This article attempts to compare the main parameters of two politically critical years in the Middle East, with a half - century's distance between them-1958 and 2008. As a matter of fact, there have always been enough crisis years in the history of the Middle East, but these two important years belonging to different eras reveal both fundamental differences and surprising similarities when compared.

Why is there any reason to think that 2008 will go down in the history of the region as a crisis? After all, at the time of writing this article, it did not have such vividly significant and tense events as those that happened half a century ago. There are several reasons for this, which will be discussed below. The situation in both 1958 and 2008 is characterized primarily by the aggravation of old and the emergence of new "nodes of tension", the conflict between different approaches to world politics - unilateral and collective, the acute rivalry of global players and attempts by regional leaders to manipulate this rivalry.

MILESTONE EVENTS OF 1958

As for 1958, its main milestones that changed the political contours of the Middle East region were, first of all, the formation of the United Arab Republic as part of Egypt and Syria (although it did not last long), the civil war in Lebanon and the July anti-monarchist revolution in Iraq. According to Leila Fawaz, an American professor of diplomacy, "Middle East experts consider 1958 to be one of the most important dates of the twentieth century" (Fawaz, 2002). At that time, the region was gradually becoming the scene of a "zero - sum game" between two superpowers and two world systems, the USSR and local communism were perceived as the main opponents by the West, Israel and pro-Western regimes, and the next most important threat for them was just becoming a new powerful growing force-Arab nationalism.

At first, many politicians in the United States and Israel did not see the Arab radical nationalists as their enemies, a force that would certainly focus on the main enemy-the USSR. These views were largely determined by the anti-communist sentiments of nationalist leaders. Recall that immediately after the anti-monarchical revolution of "Free Officers" in Egypt, American intelligence established a channel of communication with them, and CIA Director Allen Dulles, who sympathized with Gamal Abdel Nasser, believed that he and Arab nationalists like him had a future in the Arab world. E. M. Primakov, who is deeply versed in the vicissitudes of Middle East politics, writes that at the same time

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time in the leadership of "Free Officers "" the idea of cooperation with the United States prevailed "[Primakov, 2006, p. 29]. Nasser hoped to receive weapons from the United States, but negotiations with the Americans in 1954 ended in failure for him. When, in 1955, Nasser made his first deal to buy Soviet weapons, which could have had a negative impact on Western attitudes towards him, CIA officers, who served as the main channel of his confidential communication with Washington and were concerned about his reputation, advised Nasser (according to declassified documents) to make a public statement that the weapons were not received by the United States. from the USSR, and from the Czechoslovak SSR, and include in it a passage prepared by them about the Egyptian-Israeli detente. Contrary to other American advice, Nasser took part in the Bandung conference in 1955, where the Non - Aligned Movement was born - with the active role of Egypt-and in the same year refused to join the Baghdad Pact created on the initiative of the British with the support of the United States. Despite his promise to London, the West-friendly King of Jordan, Hussein, also refused to join the pact, which the West also saw as Nasser's machinations. The British thought that under the influence of Nasser, Hussein also removed the English General Glabb Pasha from the post of commander of the Arab Legion. They already saw Nasser as a very serious threat. At the behest of Prime Minister Anthony Eden, British intelligence agencies developed a plan to physically eliminate Nasser - this was supposed to be the third operation of the West (after Iran and Guatemala) to "overthrow the regime"1. And in Washington, many, though not all, would not object to the removal of Nasser. The French, especially hostile to Nasser because of his support for the Algerian revolution, strongly suggested that the British use military force.

In 1956, the Suez crisis occurred, during which there was an uncharacteristic Cold War disengagement. Britain and France, wanting to regain control of the Suez Canal, nationalized by Nasser, in alliance with Israel, which pursued its own goals, made an armed invasion of Egypt, the USSR strongly opposed it, and the United States took a position that was closer to the Soviet than to the British. The fact that the Americans did not want to engage in direct military action in the region was another indication of their plans to attract new nationalist leaders to their side, whom they saw as potential allies in neutralizing the threat of communism. As a result of the failed aggression, the British seriously damaged their relations with the Arabs and pushed Nasser to further rapprochement with Moscow.

At first, both Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and especially Foreign Minister Moshe Sharet were quite positive about the 1952 Egyptian revolution (note, by the way, that in the USSR, which at that time was oriented exclusively towards Arab communists, it was then, on the contrary, hostile 2). Perhaps this was partly due to the fact that both Egypt and Israel were now liberated from British tutelage. Sharet believed that Arab radicalism was a movement aimed at improving the socio-economic situation in the region, which, according to I. Pappe, "in the long run, will be able to recognize the positive role of Israel in this territory if the Jewish state compromises on the issues of territory and refugees" (Rarreh, 2002, p. 251).

1 British intelligence considered it a great success to recruit the deputy chief of intelligence of the Egyptian Air Force Khalil, relying on him in planning the operation, and only in 1957 it turned out that he was acting on the instructions of Nasser.

2 Here is a very characteristic assessment of that time: "The second half of 1952 was marked by a rampant reaction, which intensified with the coming to power of the military dictator, a protege of overseas aggressors Naguib Pasha" [Vatolina, 1952, p.22].

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It is known that in mid-May 1953, Nasser sent a letter to the press attache of the Egyptian Embassy in Paris, Abdel Rahman Sadeq, who had been conducting secret negotiations with his counterpart from the Israeli Embassy for the previous two years, informing him of his intention to conclude an agreement with the Jewish state [ibid.In this letter, intended for transmission to the Israeli leadership, he said that he only needed time to prepare for peace talks, and asked the Israeli leaders to influence the American leadership to support Egypt's demand for the complete withdrawal of British troops from the country [Divon (Paris) to Shiloah, 12.05.1953].

TURNING ARAB NATIONALISM INTO A THREAT

Unfortunately, by this time Ben-Gurion had formed a different, negative attitude towards Arab national radicalism, which he regarded as a kind of"anti-Israel and anti-Western Arab analogue of communism." After becoming Prime minister (for only two years) in December 1953, Sharet entered into serious negotiations with Nasser, while Ben-Gurion, at the head of an "alternative government," called for increased Israeli action against improving Egyptian-American relations. The talks were disrupted by an Israeli military strike on an Egyptian base located in Gaza. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration was then rightly viewed in Tel Aviv as hostile to Israel.3 It is no coincidence that Ben-Gurion rejected the first joint US-British peace plan ("Plan Alpha"). By the way, Israel's military plans were persistently called "defensive", and even the Israeli army, as is known, retained the euphemistic name of the "defense" army, especially inadequate after the triple adventure of 1956. The "Eisenhower doctrine" proclaimed on January 5, 1957, actually predetermined the possibility of using American military force in the name of ideological and political goals.4 At first, it did not apply to Israel. But what changed the situation was that a component of the coming crisis of 1958 on the Israeli side was the demonization of Syria, in which Ba'athism was becoming an increasingly visible force. This is partly why, in the summer of 1957, the US policy became more "pro-Israel", which also came to the conclusion that Damascus was dangerously turning towards Moscow. In August 1957, the CIA made an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Syrian government, and Ben-Gurion issued a statement in support of the United States [Pappe, 2002, p. 259].

The creation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 was the first experience of implementing Nasser's nationalist doctrine of Arab unity, which sharply increased the fears of the leaders of Western powers and Israel. But the real opportunity to test the Eisenhower doctrine in practice was provided by events in two other States in the region: the civil war that broke out in Lebanon and the acute political crisis in Jordan, where left-wing, revolutionary (including Marxist) ideas became widespread among the Palestinian population. These turbulent events gave the West reason to fear that either leftist, pro-communist forces or pro-Russian groups would come to power in these states.-

3 The prevailing view in the Russian literature that the US administration has always supported Israel without blemish is historically untenable. For all their sympathies for Israel, there was a time when American strategists even developed a plan for military action against Israel if it went to uncoordinated actions that could disrupt the existing balance of forces and interests in the region.

4 In addition to economic and military assistance, the doctrine referred to the use of armed forces "to assist any nation or group of such nations that has requested assistance against armed aggression by any country under the control of international communism". Note that the only enemy here is "international communism."

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Muslim or other Arab nationalists (Ba'athists, supporters of the Arab Nationalist Movement).

During the negotiations during his visit to the USSR in May 1958, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, as Soviet leaders noted, avoided harsh language towards the United States, and they got the impression that he was "looking for ways to normalize." Nasser said that in Jordan, "the government does not enjoy any authority" and "it is possible that the patience of the people will run out, they will rise up, overthrow the government created by the Americans, and ask for help from the UAR" (!)5. At the same time, the Lebanese government, led by pro-Western leader Kamil Shamoun, complained to the UN Security Council on May 22 about the UAR, accusing it of interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs, and the Lebanese Foreign Minister complained to the Soviet ambassador about the infiltration of Syrian "armed gangs" into Lebanese territory.6 In response, Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko suggested that the Central Committee of the CPSU approve his idea to invite Nasser, in turn, to appeal to the Security Council with a complaint about the interference of Western powers in the internal affairs of Lebanon. And in June, the USSR Foreign Ministry, in a secret reference on Lebanon, already concluded that " the action of opposition political parties and groups, as well as the masses against the Lebanese government in early May 1958, resulted in an armed uprising."7
But, as CIA resident Miles Copeland and Ambassador Raymond Hare, who maintained a constant channel of communication with Nasser, reported to Washington, the Egyptian leader was not at all an absolute ally of the leaders of the Lebanese opposition, but preferred to work with the conservative "third force". Moreover, Nasser told Copeland about his desire to act in Lebanon together with the United States and even conveyed his proposals for resolving the situation [Gendzier, 1958, p. 124]. However, attempts by Copeland and his Lebanese colleagues to persuade President Chamoun to meet with opposition leaders failed. However, Secretary of State John F. Kennedy Dulles was opposed to working with Nasser in the Lebanon crisis. Already on May 13, he instructed Shamun exactly how to apply to the United States with a request for armed intervention. As a result, twenty thousand American Marines landed in Beirut, and six thousand British paratroopers landed in Jordan on July 15, just one day after the new event that shook the entire Middle East - the anti - monarchist revolution in Iraq. This double intervention was unrelated to the events in Iraq, but it provided Washington and London with what they considered an "unexpected legitimation" (Gendzier, 1958, p.126).

THE IRAQ CRISIS

At the time, US Vice President Richard Nixon was in favor of an immediate American military invasion of Iraq, and he even demanded the replacement of those American ambassadors who opposed this idea. For his part, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who did not approve of such a plan, reminded Nixon of the inglorious outcome of the Suez adventure for the British. Although Eisenhower did not share Churchill's panicked sentiments, which foreshadowed that the entire Middle East, if the West did not take decisive action, could soon be under Soviet control.-

5 Telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Ambassadors of the USSR in China, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Korea, North Vietnam on May 24, 1958 (WUA RF, f. 059, op. 40, p. 93, d. 456, l. 116-122) [Middle East conflict..., 2003, p. 200-201].

6 Telegram of the USSR Ambassador to Lebanon SP. Kikteva in the MFA of the USSR [Middle East conflict..., 2003, p. 198].

7 Reference of the Middle East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the situation in Lebanon [Middle East conflict..., 2003, p. 206].

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However, he also feared a revolutionary "domino effect" similar to that experienced in Southeast Asia. Now, two years after Suez, the United States and Britain were once again working together and discussing plans for a possible joint intervention. However, unlike British Prime Minister Macmillan, Eisenhower did not show any determination to resort to military force here, especially since his doctrine did not necessarily imply that the United States would use troops to overthrow communist or leftist regimes. The United States generally preferred covert intelligence operations to open military intervention. In addition, they did not want to lose the moral capital they had acquired in the Arab world after Suez, and Secretary of State Dulles spoke openly about the need to distance themselves from European colonialism.

Qasem, who had struck at the very center of the anti-Soviet bloc system in the Middle East and had established good relations with local communists, was a good candidate for Moscow's new allies. The international crisis over Iraq in 1958 was much more serious than was generally accepted not so long ago. The Soviet Union issued sharply threatening warnings about Anglo-American intervention in Iraq. Decisions in the Soviet leadership were not easy to make: the idea that at that time the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was unanimous in discussing foreign policy issues was solely due to the secrecy of the materials of its meetings.

Repeating the concerns of the military, which were expressed back in 1957, then Defense Minister Marshal Voroshilov stated at meetings that he did not like the way the Soviet government's policy in the Middle East was being implemented, and said that the frequent repetition of threats against the West devalued them (two statements of the Soviet government were meant)8. He believed that active support for progressive regimes in the Middle East could have disastrous consequences for the Soviet Union, provoking a war with the United States. Other members of the Politburo also did not want war, but believed that the best way to avoid it was to constantly threaten the United States. This view was supported by Khrushchev. Mikoyan believed that the United States is still considering whether to intervene in Iraq, and their decision depends on whether the USSR will fight in defense of this country in this case. Voroshilov argued that the West has already decided to intervene, so there is no need to take risks, so as not to be obliged to enter into an open military clash with the United States. It can be concluded that the possibility of a clash of great powers over Iraq was then quite possible. It was the fear of a possible Anglo-American military intervention that was at the heart of Khrushchev's address to the leaders of the six states at the Geneva conference on July 22. It was decided to provide military assistance to Iraq, and the delivery of weapons and military equipment was carried out with the help of Egypt. At the same time, the Soviet leadership reacted calmly to the dispatch of American and British troops to Lebanon and Jordan, respectively.

After the withdrawal of the question of intervention, there was no agreement between the Western Powers on the issue of recognition of Iraq. Britain considered it necessary to immediately recognize Iraq so as not to push it into the arms of the USSR, while the United States did not want to rush, so as not to offend the leaders of Iran and Turkey. Nevertheless, the United States also agreed to recognize the new regime. But the Soviet-Iraqi rapprochement was already active, and under pressure from Moscow, Qasem agreed to cooperate with the Communists. Recognition of an Ira-

8 Based on new archival materials studied by A. A. Fursenko and T. Naftali [see: Fursenko and Naftali, 2006].

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When Khrushchev was regarded by the West as a political victory for the USSR, the Soviet leader began to act much more decisively in the international arena (which was manifested, in particular, during the Cuban crisis). It was concluded that the West wanted to overthrow the Iraqi regime by force, but retreated under Soviet pressure, and that powerful political pressure is the only language understood by the USSR's Western rivals. Thus, Iraq played an important role in the Cold War.

Paradoxically ,the" double Anglo-Saxon intervention " contributed to some improvement in relations between Nasser and the American administration. According to Diane Kunz, by quickly sending troops with a limited mission (American and British troops, having completed their tasks, soon left Lebanon and Jordan), the US administration proved that it "has the ability and will to intervene in the Middle East, but has no intention of overthrowing Nasser" (Kunz, 1958, p.99). The Egyptian leader once again had the opportunity to use the" fixation " of the Americans on the fight against communism to his advantage. When, in December 1958, Nasser again began to arrest Communists accused of "betraying the Arab cause," the United States resumed selling him high-grade wheat.

Israel also applauded the vigorous actions of the United States, but at the same time it further strengthened its distrust of international institutions, which were considered, on the one hand, as ineffective, on the other - as being under the predominant influence of enemies of the Jewish state. Ben-Gurion's grumpy sentence "um-shmum" (UM is the Hebrew abbreviation for "United Nations") became widely known.

The intervention brought the United States closer to Israel, which allowed British aircraft to fly over its territory only after persistent requests from the Americans. In return, Eisenhower and Dulles gave Ben-Gurion guarantees that the Eisenhower doctrine would apply to him (Kunz, 1958, pp. 98-99). As a result of the Anglo-American intervention, it was possible to calm Lebanon and keep King Hussein in power. This was the logic of the cold War, when one side saw behind any actions that did not suit it the machinations of the other side, and the latter, in turn, always feared that the first side was hiding under her bed. Unfortunately, this inertial logic-only with a change in addressees-was also visible in the new post-bipolar era, half a century later. However, as suggested by D. As a result of the events of 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles no longer saw the "hand of Moscow" behind everything that was happening in the region and came to the conclusion that the spread of "international communism" was hardly the greatest threat to the Middle East [Kunz, 1958, p. 100]9.

2009-LESSONS NOT LEARNED AND NEW ENEMIES

Many of the lessons of the events of 1958 have not been learned by the actors of the events of 2008. The components of this year's crisis, of course, were the tension in occupied Iraq, the escalation of the situation around Iran's nuclear program, the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian process, the active offensive of Islamists threatening to overturn the usual state-political order in the region.

To the extent that half a century ago the West and especially the United States (at that time a less "Middle Eastern power" than it is now, with its occupation forces and military bases in the region) were fixated on countering " international terrorism-

9 Dulles now considered: "It is impossible for any state to acquire the status of a Soviet satellite if it is not geographically connected with the USSR or is not under threat of occupation by neighboring states" [Memorial of Conversation, 10/8/1958].

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Now they are focusing on a new enemy - Islamism. Political Islam in the Middle East has indeed entered the niche previously occupied by local communist parties and secular Arab nationalists. The exception was the Shiite religious parties of Iraq, which paradoxically relied on the occupation authorities, but the alliance with which was very fragile. This was shown by the events of 2008, when the United States failed to push through the drafts of two long-term agreements - on the status of troops and on the"strategic framework". The bloc of forces opposed to these agreements included Sadrists (supporters of Imam Muqtada Sadr, who opposes the occupation forces), Shiites from the Fadeel party, some members of the Da'awa Party, the Sunni National Dialogue Front, and the secular list led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. This put the government of Nouri Maliki in a situation where accepting the American project would mean condemning itself to defeat in the fall 2008 elections. However, rumors spread more and more persistently in the country that American political engineers were somehow preparing to replace Maliki. Time will tell if these rumors were true.

Faced with widespread rejection of the idea of a long-term security arrangement with the Americans, Maliki's weak government stopped talking about it and also started talking about a withdrawal schedule and just a short-term pact. Part of the American establishment is noticeably concerned about this. But there were other points of view. American analysts D. Levy and M. V. Khanna, for example, in this regard expressed the not entirely trivial idea that the creation of a broad political coalition in Iraq on a nationalist basis "can protect long-term American interests in Iraq, which are focused on the formation of a stable political culture, preserving the country's territorial integrity and deterring excessive Iranian interference." in the internal affairs of Iraq, all this will ensure the US withdrawal" (Levy and Hanna, 2008).

In Palestine, after the Fatah-Hamas split, the strategy of the West and Israel was essentially to strangle Gaza, which, as its authors hoped, would lead to discrediting Hamas against the background of the growing popularity of the moderate leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, who received powerful support. But it was not surprising that Hamas not only did not lose, but also increased the number of its supporters, including in the West Bank. Why? Yes, because the energetic government of Abbas-Fayyad, having actually curbed the post-intifada chaos, managed to establish order in the autonomous region and fulfilled all its obligations, received nothing in return from Israel. But there is nothing worse than failed expectations! The policies of the poorly functioning Israeli state machine contributed to the reversal of Palestinian public opinion in the direction of Hamas. Even such simple promises as the reopening of Palestinian public and charitable institutions in Jerusalem that were closed by Sharon (including those that were very far from politics) remained unfulfilled. This has meant that the Hamas movement, as it knows how to do by effectively using mosques, has been filling the vacuum in Jerusalem over the past two years, helping to solve social issues, providing educational and medical services to the population, and in fact turning into a center of real power [ibid.].

Some analysts were more optimistic than others about the situation in the West Bank. In particular, the report of the International Crisis Group highlighted the achievements of the Fayyad Government in providing security in Jenin and Nablus, but the "Jenin model" was not extended to the entire West Bank. And on the Israeli side, " there remained great skepticism about poten-

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The Palestinian Authority's commitment to security, and the belief that only the Israel Defense Forces can maintain stability, remained strong, especially among the military" [Ruling Palestine II..., 2008, p. 31].

MEDIATION SERVICES: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

The Egyptian-brokered cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas, reached in early July 2008, continued to operate, but was threatened by renewed clashes in Gaza between Fatah and Hamas supporters (the reconciliation between the two organizations, reached in 2007 in Mecca with the mediation of Saudi Arabia, failed). As a result of the clashes, some Fatah figures in Gaza fled to Israel (!) to move to the West Bank. These events were commented on in Israel with malice, only some, the most prescient analysts understood that the only alternative to Fatah and Hamas would be some terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda. As the authors of the report mentioned above rightly wrote, without reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, without the reintegration of the West Bank and Gaza, any Palestinian success in the peace process will remain a pyrrhic victory [Ruling Palestine II..., 2008, p. 32].

The ongoing unresolved Palestinian-Israeli core of the Arab-Israeli conflict has become particularly intolerable now that the creation of a Palestinian State is an imperative for the entire international community, not excluding Israel itself.

If the crisis year of 1958 boomerangedthe "triple aggression" of two years ago against Egypt, then 2008 also reaped the fruits of the two-year-old war in Lebanon. It should be noted that the attitude to the 2006 war on both sides is rather ambiguous. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah himself said that if his organization had anticipated such a harsh response from Israel, it would not have raided Israeli territory. And the reputation of the ruling coalition in Israel has fallen so low that the Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff had to resign. The price for the failed return of the two stolen soldiers was too high. In the crisis of 2008, the return took place. But only the corpses of E. Goldwasser and E. Regev returned as a result of an exchange with Hezbollah for the militants of this organization convicted in Israel as terrorists. Not surprisingly, Israeli public opinion was ambivalent about the release of Samir Kantar, who was responsible for the murder of three Israelis (including a child), along with four other convicts. According to Hezbollah, the raid that led to the capture of two Israeli soldiers and prompted Israel to launch military operations was intended to use them as hostages for Kantar's return (Israel was supposed to release him under a deal signed in 2003, but suspended his release until he was released). Data will be provided on the fate of the pilot of the plane that crashed in Lebanon - R. Arad). For some reason, in 2006, the Kadima government did not continue the tradition of prisoner exchanges sanctioned in 2003 by the much tougher Likud government led by Ariel Sharon, which included Benjamin Netanyahu.

LOW CHANCES OF SUCCESS

This deal raised as many ethical and political questions as the 2006 war itself. However, after the Israeli cabinet voted in favor of the deal by 22 votes to 3, the way was opened for an exchange with Hamas in order to get Corporal Gilad Shalit alive and unharmed. An even higher price was requested here. According to press reports, Hamas leaders presented the spi to the Israelis-

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sok of 450 prisoners and demanded that they choose to add 550 more to them (in total, there were at least 9 thousand Palestinians in Israeli prisons, including 700 detainees awaiting trial). Israeli politicians were particularly concerned that the list, oddly enough, included the most popular Fatah leader, Marwan Barghouti. On the one hand, Barghouti is an absolute supporter of the peace process, and his return should not have helped strengthen the position of Hamas in the West Bank. On the other hand, it was Hamas that proved to be the force that would be credited with freeing this charismatic leader on a national scale. Those Israeli politicians and military officials who have long considered it necessary for the Israeli authorities themselves to free Barghouti (like former Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer) were right. Now that chance was gone.

Analyzing the Lebanese reaction to the exchange with Hezbollah, Levy noted that, despite the apparent celebration of Hezbollah organizing celebrations on the occasion of Kantar's return, "many Lebanese look at the images of Kantar and wonder if this guy is worth all that they had to go through in 2006" [Levy, 2008(1)]. At the same time, as a result of a deal brokered by Qatar between the opposing Lebanese camps that stopped the country's slide into a new civil war, Hezbollah not only won seats in the government, but also the de facto right to veto its decisions, which it interpreted as a victory. It is clear that this did not put an end to the sharp disagreements between the various political forces of the country. It is significant that not only Arab governments and agencies (such as the Egyptian intelligence service headed by Omar Suleiman) played a role in the new "point mediation", but also other Middle Eastern forces. So, by the end of the summer, Turkey had already held five rounds of indirect negotiations between the Israeli and Syrian delegations. And Damascus and Beirut in Paris finally decided to exchange ambassadors.

By the end of the summer of 2008, the Israeli-Syrian negotiations remained indirect (as were the negotiations between Israel and Hamas for the release of Shalit), although they were rumored to have achieved considerable success. Bashar al-Assad's problem appears to have been that he found it difficult to deviate from the five principles laid out in his late father, President Hafez al-Assad's plan to settle relations with Israel. That plan was put forward in response to the plan of the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, presented in 1992 and also containing five points (it was transmitted by US Secretary of State W. Bush). By Christopher). According to Syrian analysts, Assad also could not have received less than what the Egyptians received under the Camp David Treaty. One of the key issues of the negotiations was the problem of the water resources of Lake Tiberias, which Israel claimed to have a monopoly on.

Various opinions have been expressed about Syria's foreign policy orientation among its politicians and analysts, which often found comparisons with the events of half a century ago discussed above. Marah al-Buga'i, in particular, wrote: "Syrians paid dearly for their involvement in the Arab nationalist project of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and today they are once again forced to pay dearly for 'state' involvement in the Iranian project " [Al-Buqa'i, 2008]. And then: "Breaking the links of the strategic Syrian-Iranian alliance is necessary not only for Syrian foreign policy and in order to resolve the problem of the Golan Heights, it is an urgent national task, which must be solved in order to stop the Iranian project's offensive in the region and strengthen the positions of its henchmen, such as Hezbollah fighting in Lebanon and the divisive Hamas movement in Gaza" [ibid.].

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NEW PLANS

Nevertheless, the strengthening of Hamas ' position continued. A significant surprise was the late summer U-turn towards the Hamas movement in Jordan, which had previously refused to contact this organization. Jordanian analyst Urayb al-Rantawi offered two explanations for this reversal - optimistic and pessimistic. According to the optimistic view, a Palestinian-Israeli deal is about to take place, so Jordan's co-ordination with other moderate Arab regimes to turn Hamas into an ally is needed to deter Islamists from reacting strongly to the deal. The pessimistic explanation comes from the fact that the peace talks will not end in anything again, so the orientation towards a moderate Palestinian ally is hopeless (especially given the increased position of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country). [Ar-Rantawi, 2008]. The latter scenario was quite consistent with the gloomy forebodings of some representatives of the Palestinian Authority, who believed that "turning the West Bank into Gaza" was only a matter of time, and the nearest one at that.

The feeling that something profoundly tragic was about to happen again was already present in many Palestinians, a feeling that is often a sign of a worsening crisis. This was based on the critical lack of progress in the peace process and the continued construction of Israeli settlements (instead of removing illegal roadblocks and freezing settlement activity that Olmert had promised President Bush). Israeli analyst Gershon Baskin wrote: "There is a gap between the infrastructure of 250,000 settlers in the West Bank (not counting East Jerusalem) and 2.5 million Palestinians living there. Expanding Jewish settlements occupy the hilltops of the West Bank with modern "Jewish-only" roads leading to the settlements, while the Palestinians control only 40% of the territory, not even being able to develop it without prior approval from the Israeli authorities, which they almost never give "(Baskin, 2008(1)].

On July 13, 2008, the Haaretz newspaper leaked information about Prime Minister Olmert's offer to negotiate with the Palestinians, which was apparently planned by the Government. As in the 1950s, Israel was concerned with two issues: territories and refugees. According to the newspaper, Israel offered to transfer 93% of the West Bank territory to the Palestinians. In addition, the exchange of an additional 5.5% of the territory was to increase this figure to 98.5% of the 22% of all land between the sea and the Jordan bank to which Palestinian rights are recognized. A corridor should be created between the West Bank, which will be under Israeli control, but through which the Palestinians will have the right of free passage (without Israeli posts). The main part of the land for exchange lay in the Negev, and the exchange slightly increased the area of Gaza. On the issue of refugees, the "right of return"was waived. Refugees can only return to the State of Palestine, except in special cases where individual refugees will have the right to return to Israel for family reunification. The plan's complex and detailed formula for solving the refugee problem resembles, according to Baskin, the provisions proposed earlier by US President Clinton and drawn from the discussions on Taba refugees held in early 2001 [Baskin, 2008 (2)].

However, the mentioned Olmert plan (if it really existed in this form) caused considerable disappointment. It didn't even mention the issue of Jerusalem. It is not clear how the Israeli authorities could eliminate one hundred settlements with 800 thousand settlers. The plan did not say anything about how and on what time schedule it could be implemented. Remained unclear and

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the fate of Gaza, the status of its coastal waters and port. This did not end the number of unclear points in the plan, which, if supported by all parties, could still serve as a starting point for the start of a serious negotiation process.

THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE IRANIAN CRISIS

Signs of the 2008 crisis were the regrouping of forces and major changes in the activities of international terrorist groups. Let's name the main ones. First, this is what can be called "fewer attacks, more victims", in other words, there are fewer acts of terror, but their effectiveness is higher and the damage they cause is greater. Secondly, it is a more active and skilful use of cyberspace for recruiting, indoctrinating and training extremists. Third, it is a sharply increased percentage of terrorist attacks for which no one claims responsibility (unclaimed acts of terrorism). According to Raphael Perl, an influential American expert on terrorism and head of the OSCE Department of Action against Terrorism, this showed that terrorists began to seek less publicity and more and more set the task of achieving maximum damage to the enemy [in a speech at a conference at the Moscow State University named after M. V. Lomonosov (Moscow, 19.08.2008)]. Fourthly, it is the transformation of Al-Qaeda from an organizing force to an inspiring, ideational force, as a result of which, among Western experts on terrorism, it has become more common to talk about "Al-Qaeda-inspired groups "(Al-Qaeda-inspired groups). As a matter of fact, since the terrorist attack on the island of Bali, a new trend has emerged in the world - the commission of such actions by well-trained and equipped militants, who, nevertheless, did not (as the investigation showed) have any, even indirect connections with Al-Qaeda or other international network structures. Despite the fact that the percentage of terrorist attacks committed by "Islamist" groups in Europe continued to decline (in 2007 it was only 15% in the European Union [ibid.]), the suppression of the activities of such groups, the fight against radicalization of the population, the recruitment of supporters and their training remained in the focus of attention of European powers.

Although the "crusade" component in the American Global War on Terror was somewhat muted, it remained in 2008, continuing to be one of the main tools of anti-American mobilization in the Muslim world, along with the occupation of Iraq and the unresolved Palestinian problem. The" crusade "anti-Islamist strategy of 2008, which had the appropriate information frame, could be quite comparable with the equally "crusade" anti-communist strategy (and the corresponding rhetoric) of 1958, and the crisis around Iran very much resembled the political events of half a century ago in this region.

In the American foreign policy discourse, Iran has clearly taken the former place of the Soviet Union as the main threat to US policy, and not only in the Middle East region. The crisis over Iran's nuclear program has worsened due to continued tough pressure from Washington, Tehran's determination not to retreat from the uranium enrichment program, the lack of agreement between the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the growing tension between the two countries. Iran and Israel.

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THE LINK BETWEEN EVENTS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS

Dr. Eran Lerman, director of the Israel-Middle East Office of the American Jewish Committee, wrote on August 13, 2008: "A strange, thin thread connects several major news events in Israel: the terrible impact of the war between Russia and Georgia, the internal debate about the situation in Lebanon, the stalled indirect negotiations with Hamas for the release of Gilad Shalit, and the increasingly acute situation in Israel. the struggle for leadership in Kadima" [Lerman, 2008, p. 1]. It is interesting that in this briefing, the author, referring to the current disputes between supporters of multilateral and unilateral actions, draws an analogy with the dispute we mentioned above in the 1950s between Ben-Gurion and M. Sharet. It is well known that Israel ultimately decided to act alone. This issue has once again become relevant in connection with the crisis around Iran. Old soldier Ariel Sharon and his successor Olmert, oddly enough, chose the method of international action and UN sanctions as tools to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in Iran, but if these measures do not work, Lerman believes, "there will be a verdict on multilateralism with far-reaching consequences not only for Israel's behavior and strategy towards Iran, but also for the development of its nuclear program." and for its policy in general" [Lerman, 2008, p. 2-3].

But the analyst's cautious hints faded against the backdrop of bellicose threats from Israeli officials (for example, Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz) against Iran. Was this a direct reference to Israel's willingness to use military force against Iran alone? Could Israel have done this against the advice of American politicians and the military? How could such a reckless option have pushed aside the normal deterrence option for such situations? Or was it just part of an information attack designed to encourage Iran to make concessions or force the UN Security Council to tighten sanctions against Tehran? In any case, Israel's short-sighted and irresponsible bellicose rhetoric was only able to reinforce the "encirclement syndrome" of the Iranians, who were surrounded by American troops on three sides (Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf). American experts expressed the opinion that after an Israeli military strike, Tehran could easily resume its uranium enrichment program. It is also clear that, having been subjected to such a strike, Iran is unlikely not to think about nuclear deterrence.

Only Shimon Peres ' hints that Israel might support the idea of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East if peace, mutual recognition and security guarantees were established in the region inspired optimism [Levy, 2008(2)]. Hopes for a peaceful resolution of the crisis around Iran were also linked to the prospects of direct US-Israeli relations.Iran talks in Geneva and the opening of the American Interests section at one of the embassies in Tehran. At the same time, the worsening of US-Russian relations after the events in South Ossetia cast doubt on the prospects for achieving a consolidated position on the Iranian issue in the Security Council.

The connection between the events in South Ossetia and Middle Eastern politics was covered in many aspects. These were the consequences of Israeli military supplies to Georgia, and Russia's increased use of the Syrian port of Tartus for the needs of its fleet, and fundamental changes in world politics itself, including relations between leading global actors, and the unconditional support that Russia received in a significant part of the Islamic world, and the failure of US plans to use Georgia as one of the from bridgeheads to contain Iran, and possibly to launch a military strike against it. Some foreign analysts even ventured to suggest that the coincidence of success in Russia's completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant with the events in the Caucasus was not accidental. Anyway, it became

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It is clear that Russia, in projecting its foreign policy interests, will now take much less into account the opinions of its Western partners (let alone listen to their advice) and, if necessary, act alone.

But most importantly, by the end of the summer, the general crisis of all existing international and multilateral institutions, which have long been undermined by the unilateral actions of the United States and some of its allies, was clearly highlighted in the world. The UN, NATO, OSCE, European collective structures, GUAM, the CIS, the CSTO, and the SCO were all affected by this crisis, although to a far different degree. The events of 2008 confidently put it among the most critical years in modern history.

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