the chronicle, it can be assumed that, heading with his army to Tula and assuming to meet the Russian army there, the Khan left extra horses in the camp (it is inconvenient to join the battle with spare horses on the lead) and that these spare horses were captured by the Russians. It follows that about 30 thousand people participated in the campaign. Tatar warriors. And since it was, apparently, an ordinary campaign, which did not have its goal, as in 1571. (according to the Livonian chronicler B. Ryussov, 40 thousand Tatars took part in this campaign [Ryussov, 1879, p. 205]), the total crushing of the enemy, then most likely the khan recruited soldiers according to the "usual" rate indicated by Khezarfennes. It follows that under the rule of the khan there were about 210 thousand or slightly more Tatars proper. Considering that among the Tatars, as ordinary nomads, every adult male was a potential warrior [Thunmann, 1991, p. 24; Khazanov, 2006, p. 475], it can be assumed that in the middle of the XVI century, the Crimean khan could put up to 40-50 thousand men in the field during the total mobilization of all combat - ready men. warriors. According to the data given by V. Ostapchuk, who referred to the Tatar chronicle of Remmal Khoja, in 1539, during a campaign to the Kuban, special officials of Khan Sahib-Giray listed 40 thousand soldiers. The Ottoman historian Ibrahim Efendi Pecevi, describing the participation of the Tatars in the Hungarian campaign of 1594, wrote that no more than 30 - 40 thousand horsemen arrived with him in the Ottoman camp [Ostapchuk, 2001, p. 405; Smirnov, 2005, p. 333]. With uche-

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in addition to the contingents put up by the Khan's vassals, the Crimean army could have had more soldiers.

Thus, the figure given by some authors for the second half of the XVI - first half of the XVII centuries of 40-60 thousand soldiers (taking into account allies and vassals), which the Crimean Kettlebells could have in large campaigns, seems to reflect the real reality [Kargalov, 2002, p. 47-48; Skrynnikov, 1986, p. 46]. It is noteworthy that A. L. Khoroshkevich cites information from the archives of the Roman Curia, according to which in 1561 the khan, exhausted by the war with the Muscovites (sic!), could put up from 30 to 40 thousand horsemen against Ivan IV [Khoroshkevich, 2003, p.261]. However, it is unlikely that the khans could really put so many soldiers under their banners. For example, the Russian ambassador Ivan Sudakov in May 1588 reported that the Khan "twisted" when he learned that " Murat-Kirei Tsarevich z brat will be alone this summer on the Crimea war, and the sovereign of Moscow gave them Streltsy and Cossacks fifty-fifty thousand with a concave battle yes from the Volga yes from the Don Cossacks five thousand ... " [Article list..., 1891, p. 58 - 59]. Thus, 25 thousand Russian military men with a "concave battle", reinforced by Tatar cavalry, introduced the Crimean " tsar "to the"kruchina". And this was at the end of the XVI century, when the Crimean Khanate was more populous and stronger than at the beginning of the century! Therefore, we can assume that 40-60 thousand people is the upper limit of the number of the Crimean army, which could be reached only with the maximum tension of all the forces of the khanate. In reality, as a rule, many fewer horsemen participated in the campaigns - the same Ivan Sudakov reported that in February 1588 the Khan set out on a campaign to Ukraine with an army of 18 thousand horsemen and 500 Turkish janissaries from Kafa [Article List..., 1891, p. 68].

Is it too much or too little? For comparison, the total number of the Moscow army under Vasily III was about 90 thousand people, of which up to 50 thousand warriors could be involved in the field at the same time. At the beginning of the 60s of the XVI century, the field army of the Moscow tsar was (provided that it was concentrated in one strategic direction) a maximum of about 70-75 thousand people, and the entire army - up to 100 thousand military people or a little more [Penskoi, 2008, pp. 7-8, 11].

Now we will touch upon the technological aspect of the military power of the Crimean Khanate. There is a lot of contemporary evidence regarding the weapons and appearance of the soldiers of the Crimean Khanate. "Their weapons consist in bows and arrows; their spears are rare...", - the imperial ambassador S. Herberstein wrote at the beginning of the XVI century. and further emphasized that the Tatars evade close combat, unable to withstand it, " ... without a shield, spear, or helmet...". Following the ancient tradition of Herberstein, Michalon Litvin, in a polemical fervor, further sharpens this characteristic of the Tatar warrior. He informed his readers that the Tatar soldiers," ... .They were equipped according to their custom, many of them unarmed, and scarcely a tenth or twentieth of them carried a quiver or javelin, and there were still fewer in their armor; but some at least were armed with sticks of bone, others with sticks of wood, and still others with empty scabbards at their belts. Shields and spears and other similar weapons they do not know at all...". Interestingly, the Italian A. Contarini spoke in much the same spirit about arming the soldiers of the Great Horde much earlier.

A few more years passed, and the Englishman J. Fletcher wrote: "They (Tatars - P. V.)... all go out on horses and have nothing with them except a bow, a quiver with arrows and a curved saber in the manner of the Turkish... Some, in addition to other weapons, take with them pikes, similar to slingshots, with which they go to bears. A common warrior does not wear any other armor than his normal clothing... But the Murz, or nobles, imitate the Turks both in dress and in weapons...". Finally, after another half-century, the Frenchman G. L. de Beauplan, describing the appearance of Tatar soldiers, noted that " ... they are armed with a saber, a bow with a quiver equipped with 18-20 arrows, a knife in their belt... Only

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the richest wear chain mail, while the rest, in the absence of such, go to war [consider] naked... "[Barbaro and Contarini, 1971, p. 224; Boplan, 2004, p. 219-221; Herberstein, 2002, p. 257, 258; Litvin, 1994, p. 66; Fletcher, 1991, p. 91].

All contemporaries emphasized the extreme ease of arming an ordinary Tatar warrior and, at the same time, the desire of noble and rich soldiers to follow the Turkish tradition in using armor. It is obvious that the Crimean Tatars practically abandoned the direct following of the Late Horde military tradition. Nothing like the detachments of heavily armed mounted men-at-arms on horses, also dressed in armor, which were available in the Golden Horde army of the XIV-early XV centuries. [Gorelik, 1983], we do not meet. The Crimean Tatars also had a small number of" medium-armed " (according to the classification of L. A. Bobrov) plate cavalry, which was so characteristic of the Central and Central Asian armies of that time (Bobrov, 2007). Apparently, the Crimean Tatar complex of defensive and offensive weapons completely and completely fit into the rapidly developing and in the first quarter of the XVI century. almost completed the formation of a single West Asian, or Russian-Muslim, according to LA. Bobrov [Bobrov, 2004; Bobrov 2003; Pink, 2004], a complex of weapons with the only difference that the Crimean Tatars did not have armored cavalry in any serious quantities and the light cavalry of archers left the basis of the army. The standard set of weapons of an ordinary Tatar warrior at this time was, apparently, a saadak, saber and knife, and for protection, soft, quilted armor of the type of the well-known Russian tehilya and similar protective headboards were most likely used. The nobles and elite soldiers from the Khan's retinue (for the latter, see [Bronevsky, 1867, p.362, 367]) were armed, as noted above, according to the Turkish model (for the complex of weapons of rich Tatar soldiers, see [Bronevsky, 1867, p. 366]). It is possible that in some cases, noble and rich warriors could also use horse armor - quilted blankets and masks.

The lightweight armament complex of the Tatar soldiers obviously did not arise by chance. Initially, when the Crimean Tatar state was still being formed, the khans and nobles inevitably had to face a serious problem of providing the bulk of ordinary soldiers with high-quality and at the same time cheap armor and weapons. The defeat of the Golden Horde by Timur and the subsequent degradation of its urban culture led to a significant reduction in the production of weapons and armor in the Horde itself (indirectly evidenced by the above words of A. Contarini about the quality of weapons of the Horde soldiers at the end of the XV century). The import of weapons from abroad was, apparently, rather limited. The process of completing the creation of the Crimean Khanate and forming its own urban culture with a developed craft almost coincided with the rapid development of firearms and the decline in the value of defensive armor. This led to his relief and complete disappearance. The best defense against the growing firepower of the main opponents, Tatars, Russians, Poles and Lithuanians, was the mobility and maneuverability of the Crimean armies, achieved by all available means.

Firearms were not widely distributed among the Tatars during the period under review. Of course, it would be a mistake to assume, as J. Gorsey does [Gorsey, 1990, pp. 70-71], that the Tatars did not know him at all. Fighting the Russians and Lithuanians, they were well aware of what cannons, arquebuses, and muskets were, and what was the advantage of those who possessed them over those who did not. Already under Sahib Giray, the Khan's guard included detachments of infantry - (Tyufengchi), recruited from Circassian slaves and the local sedentary population, with a total number of 200 to 1000 people. They were armed and trained on the model and likeness of the Turkish Janissaries (apparently, in the service of the Crimean Khan, the Turkish infantry appeared at the end of the XV century. [Monuments..., 1884, p. 105]). Units of hired shooters from this site

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They became an obligatory component of the army of the Crimean khans [Bronevsky, 1867, p. 365, 367; Ostapchuk, 2001, p. 402-403; Smirnov, 2005, p. 307, 313; Senai, 1998, p. 32, 47; Thunmann, 1991, p.24]. Around this time, the Khan's army also included light field artillery [Bronevsky, 1867, p. 367; Nikonovskaya letopis, 2000, p. 139, 257, 258; Ostapchuk, 2001, p. 403]. The very artillery of the Krymchaks appeared even under Mengli-Giray. As early as 1502, while preparing for a campaign against the Khan of the Great Horde, Mengli-Giray, according to the Russian ambassador I. Mamonov, among other things " ... took with him the cannons...". However, these cannons, as well as the gunners, were, apparently, Turkish [Monuments..., 1884, pp. 378, 379, 417].

However, artillery, match and wheel arquebuses, muskets and pistols, which took a strong place in the armies of Western, Central and Eastern Europe, were too cumbersome, unreliable, had an unimportant rate of fire compared to the traditional bow, and not so superior to it in terms of penetration power that it was possible to abandon its use. The traditional Tatar bow was at least as effective as, if not better than, hand-held firearms. In any case, G. de Beauplan noted the skill of Tatar shooters, who "... shoot so accurately with a bow that at a distance of 60-100 paces they do not miss their target, and with mounted salvo shooting they send their arrows to a distance twice as large as the reach of Cossack hand guns " [Beauplan, 2004, p. 245, 251]. On the armor-piercing qualities and accuracy of archery, see [Nikonorov and Khudyakov, 2004, pp. 195, 197]. The rate of fire of archers was also significantly higher, especially in short-lived battles. The only advantage of the musket over the bow at that time was the ability to train a good marksman faster, while it took years of hard work and regular training to become an excellent archer. But this did not frighten the Tatars, because the words of M. V. Gorelik are quite applicable to them, who noted that " ... the widespread use of the bow, the presence of a large contingent of good archers are possible primarily in a society in which hunting and pastoral cattle breeding are developed, and social relations are characterized by a fairly high degree of individual freedom from labor that requires exhausting work. in relation to the authorities, which allowed him to have leisure for training, hunting, etc... "[Gorelik, 1993, p. 78-79]; (for the training of Tatar archers, see [Boplan, 2004, p. 215]).

Given the equestrian nature of the army of the Crimean Khanate, it is impossible not to say a few words about the combat horses of the Tatar soldiers. Contemporaries unanimously praised Tatar horses for their endurance and adaptability to local conditions [Gerberstein, 2002, p. 257; Litvin, 1994, p. 75]. True, the advantages of Tatar horses were the reverse side of their shortcomings. They were distinguished from European dogs by their shorter stature (an average of 131.9 cm at the withers [Kozhevnikov and Gurevich, 1990, p. 14-15]) and therefore were not able to carry a heavily armed, heavily armored rider. The Tatars had few good, powerful horses. Thus, in the already mentioned episode with the capture of the Khan's kosh by Russian soldiers in 1555, only 200 argamaks fell into their hands [Nikonovskaya Chronicle, 2000, p. 257].

Having analyzed the technical side of Tatar military affairs, it is impossible not to dwell on its organizational component. The structure of the Crimean army, apparently, remained quite traditional. Apparently, the army of the Crimean Khanate included three main components: the personal Khan's guard, which included both the Ottoman contingent and detachments of riflemen recruited from the inhabitants of the Crimea, and artillery; running squads and militia, called up in the event of a large campaign from among ordinary Tatar men aged 15 to 70 years.. To the Tatar army proper, contingents were added that were put up by the khan's vassals [Bronevsky, 1867, p. 365, 367; Nikonovskaya letopis, 2000, p. 138; Ostapchuk, 2001, p. 402; Smirnov, 2005, p.307, 313, 345]. The organization of the army was based on the decimal principle [Boplan, 2004, p. 223].

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What were the tactics of the Crimean Tatars? An analysis of available materials shows that it was more complex than usually presented, and at the same time it differed from the former Horde model of the XIV - early XV centuries. Therefore, S. A. Ishchenko's phrase that the Crimean khans preserved almost unchanged Horde traditions related to the specifics of military operations [Ishchenko, 1989, p. 138], it doesn't seem quite correct. There were changes, and they were quite serious. The traditional scheme of action of nomadic cavalry on the battlefield, which had been honed for centuries and included three main phases: archery, shock strike of heavy and medium cavalry "in spears", and finishing off a running enemy with cold weapons (Bobrov, 2002, p. 96; Gorelik, 1995, p. 381), no longer worked, since the composition of the cavalry was reduced to two stages: the offensive and defensive armament of the Crimean Tatars has changed. At best, only two of the three phases remain - the first and last. And the Tatar cavalry itself most likely operated on the battlefield in mixed battle formations - the first rank of the combat formation was occupied by better armed and protected soldiers, and the rest of the Tatars were formed up behind them [Bobrov, 2007, pp. 77-79].

At the same time, under the influence of the Turks, in the second quarter of the 16th century, the Crimean Tatars adopted the classic Ottoman Destur-i-Rumi order of battle, the core of which was Wagenburg-a camp of carts (zarbuzan Arabalary) equipped with light artillery (falkonets-zarbuzan), inside which there were tyufengchi riflemen (Ostapchuk, 2001, pp. 402-403, 405-406]. The following phrase from the letter of I. Mamonov gives an idea of the size of the Crimean wagon train in large campaigns. The Russian ambassador wrote that, preparing for a campaign against the Great Horde, Mengli-Giray " ... ordered all his people to be ready to be... and to feed the horses, and five men had a cart, and each man had three horses, and if the feed were different, five men would have two oxen each..."[Monuments../, 1884, p. 378]. It cannot be ruled out that Sahib Giray made this step under the influence of the heavy defeat that the Crimean Tatars suffered from the Nogais in 1523 [Zaitsev, 2006, pp. 91-96].

These changes led to the fact that the tactics of the Crimean Tatars changed in comparison with the classical Horde model and varied depending on the enemy with whom they had to deal, and on the purpose of the campaign. Destur-i-Rumi was successfully used by Sahib Giray against the Nogais and Circassians in the 1940s of the 16th century. A characteristic phrase of one of the Circassian princes, uttered by him in 1551, when he learned about the upcoming campaign of Sahib Giray: "The Khan, they say, is going to rob us... He is strong with his guns (emphasis added-P. V.), and my guns and squeakers are steep mountains and fast horses..."[Nekrasov, 1990, p. 110]. However, the attempts of the Nogais and Circassians to resist the Crimean army, which had even a few (no more than a thousand) infantrymen armed with hand firearms and light artillery, invariably ended in failure. This was the case in 1545 during the Crimean army's campaign against the Circassians, in 1546, when the Tatar army took Astrakhan, and when repelling the Nogai raid on the Crimea in 1548 [Zaitsev, 2006, p. 140; Nekrasov, 1990, p. 107; Ostapchuk, 2001, p. 406].

At the same time, the Tatars rarely used infantry and artillery in their campaigns against the Russians, Lithuanians, and Poles, and if they did appear on the battlefield, they usually failed, as in 1541 and 1552 [Nikonovskaya Chronicle, 2000, pp. 138-139, 189-190]. So, in the campaign of 1552, the Khan had 18 cannons, but all of them were lost during the unsuccessful siege of Tula [Acts..., 2008, pp. 222-223]. The technical and numerical superiority of the Russians, Lithuanians, and Poles, who relied on a much more developed industry, made it meaningless for the Tatars to compete in these new branches of the armed forces. In addition, the Ottomans, attracting Tatars from the second half of the XVI century. to participate in their campaigns, assigned them the role of lightly armed horsemen-Akinci, whose tasks included primarily reconnaissance and devastation of enemy territories. Destour-i-Rumi and a large train were not needed for this purpose. Apparently, not by chance-

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chayno in the second half of the XVI century. the bet was finally made on speed, maneuver and wear down the enemy while avoiding hand-to-hand combat until the enemy runs.

Considering the devastation of enemy lands and the capture of Yasyr as their main goal, and avoiding a direct clash with the enemy, the Tatars paid great attention to reconnaissance - and the preliminary opening of the campaign, during the campaign itself [Bronevsky, 1867, p.361-362, 363; Vigener, 1890, p. 81-82]. There is a lot of contemporary evidence about the organization and conduct of a typical Tatar campaign for Yasyr to the "north", to Ukraine or to Russia. For example, M. Bronevsky and G. de Boplan wrote about this (the latter's description of the Tatar campaign became a classic one) [Bronevsky, 1867, p. 362-363; Boplan, 2004, p.227-235].

However, if the Crimean commanders felt that the advantage was on their side, the terrain favored the actions of their light cavalry and there were high chances of victory (or the enemy forced the Tatars to fight), they decided to fight. But even in these cases, they tried to act in such a way as to use their main trump cards with the greatest efficiency - speed, maneuver and massive archery. "They very boldly enter into battle with the enemy from afar," S. Herberstein noted, describing the tactical techniques characteristic of the Tatars, " this, however, is not long: they turn into a feigned flight and, seizing a convenient moment, shoot arrows back at the pursuing enemies, then, suddenly turning their horses, again attack the enemy. scattered ranks of enemies. When they are fighting in an open field and the enemy is within a spear's reach, they do not enter the battle in orderly rows, but circle around the enemy's army, wrapping them around on all sides so that they can throw their spears more accurately and freely. They come and go in an amazing order... This kind of battle, from its resemblance to dancing, is called among them a dance..."[Herberstein, 2002, p. 257 - 258].

The above excerpt perfectly describes the main and most characteristic tactics of the Tatars. And if we analyze the evidence of contemporaries about the organization of campaigns and actions of Tatar detachments on the battlefield, then there is no trace of the prevailing opinion about the disorganization and disorder of the Tatar army. Indeed, in order to maneuver in the way described above on the battlefield, outstanding training and discipline are required for both ordinary soldiers and military leaders, starting with foremen. Withdrawal, re-formation, and change of attacking units were necessary, if only because the supply of arrows in the quivers was limited. In any case, Timur's instructions stipulated that a warrior should go on a campaign with 30 arrows in his quiver [Mirkhond, 2007, p. 17]. The discipline of the Tatars and their willingness to obey the orders of their superiors were emphasized by many contemporaries [Bronevsky, 1867, p. 366-367; Vigener, 1890, p. 82].

But it was not only iron discipline that turned the Tatars into dangerous opponents. They practically did not know regular military training and drill, which at this time was gradually being introduced in European armies. However, the absence of the latter was more than compensated for by the extensive experience of making regular raids and the "involvement" of both ordinary Tatar soldiers and command staff in the war. For example, G. de Boplan wrote about this vividly and figuratively, emphasizing the coherence of the actions of even the smallest detachments of Tatar soldiers [Boplan, 2004, p. 245, 249, 251]. It was this "involvement" and "habit" to war that reduced the "general friction" that was dangerous and negatively affecting the combat capability of any army, which the Prussian military theorist K. von Clausewitz saw in the lack of development of the military machine and its individual elements [Clausewitz, 2002, pp. 116-117].

The habit of war and discipline, vast experience, willingness to endure all the hardships of war, excellent ability to wield their main weapon, bow, excellent riding skills made the Tatars an extremely dangerous opponent.

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It should also be added that the Tatars themselves lived in a natural fortress. Hundreds of kilometers of arid and deserted steppe were much better protection for the Krymchaks from Russians, Poles and Lithuanians than fortress walls and ramparts. For a long time, the Tatars, and not their opponents, chose the time and place to strike, the Tatars, and not their enemies, had the initiative and imposed their will and their battle pattern on the enemy. And if the Krymchaks did not make mistakes in deployment and during military operations, then it was extremely difficult to deal with them. As G. de Boplan aptly noted, the war with the Tatars was won by the more cunning, not the stronger one, and it was difficult to compete in cunning and ability to conduct a small war with the Tatars [Boplan, 2004, p. 249].

And now about the latter - about the ability and desire of the Tatar society to effectively use military force. The militancy of the Tatars, their desire and willingness to fight were emphasized by all their contemporaries [Vigener, 1890, p. 81]. Founded by sabre, the Crimean Khanate maintained its existence by sabre. However, was the militancy of the Crimean Tatars their innate quality or a necessary condition for the existence of their society and state? Interesting observations that allow us to answer this question were made by N. N. Kradin, who noted the existence of a certain dependence of nomads on farmers [Kradin, 2001, pp. 95-96]. This fact was also pointed out by other experts [Barfield, 2006, p.429; Khazanov, 2006, p. 470-472; Hall, 2006, p. 451]. Meanwhile, agricultural societies, differing from nomadic ones by their greater autarkic nature and self-sufficiency, did not feel much desire to enter into economic and other contacts with the nomadic world. The latter, needing farmers, saw their attempts to isolate themselves from the nomadic world as a desire to defend their independence, ethnic and cultural identity. Given the militarized nature of nomadic societies and the characteristic "barbarian" ethos inherent in them, as well as in many other peoples at a similar "barbaric" stage of development, it is not difficult to predict the behavior of Tatars towards their neighbors. Raids on the latter, especially the northern ones, provided them with what they lacked, gave them additional income, satisfied their passion for "predation", and contributed to the survival of the Tatars in the event of an economic crisis. Do not forget that the confrontation of the Crimea with Russia, Lithuania or Poland was also religious in nature. All this gave Crimea's relations with its northern neighbors the character of particularly fierce hostility. As noted by the prominent Russian military theorist and historian N. P. Mikhnevich, "... wars of one-cultural peoples are always more or less indecisive; wars of different cultures are always fatal... " [Mikhnevich, 1911, p.38].

These are the main and most characteristic features of the development of military affairs in the Crimean Khanate in the late Middle Ages and early Modern times. The Crimean Tatars, as a society "organized for war" (as the Russian historian M. V. Nechitailov aptly put it in relation to medieval Spain), managed to create an effective military machine, which until the beginning of the XVIII century posed a serious threat to their neighbors. It was only after the military revolution in Europe resulted in the emergence of massive regular armies, well-equipped with upgraded firearms and well-trained, that the military power of the Crimean Khanate was broken, and the Khanate itself lost its independence.

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